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UNITED NATIONS ADMISSION
OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

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INTRODUCTION

The Far East is playing a significant role in the international political scene of today's world. The most prominent actors in this area, quite obviously, are the Soviet Union and Communist China, but the surrounding countries of interest to these two giants must play some part in maintaining their positions. Therefore, it is my wish to investigate the importance of one of these centers of political ferment, the Mongolian People's Republic, in relation to Soviet Russia, Communist China, the United States, and United Nations participation. Mongolian associations with the Republic of China and Nationalist China also will be pursued as will Japan during the World War II years.

Each of the above mentioned countries made some contribution to the status that Outer Mongolia holds today, that of an independent United Nations member. Due to the position the Mongolian People's Republic holds geographically and, thus, politically, each country also has shown concern about the ties that Mongolia has attempted to establish. It is these inter-related interests that has brought such a sparsely populated and heretofore little mentioned country into international focus.

Outer Mongolia asked for admission into the United Nations at the end of World War II. She had participated in that war, having aided Soviet Russia in the Manchurian area against Japan. Lack of information about the country at that time caused the Security Council to refuse admission until adequate knowledge concerning Mongolia's internal stability could be ascertained. It took fifteen years--until 1961--for a favorable decision to be reached. That which affected this affirmative vote was a combination of many factors. Those concerning the internal growth of Outer Mongolia and her foreign relations were of basic importance. But, it will also be seen that United States-Nationalist Chinese inter-relations and the growing influence of the Third World States were never lost sight of, especially during the 1950's. Hopefully, this study will shed light on the significance of each of these factors in the overall issue of Outer Mongolia's admission to the United Nations.

It was Tsarist Russia and then Soviet Russia who first wished to gain the friendship of nomad Mongolia. The whys and wherefores had to do with the foreign policy of Russia herself. Actual acceleration of modernization in Mongolia was not commenced until Communist China entered the picture. By the early 1950's China began to realize the potential of this vast territory bordering both giant Asiatic powers. They, therefore, began to pour aid into the country only to find that Russia was determined to hold the reins she had long since assumed. Russia's assistance and the results it produced are covered in the second chapter of the present study. China's attempts to contest the apparent control of her northern neighbor over a once owned

territory are pursued in the third chapter. The beginnings of the Sino-Soviet rift are explored here also, seen from the viewpoint of Mongolia's part in the conflict. It is the significance of the Sino-Soviet problem that has made the western world cognizant of the need to know more about the role of Outer Mongolia as a country bordering China and Russia. Since the United States is the super power in the West her pre-conditioning and concerns regarding Mongolia have been included as Chapter four of this study. America's diplomatic recognition of Outer Mongolia is still left open. The reason for this is related to United States attitude toward diplomatic recognition of Communist China as well as acceptance of Peking's representation in the United Nations. The United States' alliance with Chiang Kai-shek has long kept this issue a prominent one. Acceptance of Communist China would most certainly cause a dilemma to which Washington has not yet been able to find a solution.

The interests and reservations of all concerned countries were exhibited in the controversy over admission of the Mongolian People's Republic in the United Nations. These conflicts and the resulting decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly appear in the last chapter. I have tried to show the efforts of member nations as well as Outer Mongolia herself in deterring or advancing admission. This has brought into view qualifications stipulated in the United Nations Charter, the tactics of the "package deal," i.e., linking two politically and geographically separate problems into one issue, and the impact of Afro-Asian membership in the General Assembly. All surround the final admission of Outer Mongolia in the

United Nations.

Outer Mongolia's position as a Soviet satellite can not be refuted as a result of this study. Her importance in the international arena, however, has been accelerated because of the type of satellite she is. This study will attempt to show that Mongolia is not a wholly Soviet dominated country but a country which has earned her independence and practices it in a unique way. She is dependent on Russia for the aid given to put her economically and politically on her feet. But Mongolia does not appear to be intimidated by Russia nor does Russia appear to be in control of Mongolia. Russia is satisfied that she has a friend in the position held by Mongolia; Mongolia is pleased that she has gained membership in the United Nations and has economically bettered herself in many ways. The West appears contented that Mongolia's independence places her in a better situation in relation to both Russia and China.

CHAPTER I

OUTER MONGOLIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

With the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations in 1961 new interests were stirred regarding the international relations involvements of this country as a factor leading to the decision allowing membership. Outer Mongolia, a theretofore little mentioned country, made her first request for recognition in 1946¹ but was refused then and for the fifteen years that followed because many nations knew too little about the country or its government. Several factors contributed to this lack of knowledge. They included uncertainty regarding: a) the actual relationship among Mongolia and her two demanding neighbors, Russia and China, and how such relations had evolved; b) the effect that the Japanese intrusion during the Second World War years had upon the international position of Mongolia; c) the connection between Outer Mongolia; c) the connection between Outer Mongolia and the other

¹Telegram from Choibalsan, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Secretary General of the United Nations, S/95, (June 24, 1946).

Mongols in the surrounding areas, and the political effects of these relationships upon Outer Mongolia. These facts needed to be ascertained and studied before a decision could be made at the United Nations. What prompted the final decision for membership in 1961 seems of interest particularly at the present time when we are witnessing heated dispute between Soviet Russia and Communist China. It will be the author's attempt, therefore, to help clarify some of the issues involved and the positions of the different countries concerned.

Three countries had definite political relations with Mongolia in the years preceeding the second half of the twentieth century. These were Tsarist and Soviet Russia, China and Japan. These relations serve as a proper background for the concern shown in the international arena at the time Outer Mongolia requested admission to the United Nations.

A. CHINESE-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Sino-Russian relations with Mongolia prior to 1911 were based primarily on the desire for security felt by each of these countries. The Tsarist policy was to maintain Mongolia as a buffer, in the most old-fashioned sense of the word. Manchu China desired a protectorate over the area principally for the same reason. Outer Mongolia knew that her position demanded friendship with one or the other of these neighbors if her security was to be realized, and as events turned out, by 1921, it was toward Soviet Russia that her allegiance was given.

Relations with China, Western countries, or Japan as "alternatives" to Russia, in any scale suggesting supersession of Russia in importance, would be thought of only by scattered individuals, usually for reasons of personal ambition. For all others, the problem has always been not whether to make Russia the most important country in foreign relations, but how to deal with the fact that Russia is the most important country in foreign relations.²

Undoubtedly, this decision was determined by the difference in attitudes of the two countries toward Mongolia. China's protectorate allowed for an increase in the number of principalities and the placing at their head minor princes who received their titles from the Emperor. "By this means, Peking was able to weaken the power of the Khan [Prince-leader] and Khutukhtu [Living Buddha-Lama Religious Leader] and to foster support for itself among the Mongol aristocracy."³ Peking became the protector also of Lamaism and decreed that at least one son from each family must be a lama. Such a policy was geared to keep the people inactive in a land of inaction.

Prior to the Chinese Revolution, however, Tsarist Russia had no alternative but to adhere to the demands of Peking if she was to avoid a clash with China. The Treaty of Kiakhta, signed in 1727, had determined the status quo of Mongolia between the two countries. It

defined the border between Russia and China in the area of Mongolia as running from the Sayan Mountains and Sapintabakha on the west to the Argun River in the east. It left the boundary in the Uda River Valley undefined....Russian trade caravans were to be permitted to visit Peking once every three years, but Russian traders were prohibited from being active in Mongolia. Instead, border trade was to be concentrated at

²Gerard M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and Its International Position (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949), p. xix.

³Michel N. Pavlovsky, Chinese-Russian Relations (New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1949), p. 20.

the towns of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, and was to be under the joint control of authorities representing both countries.... Russia also received the right to send language students to China and to establish a diplomatic and ecclesiastical mission in Peking.⁴

Nevertheless, Tsarist Russia could not prevent the Mongols from making attempts to obtain her friendship. The Khutukhtu personally tried⁵ and at the time of the Ch'ing-kun-tsa-pu rebellion in 1756⁶ stronger attempts were made. The Mongols offered to become Russian subjects and accept the status of a protectorate.⁷ Russia hesitated too long due to possible implications and as a result the Emperor Ch'ien-lung suppressed the revolt and became reconciled with the princes. China became more arrogant and Russia, despite her Seven Years' War victory,⁸ used great self control to prevent a war.⁹ The Russian public, with the backing of the historian, Muller, were not so willing to accept Chinese arrogance. But the warnings of Vladislavich, Russian ambassador to China under Catherine II, saw to this.¹⁰

For nearly two centuries afterwards China attempted to create a vacuum in the border areas because her main interest there was

⁴Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p. 41

⁵Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 32.

⁶Ibid., pp. 32-34.

⁷Ibid., p. 34.

⁸in 1760, when Russian troops had beaten those of Frederick the Great.

⁹Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 38.

security in the form of a buffer state. This helped Tsarist Russia as it cleared troublesome nomads from her frontiers. Chinese were forbidden entrance into Mongolia or cultivation of land there as well as the right to marry a Mongolian by the Code of the Tribunal of Colonial Affairs.¹¹ This fulfilled China's desires and served to strengthen Russia's Siberian frontiers better than that made possible by her own fortified lines. No wonder Russia had no interest in intervening to modify the status quo in Mongolia.

As the overthrow of the Manchu government drew near, the activities of the protagonists of the new republic in China caused the Mongols to "hate" the Chinese. While equality was mouthed, the new republic sought the elimination of Mongolia's local autonomy which the minorities had enjoyed for centuries. Colonization was encouraged and it resulted in Mongol lands being confiscated, pastures being diminished, taxes rising to pay for transportation of immigrants, and men being drafted into service. Tsarist Russia saw her two centuries' security system threatened.

It seems obvious that a direct link exists between the threat to Russia's interest in Outer Mongolia in the first half of 1911, and the declaration of independence of that region in the latter part of 1911.¹² The latter must be attributed in part to the work of Russian agents, although it is not possible to estimate the extent of their activities. A report of a special Russian Far Eastern Committee of

¹¹V. A. Riasanovsky, Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law (Tientsin: 1937), p. 63, as quoted in Pavlovsky, Ibid., p. 40.

¹²Pavlovsky, op. cit., pp. 41-43.

Ministers of August, 1911, admits that "several of our agents in Mongolia have helped to a considerable extent to create among the Mongols the opinion that they can count upon Russia in case they should try to break with China."¹³ The departure for St. Petersburg in July, 1911, of a delegation of Mongol princes to ask the Russian Government to take Khalkha under its protection was partly a result of the work of these agents. This request was anything but welcomed and was considered very embarrassing by the officials of the Foreign Ministry. The policy of the latter was still the same as in 1905 when it was laid down and approved by the Tsar, that moral support should be given to the Mongol princes but that actual intervention in the internal affairs of the Mongols was not desirable. It was only due to pressure exercised by Stolypin, the President of the Council of Ministers, that Neratov, who was at that time acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided not to raise any objection to the visit of the Mongolian delegation. This attitude of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also clearly reflected in his wire to Korostovets, Imperial Minister in Peking, of July 27, 1911, which stated that "the internal situation in Khalkha does not in any way touch our vital interest."¹⁴ Its importance lay in its potential use in achieving "our political tasks in China."

¹³Report of Special Council of Ministers, August 4, 1911, as cited by S. Shoizhelov, "Mongolia and Tsarist Russia," Novyi Vostok, Vol. 13-14, 1926, p. 255.

¹⁴Wire from Sazonov to Korostovets, July 27, 1911, File No. 1046 as cited by Popov, "Tsarist Russia and Mongolia, 1913-14," Krasnyi Arkhiv, Vol. 37, p. 9. (translated into English in the Chinese Social and Political Review, Peking, Vol. XVI, 1932-33.)

A special meeting of the Ministers followed. Subsequently it became obvious that Russia was reluctant to play an active part in the Mongolian question due to a fear of weakening her influence in the West. The Ministers showed concern regarding the additional restrictive measures of the Chinese in Outer Mongolia. They, therefore, determined that "support of the Mongols in their desire to counteract the activities of the Chinese Government would fully correspond with our interests."¹⁵ Therefore, support was offered the Mongols but accompanying it were high hopes that the matter could be settled without a separation from China, which Russia in no way wanted to assist.

1. The Mongolian revolution-1911

While Russian support was not extensive, on the strength of the arms sent to them in December, the Mongols carried out a coup d'etat in Urga, the capital, disarming the small detachment of Chinese soldiers there and forcing the Chinese governor to take refuge in the Russian consulate, from which he was subsequently permitted to leave in Russian military custody for Peking via Siberia. On December 16, the formation of a new independent "Empire of Mongolia" was proclaimed with the Urga Khutukhtu as its head, administering a government of five ministries--War, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance and Justice. The Mongols then attempted to get Russia to support her in an

¹⁵Report from Neratov to the Tsar, July 11, 1911, as cited in S. Shoizhelov, op. cit., pp. 454-455.

independent all-Mongol state,¹⁶ combining Inner and Outer Mongolia, as well as the area of Barga in Manchuria whose inhabitants had expelled the Chinese in January, 1912, and submitted to the Urga Khutukhtu's rule. But Tsarist Russia opposed union of Inner and Outer Mongolia since this development would conflict with certain secret treaty commitments made to Japan in 1907 and again in 1910.¹⁷ "Moreover, the Russians also opposed the efforts of the Mongols to establish

¹⁶There have been five periods in this century when the merging of Inner and Outer Mongolia, either as a self-governing unit or under unified foreign control, has appeared to be at least a theoretical possibility, although the possibility may, in fact, have always been more theoretical than real. 1) During 1911-15, several Inner Mongolian princes fled to Urga (Ulan Bator) and pressed a very willing Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to "liberate" Inner Mongolia from China. However, Tsarist Russia forced the Autonomous Government to forgo such action, and the Inner Mongols lost their dominant influence in Urga. 2) In 1919-20, Semenov's anti-Bolshevik movement, supported by Japan after February, 1918, adopted a specific Pan-Mongolian aim after the so-called Dauria Conference of February, 1919. The Inner Mongolian Lama functioned as nominal leader. This attempt ended in January, 1920, however, when a Chinese garrison on the Russo-Mongolian border captured the movement's leaders and shot the Inner Mongolian Lama. Cf. infra, p. 17. 3) In 1925-26, during the struggle between two Chinese warlords, one, Feng Yu-hsiang, obtained Russian military aid and political support. His plan for a time apparently included the aim of uniting Inner and Outer Mongolia. He was defeated however, and forced to flee from North China to Urga and Moscow. 4) During the 1930's a strong Inner Mongolian nationalist movement led by Teh Wang was exploited by the Japanese as an anti-Communist group that would "liberate" Outer Mongolia and join it to Inner Mongolia in a greater Mongolian state. It, too, failed. Soviet Russia dealt a final blow to all such Japanese and Inner Mongolian pretensions at Nomonkhan in 1939. Cf. infra, p. 32. 5) During 1945-47, Soviet Russia, in conjunction with Outer Mongolia, apparently aimed to add Inner Mongolia to the territory subject to Soviet influence. However, the Chinese Communists, led by Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia, frustrated this attempt, and, on May 1, 1947, established an Inner Mongolian regime loyal to the Chinese Communist movement of Mao Tse-tung. Cf. infra, p. 76. A. Doak Barnett, ed., Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 273-274.

¹⁷Cf. infra, p. 28.

diplomatic and other contacts with states besides Russia and China, fearing the entry of competitors for commercial and political influence in Outer Mongolia."¹⁸

China, in a presidential mandate of 1912, refused to recognize the independence of Mongolia and had incorporated her as an integral part of China's territory--a province. The mandate proclaimed: "The Chinese Republic will no longer make any distinction between the five races¹⁹ of China, as was done under the Empire. The dependencies henceforth will be treated as home provinces."²⁰ This was aimed at Russia. Discussion between Yuan Shih-k'ai, President of the Republic of China, and the Khutukhtu indicated that the Khutukhtu hoped to profit by the Sino-Russian antagonism and weaken China's control in Mongolia. He even proposed arbitration through Russia. China, however, wanted direct negotiations and offered autonomy in local affairs. At the same time negotiations with Russia were in progress. Russia did not want to hamper future relations with China and so also referred to autonomy rather than independence. A memorandum was prepared stating that

The Russian Imperial Government will lend Mongolia its assistance in order to preserve her present autonomy and also her right to keep her national army, forbidding entry to Chinese

¹⁸Schwartz, op. cit., p. 87.

¹⁹The people who live in the borderlands of China are not of the Chinese race, and, except in Manchuria, they do not speak Chinese. They include Tibetans, Manchus, Mongols, Kalmuks and Uigurs.

²⁰As quoted in Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 47.

armies and colonization by her lands by the Chinese.²¹

This statement was embodied in a treaty between Russia and Mongolia, signed on November 3, 1912,²² and with it Russia left the door open for an understanding with China. The Mongols, for their part, were no longer very happy about the friend and protector they had turned to. In reality, the entire treaty "amounted to the creation of a Russian political and economic protectorate in Mongolia."²³

There was a storm of protest in China. Demands to "save Mongolia" by "Young China" groups were in reality a threat to Yuan Shih-k'ai's rule and so he ordered the press to moderate its tone and said that the government would try to settle the question through the ordinary channels of diplomacy. But when the Chinese minister to St. Petersburg spoke to Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, he was told that

for the time being, it is only a matter of Russia's recognizing Mongolia's autonomy, not her independence. If China assumes a reasonable attitude, her sovereign rights can still be safeguarded. If not, the situation might grow worse. Since the Russian-Japanese War the Chinese government has taken a contemptuous attitude towards Russia; in Peking, negotiations relating to Mongolian affairs have [suffered delay] for almost a year, and all propositions advanced by Russia have been ignored. We were finally obliged, in order to defend our interests, to

²¹Text in Carnegie Endowment, Outer Mongolia, Treaties and Agreements (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), p. 17.

²²Ibid.

²³Schwartz, op. cit., p. 87.

negotiate directly with Mongolia.²⁴

In addition to this China soon found that she would not have the support of the great powers.

Neither England nor France was anxious to endanger the triple entente by intervening in an affair which did not concern either directly. Japan was especially cool and indifferent. China had every reason to believe that an understanding already existed between Japan and Russia and that reciprocal spheres of influence had been delimited. There remained Germany, who could not act alone, and the United States, whose intervention, as the Chinese press had remarked, was improbable, since she "could not in all decency support the principle [of territorial integrity] which she had just violated herself in Panama."²⁵

2. Autonomy

Yuan Shih-k'ai decided to enter into negotiations directly with Russia which had the effect of placing the Mongolian question on the international plane and of admitting the principle of a settlement by agreement with Russia. The resulting Sino-Russian agreement was consummated on November 5, 1913.²⁶ It affirmed Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, but at the same time recognized it as being autonomous. China accepted the good offices of Russia in the establishment of Sino-Mongol relations in conformity with the new accord. Outer Mongolia was to take part in all future Sino-Russian

²⁴Telegram from Lin Jen-chin to the Office of Foreign Affairs, dated November 12, 1912, as cited in China Times, November 14, 1912.

²⁵Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 54. When in 1912 Panama became separated from the Republic of Colombia, the United States, because of her interests in the Canal Zone, readily extended recognition to the new independent state.

²⁶J. V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919 (New York: 1921), II, 1066.

negotiations dealing with common territorial and political questions. The three parties were to confer for the purpose of determining questions of Russian and Chinese interests arising from the new conditions. The final supplement rejected Mongol aspirations concerning Inner Mongolia by limiting the territory of the new autonomous state to the regions which formerly had been under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Ambans of Urga and Kobdo, and the "Tartar general" of Uliassutai.²⁷ Not only had Japan recognized Russia's virtual protectorate over Outer Mongolia, but now China, also, acknowledged Russia's special position.

All three nations had to compromise to some extent. China did not gain outright possession but only suzerainty over an autonomous Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was not included and, thus, activities there were checked. The Russian public felt they had lost but the government was satisfied, as their main attempt was to gain international recognition for Outer Mongolia's position and relation to Russia herself. The Mongols were the most discontent for they felt betrayed by Russia. Russia, therefore, was faced with the task of pacifying them as best possible. In this attempt she allowed the Mongols to send a mission to St. Petersburg headed by Sain-Noyan Khan, Prime Minister, for the express purpose of discussing again the joining of Inner Mongolia to the possessions of the Khutukhtu of Urga. Sazonov tried to explain how much the Mongols really had gained by the November 5 accord, but Sain-Noyan Khan held to his request for

²⁷Ibid.

complete independence and pan-Mongolism. Sazonov then undertook to explain the international situation that made this request impossible. His statement indicates the moderate attitude taken by Russia in this affair.

Most of the Powers do not wish to see China disintegrate. It was only through the efforts made by Russia that an autonomous Mongolia was created at all. Urga's declaration of independence in 1911 had indeed produced a very unfortunate impression on the great powers, especially England and Japan; we succeeded in preventing foreign intervention in the Sino-Mongol conflict only by giving positive assurances that under no circumstances would we support the Mongol hope of separating from China those regions where either Japanese interests (Inner Mongolia) or English interests (the regions of Kuku-nor and Tsaidam, bordering on Tibet) already existed.²⁸

Sain-Noyan Khan then insisted on the need to add certain districts to the autonomous Outer Mongolia as they had already placed themselves under the Khutukhtu of Urga. Eventually Sain-Noyan Khan was forced to drop his claims²⁹ and to accept participation in the Russian-Mongolian-Chinese conference to be convoked for the purpose of completing by a tripartite agreement the Russian-Mongolian protocol of

²⁸Letter from Sazonov to Miller, Russian delegate to Urga, January 17, 1914, as quoted in Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 60.

²⁹An incident, exploited by the Russians, caused this. It concerned an attempt on the part of the Khutukhtu to involve Japan in the unifying of the two Mongolias. A letter was sent to the Emperor of Japan acknowledging that since Outer Mongolia had negotiated with Kodama, a representative of the South-Manchurian Railway, concerning a railway in Inner Mongolia neighboring on southern Manchuria, he was asking their help to keep the Chinese out of Inner Mongolia so that Outer Mongolia could continue her work there. Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Makino, denied any instructions given to Kodama of this nature and would not send the letter to the Emperor as it could cause question between Russia and Japan. Sazonov returned the letter to Sain-Noyan Khan and reprimanded him for such an attempt to involve Japan. Friters, op. cit., pp. 221-223.

November 3, 1912 and the Sino-Russian agreement of November 5, 1913.

The conference met at Kiakhta in September, 1914, and lasted five months, followed by an agreement signed on June 7, 1915.³⁰ It incorporated the two earlier agreements, recognizing Outer Mongolia's autonomy under China's suzerainty. Mongolia was given the right to make treaties and agreements with foreign powers on political or territorial matters. On the latter questions Russia and China had to agree through negotiation with Outer Mongolian participation. As a concession to China, the Mongols agreed that the ruler of Outer Mongolia should receive his title from the president of China.³¹ "The legal framework was complete for an Outer Mongolia dominated by Russia but nominally part of China."³²

These agreements, concluded during World War I were in effect for only a short time. Soon after came the Russian Revolution, the Allied intervention in Siberia and a violent civil war in China. The principles behind these agreements, however, were later reverted to as they best met the interests of the parties concerned. Two alterations were effected by the Tsarist government before they left the scene. 1) The region of Hulumbuir was separated from Outer Mongolia and transformed into a special province under Chinese administration in an agreement concluded on October 24, 1915. 2) The Russian consul-general at Urga

³⁰Text in Carnegie Endowment, Outer Mongolia, Treaties and Agreements, op. cit., pp. 32-37.

³¹Ibid.

³²Schwartz, op. cit., p. 89.

informed the Mongolian government that Russia reserved her rights to the region of Tannu-Urianhai, which she had possessed before the establishment of Autonomous Mongolia and that the Mongolian government was to abstain from sending its officials and troops into the hoshuns (districts) of this region.³³ These both survived the revolutionary period, too.

3. China's attempt to reclaim absolute control

Russia, occupied by the war, was not able to exercise her rights in Outer Mongolia--that of railway concessions, the right to install telegraphic communications equipment and to exploit the gold mines. Even the trade declined. In reality, a dilemma had emerged. Tsarist imperialism had given Russia control of much of Asiatic lands and yet the Bolsheviks were against such ideas as imperialism. Actually, in the first phases of the Russian civil war most of this controlled Asiatic land had been either reclaimed by China or taken over by anti-Soviet elements. In Outer Mongolia, Chinese power was able to reassert itself in the vacuum left by the weakness of a Russia torn by bloody domestic strife. Lenin, considering these losses as unimportant, sought to turn them into a propaganda weapon. A declaration, issued by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Leo Karakhan, on July 25, 1919, to the Chinese nation followed. It

³³Peter S. H. Tang, Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911-1931 (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959), p. 399.

declared that the Soviet government called for negotiations with China

to annul the treaty of 1896, the Peking protocol of 1901, and all agreements concluded with Japan between 1907 and 1916, that is, to return to the Chinese people everything that was taken from them by the Tsarist Government independently, or together with the Japanese and the Allies.³⁴

To Outer Mongolia these things were said in August, 1919.

The Russian people have renounced all treaties with the Japanese and Chinese governments which deal with Mongolia. Mongolia is henceforth a free country. Russian advisers, Tsarist consuls, bankers and the rich who have mastered the Mongolian people by means of force and gold and robbed them of their last possessions must be driven out of Mongolia. All institutions of authority and law in Mongolia must henceforth belong to the Mongolian people. Not a single foreigner has the right to interfere with Mongolian affairs.³⁵

The reality of the situation in Outer Mongolia in late 1919, however, was that Chinese rule had been reimposed upon the area, and the dominating Tsarist Russian position, won five years earlier, had been essentially wiped out. China took advantage of her position of sovereign. She invited Mongol delegates to Peking to present "tribute" and perform the "kotow." Yuan Shih-k'ai tried to make the Khutukhtu humble himself in this manner when an envoy came to give him his formal title, as was agreed upon in the Tripartite Agreement, but the Khutukhtu stubbornly refused.³⁶

³⁴As quoted in Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 270-271.

³⁵As quoted in X. J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 200.

³⁶Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 67.

4. "Little Hsü" and the Anfu clique

Several violent crises confronted Outer Mongolia during the absence of the stabilizing force of Russia--incidents which were to effect her position politically. The first of these involved an anti-Bolshevik, Ataman Semenov, who planned a pan-Mongolian state inclusive of Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Hulunbuir, Tibet and the Buryat region of Russian Transbaikalia. A carrying out of this proposal would have been a violation of the Tripartite Agreement. For that matter, Outer Mongolia was fearful of such a plan. She even asked China for protection, based on the fact that if the Khutukhtu had refused the plan strong military pressure was expected to overcome their reluctance and to win them over forcibly to the separatist movement. Semenov then switched sides and joined the Anfu clique³⁷ of the Peking government who wished to rid Mongolia of her autonomy altogether. From that time on the Mongolian problem was in the forefront of the political situation of China. It was not only a question of foreign policy but, as in 1912-1913, of internal policy as well. In this connection, David Frazer, the Times correspondent in Peking, wrote,

³⁷The Anfu clique was a group within the Peking government who sought the complete reintegration of Mongolia under Chinese administration and the abolition of her autonomy. They had pro-Japanese sympathies. In 1921 during the Civil War in China, the influence of the Anfu Clique in North China was broken. As a result General Hsü, then a member of the Anfu clique and controlling Outer Mongolia in China's name, lost his usefulness to the Japanese and they made use of the bands of which Ungern Sternberg's army was composed. Documents which were found on Sternberg when he was captured seem to confirm that he was counting on substantial help from the Japanese. Friters, op. cit., p. 231.

It is a curious fact that the question of relations between North and South China, which for a long time has absorbed the complete attention of Chinese politicians and which is, indeed, a fundamental question for the country, has been suddenly relegated to the background to give place to the Mongolian problem, which in itself is of minor importance. The northern militarists suffered defeat in the south, and, instead of trying to come to terms with the Southerner, they preferred to effect a diversion in Mongolia, to regain their prestige. An anti-foreign policy is always popular in China, and if, by annulling the tripartite Russian-Chinese-Mongol agreement, they could succeed in making China the absolute master in Mongolia, the glory would revert to Tuan Ch'i-jui and his Anfu clique.³⁸

The plan to enact this was put into effect by General Hsü Shu-tseng (Little Hsu). He bestowed many gifts in Urga and then asked that Outer Mongolia send in a voluntary petition asking for a cancellation of their autonomy. The Khutukhtu and two houses could not consent to this. Hsü then drew up eight conditions and gave the Khutukhtu forty-eight hours to comply. Knowing they could not oppose Hsu's army, they gave in.³⁹ Little Hsü set about exploiting the Mongols to the fullest extent and this was halted only when the Anjuites were overthrown in Peking and the Little Hsü control was ousted. Mongolia was not to be satisfied, however. The princes, the lamas, and the entire population hoped for but one thing--liberation from the Chinese yoke.⁴⁰ This desire led to the second crisis.

³⁸North China Daily News (Peking), August 6, 1919.

³⁹Pavlovsky, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

⁴⁰Friters, op. cit., p. 121.

5. Baron von Ungern Sternberg and Soviet aid

An anti-Bolshevik, Baron von Ungern Sternberg, provoked this crisis. Diverted from his attempt to reach partisans at Troitskosavsk and continue the fight against Soviet lines, the Baron came into Urga as its savior against Little Hsú and the exploitations of the Chinese. In February, 1921, an independent Mongol government was again proclaimed with Baron von Ungern Sternberg as supreme military adviser. Exploitation of this position soon caused distrust and a desire to rid Mongolia of their "savior."⁴¹

General Hsú Shu-tseng's and Baron von Ungern Sternberg's activities in Outer Mongolia set the stage for the resumption of Russian control over Mongolia. A facade of legality was cast over the intervention by the creation of a tiny Mongolian People's Revolutionary

⁴¹A reading of the appeals and orders of the day, the letters seized at the time of Ungern's capture by Soviet troops and which have been published in Washington, and the testimony of his own collaborators, reveal a succession of confused, even contradictory, plans, ephemeral products of a brain affected by delusions of grandeur. Sometimes Ungern saw himself at the head of an independent Lamaist Greater Mongolia coming to grips with China; sometimes he called for an alliance of the Mongols with the Chinese for the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. All this, naturally, without forgetting the fight against Communism....The incoherence of his plans, the relations which he tried to establish with the Chinese, especially with the entourage of Chang Tso-lin, quickly made him suspect with the princes and lamas, while his "purges," which were of an incredible cruelty, and the looting and extortion indulged in by his troops, finally changed the sympathies of the population into hate for the military genius who liberated them from oppression. Shortly thereafter, he was abandoned by his troops, captured by the Soviets, and publicly executed. Pavlovsky, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

Party,⁴² which met in the border town of Kiakhta in March, 1921, and proclaimed a "Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia." This government appealed for Soviet help to annihilate the Baron's forces, help which was quickly and enthusiastically supplied. The Soviet forces and their Mongolian puppets marched into Urga in July, 1921,

⁴²Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Chinese moved into control of large parts of Mongolia. For a time, Mongolia was a battlefield, with White Russians and Chinese vying for control. However, partisan groups of Mongols were coming into being, mainly in the northeastern districts bordering the Soviet Union. These groups, purportedly led by Sukhe-Bator and Choibalsan, met near Kiakhta, in Soviet territory close to the Mongolian frontier, in March, 1921, and held the First Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The Party, after it had been established in Mongolia with Soviet assistance was paraded before the world as a purely national movement, independent of Soviet Russia. In effect, however, the Soviet Union had restored the old Tsarist protectorate over Mongolia. Moscow's role in the establishment of an independent Mongol state was obviously one in which protection of Soviet borders and advancement of the Russian national interest was of primary concern. Soviet troops and advisers remained in Mongolia, and the Red Army did not leave until 1925, when the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was firmly in power. Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Communist Revolution in Asia (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), pp. 84-85. There was a special reason for the formation of a revolutionary party. The Soviet technique of promoting revolutions in territories bordering on Russia consists of bringing into life in such a territory a Communist group, however small and insignificant; of inducing such a group to proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government of the territory in question and to appeal to Moscow for military assistance, which would be immediately furnished. This was the program gone through in the Caucasus and elsewhere. And this was precisely the plan worked out for Mongolia. Tang, op. cit., pp. 371-372. In other instances when the Communist Party was able to take over a state and then proclaim it a Communist nation the Party dropped Revolutionary from its title. This is not the case with Mongolia. The author was not able to ascertain the reason for this but believes it has some connection with the fact that Mongolia is not included as a republic of the U.S.S.R.

and Outer Mongolia became the first Soviet satellite.⁴³

Soviet Russia wished to legalize her hold on Outer Mongolia. An agreement "for establishing friendly relations" with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government was thus drawn up and signed on November 5, 1921 in Moscow.⁴⁴ In the preamble it was stated that, in contrast to treaties made "by the cunning and predatory Tsarist Government," the agreement was one of "free friendship and collaboration between the two neighboring states."

This Soviet-Mongolian treaty provided for: a) mutual recognition between the two governments without mentioning China (Article I); b) the reciprocal establishment of consulates in necessary places at the governments' discretion; c) the construction of postal and telephone communication lines in Mongolia undertaken by Russia; and d) Mongolia's cession to Russia of such territory as would be needed for the construction of railroads (Article III).⁴⁵ Outer Mongolia had attempted through the treaty to reclaim the territory adjoining her in the west--Tannu Tuva or Urianghai.⁴⁶ She failed, however, for it was

⁴³William Ballis, "The Political Evolution of a Soviet Satellite--the Mongolian People's Republic," The Western Political Quarterly, IX (June, 1956), 301.

⁴⁴Text in Leonard Shapiro, ed., Soviet Treaty Series, 1917-1928, Vol. I (Washington: 1950), pp. 137-138.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Until 1911 Tannu Tuva, then Urianghai, administratively constituted a part of Western Outer Mongolia under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Chiang-Chun, or Military Governor, at Uliassutai. At the time of the Mongolian independence movement in that year, Russia took it over from Outer Mongolia and proclaimed a protectorate over it in 1914. During the internal strife in Russia following World War I, it came

not acknowledged by the Soviet Government as a part of the Outer Mongolian state. Instead, according to the treaty, Tannu Tuva was set up as a separate state, which was obviously marked by Russia for annexation.⁴⁷

In order to avoid Chinese anger, the text of the treaty with Mongolia was not published immediately and the director of a Soviet mission in Peking, Alexander Paikes, directly denied that any such treaty had been concluded.⁴⁸ Finally, however, it had to be made public. Irritation at Russian tactics mounted high in Peking. On May 1, 1922, the Chinese Foreign Minister addressed a note to Paikes, reprimanding the Soviet Government for having gone back on their word.⁴⁹

Thus by 1922 the issue of Mongolia had become the most important matter in dispute between the Soviet and Chinese governments. In all negotiations carried on at that time by China with the Soviet envoys, "the Russian offers were turned down by the Chinese in an effort to

again under Chinese jurisdiction but in 1921 the Soviets proclaimed it an independent "republic" under the tribal name of Tannu Tuva. In 1926, under Soviet auspices, it was definitely separated from the rest of Outer Mongolia by treaty with Russia, against the will of both Mongolia and Tannu Tuva. On October 13, 1944, Tannu Tuva was annexed by the USSR as an autonomous region of the RSFSR. Tang, op. cit., p. 399.

⁴⁷Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

⁴⁸Tang, op. cit., p. 379.

⁴⁹Note from Waichiaopu to Paikes on May 1, 1922, The China Year Book (Peking: 1923), p. 680.

prevent the detachment of Mongolia from China."⁵⁰

Moscow seemed to be determined not to return Mongolia to China until China herself should turn pro-Soviet and firmly ally herself with Russia. In this connection Grigorii Zinoviev, President of the Third International, said, at the First Session of the Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East in 1922, that

a definitive solution of the Mongolian question will not become possible until the Chinese shall liberate themselves from the yoke of their oppressors, until they drive from their borders the soldiers of foreign imperialist nations,⁵¹ until the revolution shall be victorious in their country.

6. Establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic

Regardless of this desire, it became more imperative that Soviet Russia regain diplomatic relations with China and to this effort several missions were devoted. After three years of negotiations in which the Mongolian problem was the focal point, the Chinese Government came to the conclusion that it had no means at its disposal with which to restore its previous position in Mongolia, and that it had to acknowledge the fait accompli in Outer Mongolia. It then reverted to the same construction that had been used by both Russia and China before the Revolution: a compromise wherein Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia on paper, while China acknowledged Russia's actual dominance there. On this basis a treaty was finally concluded

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Speech given by Zinoviev, cited in Whiting, op. cit., p. 259.

between China and the USSR on May 31, 1924.⁵² Stipulations with regard to Outer Mongolia were contained in an additional agreement "concerning general principles for the settlement of pending questions between the Chinese Republic and the USSR."⁵³ Article Five of the agreement was a recognition of China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. Also included was a declaration by the Soviet Government stating that as soon as the withdrawal of all Soviet troops should have been agreed upon at a subsequent Sino-Russian conference, "it will effect the complete withdrawal of all troops of the USSR from Outer Mongolia."⁵⁴

This was, however, only an "agreement on general principles," and, apart from the promise of withdrawing troops, it contained no concrete proposal for reestablishment of direct contact between the Chinese Government and the Mongolian authorities. It was, then, a diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union, one which became more apparent when, in November of the same year, the Mongolian People's Republic was established with Choibalsan as premier.⁵⁵ This left little doubt in Chinese

⁵²Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1919-1929 (Washington: 1929), p. 49.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Khorloin Choibalsan was co-founder, with Sukhe Bator, of the Mongolian Army, and its long-time commander-in-chief. He enjoyed special Soviet favor. After the major Comintern agents in Mongolia and the important Party and Government leaders had been purged in the 1930's, Choibalsan assumed top importance. He carried out his job of fitting the Mongolian People's Republic into the Soviet straitjacket without qualm or hesitation, and by 1939 emerged as Prime Minister and undisputed leader of the country. Robert A. Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 234.

minds just what the situation was. But if there was doubt, Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, made it clear, when he spoke before the Congress of Soviets which met in March, 1925, that Russia did not intend to tolerate any interference by China in Outer Mongolian affairs.

We recognize this republic as part of the Chinese Republic, but we also recognize its autonomy as sufficiently wide to preclude any interference in the internal affairs of Mongolia....In Mongolia we have a government completely directing its policy along the lines of a close rapprochement with the USSR.⁵⁶

The conference that was to have followed the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 never occurred and thus, China did not officially recognize Outer Mongolia's autonomy. But then, neither did Outer Mongolia accept Chinese sovereignty.

The absence of a tripartite treaty similar to that of 1915, or a direct Sino-Mongol convention, was particularly disadvantageous to China, since it permitted Mongolia to interpret her autonomy as widely as she wished, and permitted Russia, while admitting Chinese sovereignty, to turn this wider interpretation to account.⁵⁷

7. 1924 Constitution

Thus, the Mongolian Great Khural (Constituent Assembly) on November 26, 1924, adopted a constitution in which the powers of the government of the "People's Republic" of Mongolia were defined

to represent the Republic in international relations; to conduct diplomatic negotiations and to conclude political, commercial, and other treaties with the Powers; to modify

⁵⁶As cited in Whiting, op. cit., p. 259.

⁵⁷Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 90.

the frontiers of the Mongol state; to declare war; to conclude peace; to ratify international treaties; to float loans abroad.⁵⁸

Following this, any kind of normal relations between the Peking government and Ulan Bator, formerly called Urga, were based on the acceptance of stipulated Mongolian conditions--that Peking recognize the "right of the various races of China to settle their own affairs."⁵⁹

Throughout the remainder of the twenties and the first of the thirties the Chinese Government was far too much absorbed with internal troubles to be able to occupy itself effectively with Outer Mongolian affairs. In this same period Soviet Russia was able to halt the renewed aspirations of some of the Mongolians to unite with surrounding Mongol areas, Tannu Tuva,⁶⁰ Inner Mongolia⁶¹ and Barga.⁶²

⁵⁸Text of the Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic, China Year Book (Peking: 1926), pp. 795-796.

⁵⁹Pavlovsky, op. cit., p. 90.

⁶⁰Cf. supra, p. 21, n. 46.

⁶¹Inner Mongolia was never a political entity. Under the Manchus the territory referred to as Inner Mongolia was divided between tribes or groups of tribes which were separately tributary to the Manchu court. After intermediary stages between 1911 and 1927 the territory was divided in 1928 among four new Chinese provinces, Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol, each of which consisted partly of Mongol territory and partly of pieces carved from China's northern provinces of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Hopei and Liaoning. Important territories in Eastern Inner Mongolia were administratively absorbed into the already existing Northeastern or Manchurian provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang. Friters, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶²Barga, also known as Hulunbuir, comprises practically all of Heilungkiang Province to the west of the Manchurian Hinghan range. It is flanked by Russian Siberia to the north and Outer Mongolia to the west. Tang, op. cit., p. 81.

They were also successful in establishing trade relations that eventually weaned Outer Mongolia from the need for Chinese trade and the trade of most foreign countries. This was accomplished through the sovietization policy as carried out by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). Such a policy was certainly foreshadowed by the new Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic. It was nearly identical with that of the RSFSR of July 10, 1918.⁶³ The Mongolian Constitution of 1924 defined the Mongolian People's Republic as

an independent state of the working people who abolished the imperialist feudal yoke in order to assure the noncapitalistic development of the country for a transition to socialism in the future.⁶⁴

According to the constitution the supreme political organ is a legislative body called the Great People's Khural, convened not less often than once in three years. Subordinate to this body and responsible to it is the Small Khural, which, for the execution of its ordinary duties, elects a presidium from among its members and also appoints the "Council of Ministers."⁶⁵ Except for the use of tribal terminology in the meaning of political offices, the structure of the hierarchy closely follows the Soviet pattern.

It is true that sovietization was in full process during the late twenties and early thirties, but the Soviets found that it was not an easy innovation among a predominantly nomadic people. By 1935

⁶³Tang, op. cit., p. 387.

⁶⁴China Year Book, 1926, op. cit., pp. 795-796.

⁶⁵Ibid.

collectivization had to be abandoned and private property restored if the Mongolian national economy was not to be threatened mortally. Sanction for these decisions came from Russia, who realized that she had to abandon any ideas she may have had about Outer Mongolia's being a part of the Soviet Union. Outer Mongolia, as a "bourgeois democratic republic," necessarily had to remain outside of the Soviet Union, which includes only "socialist republics."⁶⁶

B. JAPANESE RELATIONS

Economic considerations which prevented the building of a socialist republic in a country of nomads were perhaps not the only ones which caused the Soviet government to respect the international status of Outer Mongolia. In 1912-1915 the Tsarist government cautiously penetrated into Mongolia, its eyes constantly fixed not only on China, but also on Japan. The agreements which it concluded with Mongolia and China in 1912 and 1913⁶⁷ were accompanied, if not preceded, by an arrangement with Japan concerning allocation of reciprocal spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia.⁶⁸ Soviet Russia was in a different situation. At the time of the conclusion of her treaties with Mongolia in 1921 and with China in 1924, she had not yet established diplomatic relations with Japan. Available sources did not reveal

⁶⁶Pravda (Moscow), April 8, 1935.

⁶⁷Cf. supra, pp. 10 and 11.

⁶⁸Tang, op. cit., p. 353.

whether or not the Mongolian question was discussed later. But the Mongol change in policy regarding sovietization and the Soviet declaration regarding the "bourgeois" character of the Mongol republic and its independence from Soviet Russia did coincide with an event of great importance. The event was the creation of a new state on the eastern frontiers on Mongolia--Manchukuo,⁶⁹ under the protection of Japan. Rightly or wrongly, the government of Ulan Bator believed that Mongolia's independence was endangered by the presence of Manchu troops and forces of her protectors in the neighborhood of her border. Repeating the traditional gesture which Mongol leaders had made for three centuries whenever they believed themselves to be in danger, Guendon, the Mongol Premier, turned to Moscow for assistance. The Soviet Government, as its Tsarist predecessors had been, was very careful. It did give some assurance, however, that it would give its support to Mongolia "in case of necessity." On November 27, 1934, the Soviet Union signed a "Gentleman's Agreement" with the Mongolian People's Republic providing for Mongolia's defense.⁷⁰

Soviet Russia's belief that a "necessity" might arise was based on former activities of the Japanese in the Mongolian area. They

⁶⁹Friters, op. cit., p. 235.

⁷⁰Text of Protocol, New York Times (New York), April 8, 1936. On March 12, 1936, the 1934 "Gentleman's Agreement" was raised to the level of a Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, including a Mutual Defense Protocol. The reason for calling it a "Gentleman's Agreement" could be because it was a verbal agreement in effect before being finalized on paper.

were purported to have backed the Anfu clique⁷¹ in China in support of Little Hsü as well as the Ungern Sternberg revolution.⁷² In both of these major incidents the Japanese Government publicly denied any support and the blame of Japanese intervention was placed on the heads of some important officers. That these activities were not successful may well be due to the incapacity and reluctance of the Japanese Government to lend them active support. Looking at the Japanese campaign in Manchuria in 1931-1933 two questions come to the fore. How reluctant was the Tokyo government in supporting pan-Mongolism? And, how much did that government actually do?

1. Tanaka memorial and Manchukuo

One document in particular strongly indicates a policy of expansion not only in Manchuria and in the Mongolias but throughout all of China. This was the Tanaka Memorial presented in 1929 by the Japanese Prime Minister, General Baron Giichi Tanaka, to the Emperor.⁷³ During the Sino-Japanese controversy before the League of Nations in 1931-1932, the Japanese delegate described it as a "forgery from

⁷¹Cf. supra, p. 17, n. 37.

⁷²Cf. supra, pp. 17-19.

⁷³Text in "The Puppet State of Manchukuo," Appendix IV (Shanghai: 1935), pp. 204-238.

beginning to end."⁷⁴ Others⁷⁵ began to believe its authenticity as the plans mentioned in it were carried out. According to it Manchuria and Mongolia were to be infiltrated with Japanese retired officers who were gradually to guide the thinking of these areas toward the economic and military plans of Japan. This would be advanced by a system of railroad lines that could enable rapid transport of goods or troops while at the same time cut off the Chinese and Russians. Once accomplished these areas would serve as a base to penetrate into the rest of China. Utilization of minority groups, particularly the Koreans, was to be backed to the hilt. Some actions might cause war with China and Russia. The risk would be greater with the latter but still there was to be no hesitancy. Hence, in 1929

the Prime Minister of Japan sketched in a few thousand words a whole campaign of aggression covering Asia, the Pacific and even Europe. Countries were to be conquered "by fear" so that they would capitulate without a fight. Unity against her is the thing Japan fears--"the day when China unites."⁷⁶

Many of the aims of Japanese policy as enunciated in the Tanaka Memorial were realized by the creation of Manchukuo, including Manchuria and Jehol. The declaration of the establishment of the new Government of Manchukuo, dated March 1, 1932, spoke of the state as

⁷⁴Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore: 1935), pp. 161-162.

⁷⁵Stepan Vostrotin, "Russia's Crisis in the Far East," The Slavonic Review, IV (1935-36), 112.

⁷⁶G. D. R. Phillips, Russia, Japan and Mongolia (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1942), p. 53.

comprising "the territory of Manchuria and Mongolia."⁷⁷ The result of this was to confront Outer Mongolia with a new neighbor.

Within Manchukuo, the province which bordered on Outer Mongolia was the "autonomous" province of Hsingan, itself inhabited by Mongols. The setting apart of such a province, in such a manner, within the new state, in itself suggested the idea of a future unification of all Mongol territory under Japanese control and following a course of development agreeable to Japanese interests. For the Mongols this was a reminder of the earlier idea of Mongol unity centering in Outer Mongolia, and at the same time a challenge to the idea. To the Soviet Union, it must have appeared as an ominous step toward an attempt, long foreseen, to assert Japanese influence in Outer Mongolia.

Indeed, the new official interest of Japan in Outer Mongolia changed the whole aspect of Outer Mongolian diplomatic relations as well as of Soviet-Japanese relations. For, after the creation of Manchukuo by Japan, one of the chief points at issue between the U.S.S.R. and Japan was connected with Outer Mongolia. From the Russian point of view, this Japanese advance not only entailed a direct threat to her remaining interests in Manchuria, but meant that for many miles she and Outer Mongolia were now confronted by a new neighbor in the form of the Japanese-controlled "Manchukuo."

In 1934, possibly in the hopes of appeasing Japan, Soviet Russia

⁷⁷Dept. of For. Affairs, Manchukuo Gov., Proclamations, Statements and Communications of the Manchukuo Gov., Series No. 1 (Hsinking: October, 1932), pp. 3-6.

withdrew from Manchuria, sold her share in the Chinese Eastern Railway,⁷⁸ and became feverishly engaged in strengthening her military position along the frontier of Manchuria. This frontier region included the northeastern corner of Outer Mongolia, with which it soon became clear that Japan desired to establish direct relations. As border incidents began to extend from the Russia-Manchukuo to the Mongolia-Manchukuo frontier, Soviet Russia strengthened her relations with Outer Mongolia. This occasioned the aforementioned "gentleman's agreement" concluded between Soviet Russia and the Mongolian People's Republic on November 27, 1934.⁷⁹

It is important to note that the dispute between Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic was not so much one of delimitation of frontiers, but was concerned mainly with the demands of Manchukuo to have in Ulan Bator a formally accredited Manchukuo agent with wide powers. This would assure Manchukuo of virtually equivalent diplomatic status and enable her to protect her interests in the Mongolian capital and to participate in the settlement of frontier incidents. In reality, this was recognition on the part of Manchukuo of the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. It also meant that recognition by Japan then would have been only a matter of form. When, however, during the alarming situation created by border incidents in the middle of 1935, the Mongolian Government refused to

⁷⁸Phillips, op. cit., pp. 59-60; Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

⁷⁹Cf. supra, p. 29.

admit any representatives sent to discuss the settlement of these incidents, it was interpreted by Manchukuo and Japan that Outer Mongolia obviously was not truly independent because her liberty of action was apparently restricted by another agency. Whether Manchukuo and Japan considered them independent or not was not the main concern of the Mongolian Government. They saw, in the attempt to place representatives throughout the Mongolian People's Republic the carrying out of Japan's plan of "legalized 'Manchukuan' centers for Japanese espionage and wrecking." This was likewise the opinion of Soviet Russia.⁸⁰

2. Soviet protection

With a Japanese attack upon Outer Mongolia apparently possible at any moment, Stalin announced publicly in February, 1936, that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of Outer Mongolia if the Japanese should attack.⁸¹ Two months later it was revealed that Moscow and Ulan Bator had concluded a mutual assistance pact amounting to a military alliance.⁸² With these moves in effect the period of appeasement to Japan was over. The story of the Chinese Eastern Railroad would not be repeated in Outer Mongolia.

⁸⁰Phillips, op. cit., p. 57.

⁸¹The Soviet Union and the Path to Peace, a collection of Statements and Documents, 1917-1936 (London: 1936), p. 15.

⁸²The Times (London), April 2, 1936.

Upon learning the terms of the protocol a spokesman of the Manchukuo Foreign Office, in a declaration to the press made at the beginning of April, 1936, asserted that in view of the fact that Outer Mongolia was entirely secluded from all foreign countries, with the sole exception of Soviet Russia, the conclusion of such a mutual aid pact between Moscow and Ulan Bator was little short of the actual absorption of Outer Mongolia into the Soviet Union. Though that pact was called a "mutual assistance" instrument, it virtually constituted a military alliance between the two contracting parties, with Manchukuo as its objective. Thus, Manchukuo could not but feel serious concern in this matter; she could not remain indifferent toward such a state of affairs in view of the fact that she had a long, common frontier with Outer Mongolia, and also because she had ties of blood with that country. Finally, the spokesman claimed that Manchukuo took as much interest in Outer Mongolia as the Soviet Union, if not more. As far as that area was concerned Manchukuo was entitled to have at least an equal voice. It had also the right to obtain the same position in that area that Moscow had achieved.⁸³

It is consistent with this view that in the beginning of May, 1936, in his address to the Japanese Diet, Hachiro Arita, the Foreign Minister, reiterated the opinion that the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian difficulties must not be settled by a Russo-Japanese arrangement, but by "direct negotiation between the Manchukuo Government and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic," which he hoped would result

⁸³Japan Chronicle (Kobe), April 16, 1936.

in an "early solution of all questions and particularly in the exchange of representatives between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia."⁸⁴

3. China's protest

Japan and Manchukuo were not the only ones to question the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance of 1936. For many years Outer Mongolia's position regarding the Soviet Union resembled that of a satellite. Now there was no doubt. Outer Mongolia was a Soviet satellite and the 1924 position, regarding her as a part of China, was ended. Chiang Kai-shek's government protested the 1936 treaty,⁸⁵ pointing out that

in so far as Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Chinese Republic, no foreign state may conclude with it any treaties or agreements. The actions of the Government of the USSR which concluded with Outer Mongolia the above mentioned protocol in violation of its obligations towards the Chinese Government, form undoubtedly a violation of the sovereignty of China and the terms of the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924. It is, therefore, my duty to declare a strong protest to Your Excellency, and to state that the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol by the Government of the USSR is illegal and the Chinese Government cannot, under any circumstance, recognize such a protocol and is in no way bound by it.⁸⁶

Chiang knew that such a protest would not influence events in Outer Mongolia but possibly there was an ulterior motive for it. Japan's

⁸⁴69th Session of Japanese Diet, May 6, 1936," Contemporary Japan, Vol. V., No. 1, June, 1936.

⁸⁵When the terms of the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance became known, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent two notes of protest to the Soviet Ambassador, the first on April 7, the second on April 14, 1936.

⁸⁶China Year Book (Peking, 1938), pp. 31-32.

takeover of Manchuria and Jehol brought her that much closer to Inner Mongolia. During the twenties China wished to prevent the Inner Mongols from following the example of the "independent" Outer Mongolia. She put in effect an extensive policy of colonization and penetration in these regions. Now she feared that she would be made to pay for a policy which had alienated the Mongols from her. When Prince Teh and the Mongolian Political Council, who were championed by Japan, set up to achieve independence, China attempted to counteract this move by forming the Suiyuan Mongolian Political Council, which gave to the Inner Mongol princes and nobles a certain degree of autonomy.⁸⁷ It was not successful, however, because the members of the Council felt that the offer of the autonomy was not enough. "The Chinese should help the Mongols to achieve self-government, and there is no better way than to assist in promoting education and developing production."⁸⁸ China wanted desperately to hold on to Inner Mongolia. By making such an issue of the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance she may have bought a little time. To advertise the knowledge of the existence of the mutual assistance pact was the only effective means to stem the advance of Japanese troops into Outer Mongolia, and at the same time it imposed upon Japan the heavy obligation of keeping a considerable number of troops in the regions of Manchukuo bordering Outer Mongolia, thereby at least delaying her advance into Inner

⁸⁷Dr. Shuhsi Hsü, The North China Problem (Shanghai: 1937), pp. 41-59.

⁸⁸The North China Herald, Vol. CCII, No. 3631, March 10, 1937, p. 398.

Mongolia and North China.

Independence seekers within Inner Mongolia were not anxious to acquiesce to Japan and at first their strong resistance caused certain setbacks for the Japanese. There was an added attempt on the part of the Chinese to prolong these anti-Japanese moves. They concluded a pact of non-aggression with Soviet Russia in the autumn of 1937.⁸⁹ It is true that this meant that they were bound to look differently at the Protocol of Mutual Assistance but China's fear of Japanese infiltration was greater than her distaste of Outer Mongolian backing by Russia. Such attempts were only temporary and progress by the Japanese troops, supported by the Mongol, Prince Teh, and others turned the tables in favor of complete Japanese dominance.

The capture of Kalgan, the gateway to the Mongolian plateau, the subjugation of Suiyuan and the seizure of the railway from Kalgan to Paotou, at no great distance from and running parallel to the Outer Mongolian border, and the creation of a new autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia, were milestones of Japan's success.⁹⁰

Within a very short time the leaders of the new "Mongolian Autonomous Government" questioned their actual position in relation to the Japanese. Rather than submit to Japanese exploitation certain Mongol groups considered joining with the Mongolian People's Republic. In either case Chahar and Suiyuan, two of the three areas forming Inner Mongolia, were lost to China. Strategically and economically the Mongolias could have benefited China but she had not proferred an understanding hand early enough in either case.

⁸⁹Friters, op. cit., p. 145.

⁹⁰Phillips, op. cit., p. 73.

Inner Mongolia was of strategic importance to Japan because it "enclosed Outer Mongolia on the east and south."⁹¹ Together with Manchukuo, Japan might have been able to hem in Outer Mongolia, and this long and vulnerable frontier became a source of increased friction and menace to Outer Mongolia as well as to Siberia. On the other hand the presence of the Outer Mongolian army on their flank was a constant threat to the Japanese, particularly if considered in conjunction with the Far Eastern army of Soviet Russia stationed on the frontiers of Manchukuo.

4. Japanese, Manchukuo--Soviet, Outer Mongolian confrontation

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Japanese strategy in World War II might have been different if the miniature war started by Japanese and Manchukuo troops in the Nomonkhon area near the Outer Mongolian frontier in 1939 had not resulted in severe defeat.⁹² Border incidents in that region were of long standing,⁹³ but the intensity of the battles, including the use of aircraft and tanks, provided a new element. At the beginning of the fighting Russia's

⁹¹Owen Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria (New York: John Day Company, 1934), p. 31.

⁹²Japan, in an effort to appropriate part of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, wished to change the Mongolian-Manchurian border in her own favor. She attacked at the Nomonkhon Area and the fighting lasted from May to September, 1939. Russian and Mongolian troops, under Marshal Zhukov, defeated Japan with the use of tank warfare. Friters, op. cit., p. 148.

⁹³Cf. supra, p. 33.

position was clearly put by Foreign Minister Molotov in a report before the Supreme Soviet on May 31, 1939. "I give warning that the border of the Mongolian People's Republic, by virtue of the mutual assistance pact concluded between us, will be defended by us as vigorously as we shall defend our own frontier."⁹⁴ This defense naturally caused a set-back in Japanese plans, one which not only influenced their general policy toward Russia, but also their aims in Manchukuo. The fighting ceased in September. The truce which followed remained for some time an uncertain one, subject to all the vicissitudes of the world war situation and Soviet-Japanese relations in general. It was only in May, 1942, that the Mixed Border Commission, set up at the end of the fighting in September, 1939,⁹⁵ reached an agreement. The main explanation for the delay seems to have been that Russo-Japanese relations in general were then at a critical stage. The Japanese were anxious not to provoke Russia in any way.⁹⁶ Yet, they were unwilling to confirm officially certain Mongolian advances made in the disputed Nomonkhon area. This appears to be borne out by the fact that the Mixed Border Commission only resumed work following the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union of April 13, 1941. The latter created a modus vivendi between the two parties insofar as in a declaration

⁹⁴V. Molotov, The International Situation and Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publication, 1939), p. 14.

⁹⁵Friters, op. cit., p. 148.

⁹⁶Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, March 28, 1941, (Washington: 1948), p. 301.

attached to the Pact Japan and the Soviet Union pledged themselves to respect "the territorial integrity and inviolability" of the Mongolian People's Republic and of Manchukuo.⁹⁷ Work on the demarcation of the frontier was begun on June 27, 1941, and the negotiations ended with the ratification of a Mongol-Manchukuo border demarcation agreement in May, 1942, six months after Pearl Harbor.⁹⁸ It is well to note that the treaty of April 13, 1941, maintained peace in the area until the very end of the Second World War, in 1945, when the Soviet Union and Mongolia both declared war on Japan, and Russo-Mongol forces swept through Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

5. Communist Chinese and Kuomintang reactions

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the special declaration concerning Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic caused differing comments from the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang Government. The Chinese Communist Party jumped to the defense of Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet-Japanese arrangement did not mean, it said, that the Soviet Union would

restrict its just aid to oppressed peoples in the interests of imperialists. The hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests, above all, on the USSR, and by this treaty the USSR has not disappointed and will never disappoint China.... Now the Soviet-Japanese Declaration guarantees that Outer Mongolia will not be subjected to aggression. This is not only of positive significance for Outer Mongolia, it will

⁹⁷Excerpts of text in Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945 (Princeton, N. J.: 1945), pp. 200-201.

⁹⁸December 7, 1941, Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor, causing United States entry into World War II.

also benefit the cause of liberation of the whole of China.⁹⁹ Apparently the Chinese Communists considered Soviet Russia a guardian of Outer Mongolia until such time "when the Peoples' revolution has been victorious in China" and then "the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will."¹⁰⁰ Such were the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung in 1936. These ideas would have found little response from the Mongols of the Mongolian People's Republic by 1943. The possibility of China and Mongolia cooperating "as friendly neighboring States" was to be based on China sanctioning a Mongol claim to the restoration of Mongolian boundaries formerly recognized by the Manchu Dynasty--which in fact would mean the recognition of an independent federation of Outer and Inner Mongolia.¹⁰¹

On behalf of the Kuomintang, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact when he said that

it is an indisputable fact that the four Northeastern Provinces and Outer Mongolia are an integral part of the Republic of China and will always remain Chinese territory [and that therefore] the Chinese Government and people cannot recognize any engagements entered into between third parties which are derogatory to China's territorial and administrative integrity, and thus considers the Soviet-Japanese declaration as having

⁹⁹Text in Anna Louise Strong, China's New Crisis, Key Books No. 14 (London: no. d.), pp. 49-51.

¹⁰⁰Mao Tse-tung as quoted in Edgar Snow, Scorched Earth (London, 1941), p. 289.

¹⁰¹Edgar Snow, People on Our Side (New York: 1944), pp. 196-197.

no binding force whatsoever on China.¹⁰²

Never once during the Second World War did Chiang Kai-shek relinquish a legal claim to Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China. His book, China's Destiny,¹⁰³ published in 1943, contains a map showing Outer Mongolia (as well as Tibet and Hong Kong) as Chinese territory. Another assertion of China's control is seen in S. R. Chow's book, Winning the Peace in the Pacific. After pressing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia, once Russia has "no longer any fear of the Japanese menace of the Siberian border," Professor Chow suggests that if this contingency were realized "China would deem it wise and safe to grant the Outer Mongolian people, if they desire, a regime of self-government compatible with Chinese sovereignty."¹⁰⁴ A similar implied doubt was voiced by two Chinese members, speaking from a personal point of view, at the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in January, 1945, when they saw no objections to the independent membership of Outer Mongolia in a future world security organization "provided the people really wanted independence without being pressed from outside and provided that the people in that region were capable of growth and self-government." For China, they added, "it is largely a question of maintaining these regions free from foreign control and in general it was security that China

¹⁰²China Handbook, 1937-1943 (New York), p. 170.

¹⁰³Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (New York: Roy Publications, 1943).

¹⁰⁴S. R. Chow, Winning the Peace in the Pacific (New York: 1944), p. 90.

chiefly desired."¹⁰⁵

These details may appear irrelevant after January 5, 1946, the date on which the Chinese Republic officially recognized the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.¹⁰⁶ But they make it possible to evaluate the about-face policy of China and to seek an explanation for it in events outside the control of the Chinese Government. No actual proof could be obtained at the time as to the secret arrangements made between the United States, Britain and Soviet Russia at the Yalta Conference without the participation of or consultation with China. Since this Conference so greatly affected the outcome of the final status of Outer Mongolia a look at its political undertones seems in order.

C. YALTA AGREEMENT

The immediate and primary considerations impelling American officials to conclude and implement the Yalta Agreement of February, 1945, were undoubtedly military in nature--assuring Soviet participation in the Pacific war in order to secure the unconditional surrender of Japan. But their deeper thoughts centered on its political effects on the internal situation in China. The saving of American lives was the underlying factor of the military reason. The second reason possibly can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the

¹⁰⁵Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Virginia, January 6-7, 1945, (New York: 1945), p. 122.

¹⁰⁶Friters, op. cit., p. 216, n. 190.

balance of power from being totally upset by a resurgent Soviet Union working in coordination with the Chinese Communists.¹⁰⁷ According to Ambassador Harriman, President Roosevelt sought by the Yalta Agreement "to limit Soviet expansion in the East and to gain Soviet support for the Nationalist government."¹⁰⁸

1. Stalin's proposal

Stalin had always said that he would enter the Pacific war but only after the defeat of Germany and even before the Yalta Agreement he had assured himself that only Soviet forces would conduct the ground campaign into North China. Harriman had informed him that "the Americans would cut off the Japanese garrisons on the southern islands and the Russians would cut off the Japanese land forces in China."¹⁰⁹ There were other and more important concessions that Stalin wanted, however, and he was in a good bargaining position because the United States was anxious to have the Soviet Union enter the war before American forces invaded Japan. In a report by General MacArthur it was recognized that Russia wanted something in return for entering the war.

¹⁰⁷George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), pp. 349-369.

¹⁰⁸Statement of W. Averell Harriman, Hearings of Military Situation in the Far East, Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress, 1st session (1951), p. 3332.

¹⁰⁹Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 465.

Russia's aims are understood;...they would want all of Manchuria, Korea and possibly part of Nationalist China. This seizure of territory was inevitable; but the United States must insist that Russia pay her way by invading Manchuria at the earliest possible date after the defeat of Germany.¹¹⁰

Without a defined agreement, therefore, Stalin's potential in upsetting China's internal politics was unlimited. The United States would accept certain compromises but in return they would ask not only for entry into the war but also support of Chiang's leadership in China. Stalin appeared to be accommodating as regarded United States' stipulations but also informed Harriman of his own political claims in December, 1944, two months before Yalta. Among these claims the one which most concerns the present inquiry was his demand for "the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia--the maintenance of the Republic of Outer Mongolia as an independent identity."¹¹¹ Other phrases, referring to Russia's "preeminent interests," used in the draft agreement, furnished Stalin with a pretext for making greater claims on China than those which Roosevelt thought he agreed to support.

China was not informed of the agreement until June and while they were concerned about the term "pre-eminent interests" used in the Yalta Agreement and would not on their own have accepted it, they realized their need for a connection with the United States if they

¹¹⁰U. S., Department of Defense, "The Entry of the Soviet Union in the War Against Japan. Military Plans, 1941-1945," (September, 1955), pp. 51-52.

¹¹¹U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 379.

were to keep out of the Soviet orbit. They had to agree to Mongolia's independent status before Russia would enter the war and the immediate need for this was most necessary now that Germany was defeated. T. V. Soong, the Foreign Minister of China, went to Moscow on June 30 to negotiate with Stalin.

Stalin began the conversations by insisting that China recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia.¹¹² According to the Soviet view, the insertion of the words "the Mongolian People's Republic" in the parenthesis after the phrase "the status quo in Outer Mongolia" in the Yalta Agreement indicated that the provision meant the independence of Outer Mongolia.¹¹³ Soong replied that China could not agree to the cession of territory, that recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia would complicate the question of Tibet, and that the Chinese government might fall. He stated that the Chinese Communists would be among its most active critics if it ceded Outer Mongolia.¹¹⁴ Stalin reassured Soong that there would be nothing to fear if the Chinese and Soviet government stood together. He suggested a secret agreement on the independence of Outer Mongolia which might be published after the defeat of Japan.¹¹⁵

¹¹²Harry Truman, Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 315.

¹¹³U. S., Department of State, United States Relations with China (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 113, n. 2.

¹¹⁴Truman, op. cit., p. 315.

¹¹⁵Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 272.

Soong asked Ambassador Harriman to ascertain from President Truman the American Government's interpretation of the provision regarding Outer Mongolia in the Yalta Agreement. The reply was that at that time the United States did not want to act as interpreter on any point in the Yalta Agreement.¹¹⁶ But Harriman was authorized to tell Soong informally that the accepted meaning of the provision would be that the present factual and juridical status of Outer Mongolia was to be preserved. Then Truman told Harriman, for the latter's information only, what, as the American government understood it, the status quo was. "While the de jure sovereignty of Outer Mongolia remains vested in China, de facto this sovereignty is not exercised."¹¹⁷

2. Chiang Kai-shek's compromise

On Chiang Kai-shek's instruction Soong then offered to grant Outer Mongolia the highest degree of autonomy. Soong's explanation of this was that Outer Mongolia would be independent in regard to internal administration, foreign relations, and military affairs, and that she could enter into agreement with the Soviet Union, but that China would retain sovereignty over that region. Stalin insisted on outright independence and ended the talk by saying that unless this issue were settled no agreement would be possible.

Upon request, Chiang sent significant instructions to Soong. He clearly revealed the decisive consideration leading him to seek an

¹¹⁶Truman, op. cit., p. 317.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

agreement with the Soviet Union. For the sake of promoting the common interests of the two countries and permanent peace, China would permit the independence of Outer Mongolia after a plebiscite, provided the Soviet government gave concrete and firm answers to three questions. These involved China's administrative integrity over Manchuria, Soviet assistance in suppressing local rebellions in Sinkiang, and, very importantly, Soviet support for China's central government and not the Communist Party.¹¹⁸ Stalin accepted Chiang's proposal.

The issue of Outer Mongolia was the most hotly debated question in the negotiations at the meetings. Soong's spirited defense of China's legal title to Outer Mongolia has elicited the following comment in the State Department's White Paper on China:

One of the main preoccupations of Dr. Soong during the negotiations was to secure Soviet recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia....Dr. Soong was apparently willing to agree to other significant and important concessions in return for Outer Mongolia and it was with some difficulty that he was persuaded by Mr. Harriman to accept substance in place of form.¹¹⁹

This interpretation gave too little credit to Soong's and Chiang's diplomatic skill. It is true that to relinquish the legal title to a large piece of territory was unpalatable to Soong, Chiang, or any other Chinese who had been inculcated in the past fifty years with a deep sense of national humiliation over China's loss of territory and rights to other powers. But the Chinese were also realistic enough

¹¹⁸Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 318-319.

¹¹⁹U. S., Department of State, United States Relations with China, op. cit., p. 117, n. 7.

to recognize the inevitable and to try to gain the best advantage from it. The actual control of Outer Mongolia had been in the hands of the Soviet government since 1921 and the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924, while reaffirming Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, did not change the reality of actual Soviet control. By 1945 Chinese opinion gave signs of readiness to abandon the legal fiction for the sake of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. It has been mentioned what the two delegates to the Hot Springs Conference in early 1945 personally thought about independent membership in a future world security organization.¹²⁰ At the time of the San Francisco Conference, Ta-kung pao, the leading newspaper in Chungking, suggested in an editorial that Outer Mongolia be accorded a supreme measure of autonomy or alternatively might be recognized as an independent state and that simultaneously a Sino-Soviet pact should be concluded on a friendly basis.¹²¹ Subsequently, in justifying the Sino-Soviet treaty, Chiang told a joint session of the Supreme National Defense Council and the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang that "the racial group in Outer Mongolia had, in effect, declared its independence from the mother country as early as 1922 when the Peking government was in existence. This was almost a quarter of a century ago."¹²²

¹²⁰Cf. supra, p. 43.

¹²¹Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union (New York: John Day Co., 1950), pp. 286-287.

¹²²The Collected Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-1945, Vol. II (New York: John Day Co., 1946), p. 856.

In the light of these facts, it would seem that Soong's spirited defense of China's legal title was undertaken with two compensating notions in mind. One was to minimize China's loss, and the second was to strengthen her bargaining position in order to gain the maximum advantage in return for her concession. Chiang fully recognized the importance that Stalin attributed to Outer Mongolia. After the negotiations were deadlocked over it, Chiang instructed his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to see Stalin in a private capacity. In their informal talk, Stalin stressed the strategic importance of Outer Mongolia in the defense of Siberia and expressed his fear of a revived Japan.¹²³ He insisted on the independence of Outer Mongolia. Shortly afterward, Chiang offered his compromise solution. It is obvious that he would have gained much and lost little from the compromise if Stalin had strictly fulfilled all his promises.

3. Independent Mongolian People's Republic

The plebiscite by which the people of Outer Mongolia confirmed their desire for independence took place on October 20, 1945, after many meetings of "instruction" explaining for what the people were being asked to vote. In the presence of a Chinese delegation, the qualified Mongols voted "unanimously" for their independence. Then, on February 27, 1946, a ten-year pact, the Treaty of Friendship and

¹²³Chiang Ching-kuo, My Father (Taipei: 1956), pp. 6-9.

Mutual Assistance, was concluded with the USSR.¹²⁴ This was accompanied by a Soviet-Mongolian agreement on economic and cultural collaboration. This latter has allowed for a very progressive economic build-up in the Mongolian People's Republic, one from which the Mongols have greatly benefited. The former, despite its promise of military withdrawal, has allowed for a political crippling of the age-old ambitions of all Mongols--Pan-Mongolism and "true" independence.

Outer Mongolia's undisputed position as a satellite in the Russian "galaxy" gave cause for grave consideration after the summer of 1946, for it was then that her application for membership into the United Nations came before the Security Council.¹²⁵ She was refused membership at that time, possibly as a side reaction of the "cold war" or because a number of delegates felt that

the available information was not sufficient to show the Mongolian People's Republic was capable of fulfilling the obligations under the Charter and expressed the desire for further information which would clarify some points.¹²⁶

¹²⁴William Mandel, compiler, Soviet Source Materials on USSR Relations with East Asia 1945-1950 (New York: 1950), pp. 129-131.

¹²⁵Telegram from Choibalsan, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Secretary General of the United Nations, S/95, (June 24, 1946).

¹²⁶United Nations, Security Council, S/133, Report of the Security Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members, August 30, 1946 (SCOR, First Year, Second Series, Supplement 4, Annex 7, p. 66.)

CHAPTER II

SOVIET RUSSIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO OUTER MONGOLIAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

The Soviet Union, having taken the lead in assisting the Mongolian People's Republic to gain her autonomy, took active steps to clinch her position of dominance in the area. As a result various policies were attempted from 1921 onward. Each of them caused certain reactions and stimulated the internal desires of the Mongolian people. Ultimately the combination of policies, reactions and desires were to have an effect upon Outer Mongolia's status in the international arena.

Between the years 1946 and 1961 these policies and attitudes resulted in the emergence of three important factors which contributed to the position of Outer Mongolia when finally admitted to the United Nations. Mongolia was transformed into something more closely approximating the administrative structure erected in the Soviet Union. The economy was bolstered in an attempt to put Outer Mongolia on a footing more indicative of an independent state. A unique style of nationalism evolved due, in part, to affirmative and negative roles played alternately by the Soviet Union.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

As in other communist states, the Communist Party in Outer Mongolia is the organ used to control state and local government. Following early party division from 1921-32 and advisory and military assistance from the Soviet Union,¹ a gradual "transition to socialism" was adopted, with emphasis on persuasion and education. This marked the beginning of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union and Khorloin Choibalsan² became the symbol of this cooperation.³ The republic modeled its institutions closely on those of the Soviet Union.⁴ The

¹The right group in the MPRP were accused of having "followed a policy of subordinating the party's Central Committee to the coalition government, opposing the execution of social and economic reforms, trying to introduce elements of hostility into the relations between Mongolia and the Soviet Union and cooperating with Chinese militarists and the Japanese, as well as other imperialists in their struggle to thwart friendly relations between the working classes of the Soviet Union and Mongolia." Tang, *op. cit.*, p. 387. They were purged from the Party in 1924 and Soviet Russia helped establish a constitutional monarch to replace the coalition one. By 1928, however, the left group in the MPRP gained control and argued that Mongolia should proceed directly to socialism. They attacked on every front, aiming at the liquidation of the nobility and the religious hierarchy. These policies led to open rebellion, which was quelled only with Soviet military assistance. The Party later claimed that the leftist leadership violated the Leninist principle of mass leadership and pursued a policy of separating the Party from the masses, and in so doing alienated a sizable segment of the rural population. The official record states that Stalin himself advised the end of the "left deviation," and, in June, 1932, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Party so decided. The Party now adopted a more gradual sophisticated approach, placing emphasis on persuasion and education. Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²Cf. *supra*, p. 24, n. 55.

³Rupen, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 265.

1940 Constitution was a near replica of the Soviet Constitution of 1936.⁵ The Five-Year Plans, begun in 1948, emulated the Russian model.⁶ The Cyrillic alphabet was adapted for Mongolia.⁷

1. Party leadership

Although the Soviet government lost some influence over the Mongols at the death of Stalin, it soon reasserted itself and pressed for changes consonant with Soviet policies. Tsedenbal, who enjoyed considerable power under Choibalsan as deputy commander in chief and later as secretary-general of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, became both prime minister and leader of the Party on Choibalsan's death in January, 1952. For a brief time he lost control of the Party to D. Damba.⁸ This was the period before Khrushchev had consolidated his position of power in the Soviet Union and when the principle of collective leadership was being stressed in the Soviet Union and other countries in the communist bloc. It was also a period of factionalism in Outer Mongolia. In January, 1959

the communist propaganda machine took pains to deny press reports (which originated in Taiwan) of revolts against Soviet domination of Outer Mongolia, which had been lead by members

⁵Friters, op. cit., pp. 325-344.

⁶George G. S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia: A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), p. 156.

⁷Rupen, op. cit., p. 264.

⁸Scalapino, op. cit., pp. 86 and 87.

of the government and which had been quashed by the Red Army.⁹

In April, then, it was

casually reported that there had been "certain short-comings within the Party which were not in the interests of the cause of the Party and the people." It was announced that there had been a widespread reshuffle of senior posts in both government and party.¹⁰

Since 1958 Tsedenbal has headed both the government and the party and has maneuvered the Mongolian Party-Government system into a likeness of the Soviet Party-Government system.

The politico-economic upheaval in Outer Mongolia during this period greatly effected the role of the Party as the governing apparatus. The country was in the throes of a veritable revolution aimed at refashioning the innermost substance of the community's social and productive patterns in pursuance with the regime's "socialist" doctrine.¹¹ The very comprehensiveness of the attempt to bring socialism to Mongolia, as well as the serious risks involved in the venture, of necessity, dictated a major change in the nature and the modus operandi of the local Communist party. For many years prior to this time the membership level of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) had remained near constant. It was only since the Thirteenth Party Congress in March, 1958, that a serious effort was

⁹"Outer Mongolia--Mongolian People's Republic," Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 8 (August, 1959), p. 418.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 419.

¹¹Robert A. Rupen, "Inside Outer Mongolia," Foreign Affairs, January, 1959, pp. 328-333.

made to expand the party's ranks, raise the prestige of its cadres, and enhance the party's responsibilities as a whole in keeping with the growth of the tasks and duties facing the authorities.¹² To cope with their increased obligations the party had been forced to step up their campaign to enroll new members. They also found it necessary to alter their entire course of action.¹³ Previously the MPRP had been largely content with the following: a) monopolizing the power at the center; b) placing reliable personnel in key positions throughout the administration, and c) drafting the broad outlines of policy, leaving its actual realization to the lower echelons of the public service. This procedure was now abandoned under the pressure of changed conditions and requirements.

In order to assure the correct implementation of the proposed program¹⁴ of building socialism in Mongolia, the State and Party leadership was obliged to take direct participation in local affairs, political as well as economic, and to assume a formal role in administrative matters at all levels of government, from the district Councils to the central ministries. The past practice of informal guidance and supervision was replaced by the personal assumption of authority by trained party functionaries. Thus, with the reduced

¹²G. A. von Stackelberg, "Mongolia and the Thirteenth Congress of the Mongolian National Revolutionary Party," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, II, No. 4 (April, 1955), 11-17.

¹³"Agitation Among the Arats in the Mongolian People's Republic," World Marxist Review, I, No. 2 (October, 1959), 90.

¹⁴Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, pp. 142-143.

size of the elective bodies of government, the increasing concentration in the administrative apparatus, and the proliferation of diverse interlocking directorates, the newly renovated and strengthened MPRP was gradually able to consolidate and secure its hold of the Khurals.¹⁵ Before, its role had been quite nominal and primarily in the form of an ideological guide rather than an exercise of concrete control. Judging from the doctrinal formulas enunciated in the preamble to the new 1960 Constitution,¹⁶ this process may only be expected to persist in the coming years and, indeed, to gather speed with the passage of time.

2. Soviet leadership vs. Chinese

The Mongol leaders themselves firmly believed in the necessity of building socialism in Mongolia on a pattern already tested in the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In their stepped-up pursuit of this objective, however, the government in Ulan Bator consistently took into account the special conditions¹⁸ obtaining in Mongol society and made due allowance for them in drafting and implementing its political blueprints. There may have been an ulterior reason for the Government's program of

¹⁵Scalapino, op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁶Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 413.

¹⁷George Ginsburg, "Local Government in the MPR, 1940-1960," The Journal of Asian Studies, XX, No. 4 (1961), p. 506.

¹⁸Such as: traditionally proud people; predominantly livestock community; sparsely populated state; intensely attempting industrialization; recently liberated government. (author's note)

initiating far-reaching institutional reforms designed to make the Mongolian administrative apparatus resemble even more the Soviet model. This motive may have been grounded in a certain apprehension at the doctrinal claims then being advanced by Communist China.¹⁹ Indeed, it is conceivable that these drastic reforms evidenced a strong desire on the part of Ulan Bator to identify itself more intimately with the Kremlin's sphere of influence, while also subtly implying thereby that the Mongol system had progressed farther up the ladder of historical evolution leading to socialism and eventual communism than Communist China.

It is difficult to discern sharp divisions in modern Mongolian politics. Educated Mongols know that they must live under Soviet influence because of the geographic location of their country. At the same time they seem to have no liking for the Chinese. Whether there was, or is, a genuinely pro-Communist Chinese pressure group contesting for power in the country is a moot question. Perhaps we can best interpret domestic Mongolian political changes purely on the basis of a power struggle within an organization whose warring factions are divided by mere day-to-day, rather than fundamental, ideological differences.²⁰ The impression one gains is that the Mongols have learned to accept Soviet influence and to concern themselves only with the implementation of Moscow policies laid down for them. Administratively, however, they can to some small degree temper to their own liking these

¹⁹Ginsburg, op. cit., p. 506.

²⁰Murphy, op. cit., p. 151.

policies evolved for them.

A stronger show of independence is hardly to be expected from a small country fated to deal with Soviet Russia and lying next to Communist China. The balance of advantages over disadvantages to the Soviet Union in having the Mongolian People's Republic as a satellite, rather than as a union republic, cannot be substantial. Any move toward real independence on the part of the Mongols would again bring Soviet military forces to Ulan Bator. This is so particularly since Communist China has expressed her opinion that she considers the Mongolian People's Republic as "lost territory." Such an attitude makes the Soviet Union feel that Red China would be quick to seize upon any break with Russia as a chance to increase her own influence in Mongolia. To have Chinese settlers on the northern rivers of Outer Mongolia, as in the 1880's, would be intolerable. The Soviet Union is in a position to wield extreme coercive power over the Mongols and the Mongols have no choice but to accept the tenuous status of "independence" which is theirs.

B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The second factor contributing to the position of Outer Mongolia when admitted to the United Nations also was initiated primarily by Soviet Russia. The Soviet Union was the first to involve herself with the transformation of Outer Mongolia's socio-economic structure, which, in turn, opened the way for acceleration.²¹ Slow development caused

²¹Owen Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 172.

this transformation. New machines and techniques, when first introduced, are mere additions. They are at the periphery of the economy, not yet within it, and the men who operate them are attached to the society but not yet integrated into it. A second phase opens as the complex of men, machines, and techniques begin to change the economy and society which were there before. Then comes the decisive phase. Either, as in Kuomintang China, the new additions fail to fuse with the old elements and there is a breakdown leading to a totally new regrouping, or there is a fusion which goes beyond "old plus new," a transformation which results in a new entity ready to make its way in the world. A transformation of this kind seems to clear the way for acceleration. In Mongolia, making a very rough count by decades, it can be said that the 1920's was the decade of addition, the 1930's the decade of modification, the 1940's the decade in which transformation began, and the 1950's the decade in which transformation became complete enough to open the way for acceleration.²² It is this last decade which has seen an enormously strengthened apparatus of economic control imposed by the Soviet Union on the Mongols. With the effective collectivization of practically all the nomads and most of their livestock during 1957-1959, nationalization of the economy in Mongolia was completed, since all other economic enterprises had long been incorporated into the "socialist sector."²³

The major instruments of economic control, operating under the

²²Ibid., pp. 171-173.

²³Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 298.

overall control of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, included in 1961: 337 cooperatives, enrolling more than 99 per cent of total arat²⁴ households and owning about 80 per cent of total livestock; 36 Machine Livestock Stations (preparation or processing stations); and 28 state farms.²⁵

1. Five-Year Plans

Outer Mongolia has also become a country of Five-Year Plans: the First Five-Year Plan (1948-1952);²⁶ the Second Five-Year Plan (1953-1957);²⁷ the Three-Year Plan (1958-1960);²⁸ and the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965).²⁹ Russia was to supply approximately 15 per cent of the total Mongolian investment in the Third Five-Year Plan, while China was to supply about 5 per cent. The Russians appeared to be far more actively involved in Mongolian planning than the Chinese. It was to Moscow, not Peking, that a member of the Mongolian Politburo, Molomjamts,³⁰ went in 1960 for consultation about the scope and

²⁴Arat = people, common people. It also refers to one person. This word is important in the political vocabulary of Mongolia. A number of important terms derive from it, such as arat-un erketei (democratic), arat erke (democracy), arat erke-in ulus (republic) and arat-tumen (the masses). Friters, op. cit., p. 322.

²⁵Ibid., p. 323.

²⁶Murphy, op. cit., pp. 157-169.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 169-176.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 176-179.

²⁹Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 325.

³⁰Ibid., p. 334.

direction of the Third Five-Year Plan. Further evidence of Soviet involvement in Mongolian planning was provided when Sambu,³¹ also a member of the Mongolian Politburo, emphasized in a speech in Moscow in April, 1960: "...an event in the spring of 1959 of historical significance for the development of new Mongolia: stressing agriculture on the initiative of Khrushchev."³² Mongolian economic policies often echo the current Soviet line.

Outer Mongolia's lack of machinery and equipment has been met, and continues to be met, by imports from abroad, mainly from the Soviet Union. In the Three-Year Plan period (1958-1960) Russia supplied the Mongols with 2,500 tractors and 3,000 trucks.³³

2. Collectivization

The nationalization of land in Mongolia, which took place as early as 1924, did not profoundly affect the Mongolian economy or society because land had never been considered "private property" in the Western sense. However, the attack on the Buddhist Church had very great economic effects. The Church and its leaders had, in fact, fulfilled the functions of economic entrepreneurs as well as theocrats, and the regime's anti-Church policies included confiscation of its property and economic resources.³⁴ By 1938 the Church

³¹Ibid.

³²Isvestia, April 13, 1960.

³³Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 291.

³⁴Murphy, op. cit., p. 108.

owned no livestock whereas it had previously owned millions of head.

Forcible collectivization of the nomads was then attempted in 1929-1931, but it was quickly abandoned when the nomads slaughtered over one-third of their animals.³⁵ When collectivization was finally carried out successfully in 1957-1959, the government did not employ force in the same direct way. Instead, it achieved its goals by exerting more subtle economic pressures, through taxation and control of markets. By 1961 the country was almost completely collectivized, but some private ownership of livestock continued in the collectives.

It is legitimate to ask why, after so many years of inaction after 1931, the regime moved so vigorously and rapidly in collectivizing during 1957-1959. Was this a "great leap forward" on the Chinese pattern? Perhaps it represented a Soviet-inspired reaction to Chinese policies. Collectivization had always remained a Communist goal for Mongolia.³⁶ Perhaps, also, the Russians stepped in vigorously in 1957, following the rapid collectivization program that took place in China during 1955-1956, to prod their Mongolian satellite into action. Chinese influence may, therefore, have indirectly affected the timing and speed of the operation. No major production-increase campaign

³⁵Friters, op. cit., p. xxxvii.

³⁶Some years after the collapse of the collectivization campaign of 1929-1931, Choibalsan spoke on this subject, in January, 1938: "The peasants of the USSR have attempted to find a happier, more prosperous life through kolkhozes. We believe that there will come a time when our arats will themselves wish to form kolkhozes. We oppose the repetition of leftist errors, we will resolutely fight against any attempt at forced collectivization of kolkhozes." Text in Robert A. Rupen, The Mongolian People's Republic, Hoover Institution Studies, No. 12 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966) p. 35.

followed collectivization in Outer Mongolia, however, as it did in China during the Great Leap Forward of 1958.

3. Population growth

The population increase in Outer Mongolia is a significant indication of improved overall policy. Since 1955 the annual gross population growth rate has steadily increased from 1.8 to 3.3 per cent.³⁷ The country's crude birthrate in 1960 was 41.2 per thousand, a high figure, and the death rate was 10.0 per thousand, a low figure, compared with world patterns of fertility and mortality. Modern health practices and modern medicine have had beneficial effects on both birthrate and death rate. The availability of better and less hazardous employment opportunities, combined with a sense of change and progressive purpose, may also have contributed to faster population growth. The population picture, however, also mirrors the costs of Soviet control. Before this period of acceleration when the policy was that of gradual transition to socialism, there was little socio-economic change and, consequently, little change in population rates. The outbursts of political opposition and social disorder during that time obviously must have added to the high mortality rates, thus reducing the population even more. The 1950's saw a change in policy and also a noticeable change in population conditions. This has been a great advantage to Mongolia for there really is no hope of progress for them in any area without a larger population.

³⁷Statistical Handbook (Ulan Bator, 1961).

The occupational composition of Outer Mongolia's population had also changed somewhat by 1961. Thirty-six per cent of the population consisted of civil servants, industrial workers, and other non-agricultural employees and their families. The other sixty-four per cent were engaged in animal husbandry, either on state farms or in the collectives mentioned earlier.³⁸ Such percentages would indicate that the Mongolian People's Republic was still heavily oriented toward primary production. Actually, of the nonagricultural work force, less than one-third were directly engaged in industry. Education, culture and health accounted for almost as many employees as did industry. The only other important groups of nonagricultural workers were distributed among construction, transportation and trade.

4. Dependence on foreign assistance

On the surface some of these statistics might indicate a greater rate of economic growth in Outer Mongolia than actually existed. In reality, the overall orientation of their economy had not changed greatly. They were and are very much dependent on foreign economic assistance.³⁹ An independent economy could probably never be attained except at a very low level of subsistence by a country like Mongolia, which depends heavily on imports for a great range of significant items, including tea, textiles and machinery. The problem lies in the question of repayment, for Mongolia's trade imbalance continues and

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹E. H. Rawlings, "Progress in Mongolia," Eastern World, XVI, No. 4 (April, 1962), 11-12.

even grows. Essentially, Mongolia's only important exports consist of livestock and livestock products, and the livestock sector of the Mongolian economy in 1961 was far below expectation. The Mongolian economy had not "taken off" by then and seemed not too close to doing so. Certainly, the cutoff of Soviet largesse would doom hopes for Mongolian economic development.

While Outer Mongolia greatly depended upon its trade with the Soviet Union it did have trade agreements with other nations. This opening up to the Soviet bloc and then outside nations seemed to be a reaction to the criticism given by the Security Council leading to the 1955 refusal of Outer Mongolian admission to the United Nations.⁴⁰ Security Council members felt that the Mongolian People's Republic should have diplomatic relations with countries other than the Soviet Union and Communist China before further considering her admission to the United Nations. By initiating several trade agreements the Mongolian government slowly eased itself into the world arena and diplomatic relations with some nations followed. The latter gave Mongolia greater confidence in her political status and the trade agreements have proven to be economically beneficial to her. Not only the East European countries negotiated trade treaties with them but so also did various western bloc countries. Even the United States accepted imports while placing an embargo on her exports to Outer

⁴⁰SCOR, 2nd year, Special Supplement, No. 3, 1947, p. 11.
SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No. 4, 1946, pp. 64-65.
S/PV.56, 1946, p. 90.

Mongolia.⁴¹

It is true that the increased extent of foreign assistance the Mongolian People's Republic now enjoys will undoubtedly help to raise the country's economic standard of living. Yet, for those who consider the expansion of political freedom as one of the most prized social ends, evaluation of Outer Mongolia's progress will always be colored by the nature of the Soviet political system. None of the colonies of the West, or at least of the enlightened West, ever had to pay the price of initial submission to a party dictatorship in return for the right to embark on the road to economic development. Moreover, no small satellite within easy reach of Soviet ground forces can advance toward political freedom at its own speed. Each must keep in step with the Soviet bloc as a whole, although some may be leaders and others laggards. Should there be a regression toward autocratic rule within the bloc as a whole, small satellites would inevitably suffer the most.

In addition to enduring external constraints of this nature, the Outer Mongolians have found their aspirations for a wider Pan-Mongol polity consistently frustrated by the Soviet Union. To all intents and purposes the Pan-Mongol question no longer exists, because those areas where Mongols formerly predominated outside Outer Mongolia are now peopled by Chinese and Soviet ethnic groups. However, it was the desire for Mongol unity and the adjustments of this desire with their

⁴¹Robert A. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," Pacific Affairs, XXXIII (1960), 139-140.

new way of life that did help mold a unique style of nationalism among the peoples of Outer Mongolia. It is this nationalism that is the third special ingredient resulting in Outer Mongolia's position when admitted to the United Nations.

C. IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

Nationalism in Outer Mongolia had its roots in the desire for independence. It was Inner Mongolia under the threat of sinification and Buryat Mongolia under the threat of russification who brought this nationalistic sentiment to Outer Mongolia.⁴² It had not been as intense in Outer Mongolia because their traditional mode of existence was not being threatened to the extent of their neighbor Mongols.

1. Escape from sinification

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, growing economic pressure indirectly but seriously threatened the Outer Mongols. Chinese control of the Outer Mongolian market intensified as the Chinese became alarmed at the growing Russian trading activities in the area. The Russians worried, in turn, about an increasingly aggressive Chinese economic policy, seeing their hard-won gains in Outer Mongolia potentially threatened. The Mongols found themselves ever more in debt to Chinese merchants and money-lenders, and many activist Inner Mongols fled to Ulan Bator with frightening tales,

⁴²Cf. supra, p. 8, n. 1; Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 6-35, passim.

evidence of what the future might bring to Outer Mongolia. Some Buryats left Russia, similarly encouraging Outer Mongolian political action. The Chinese threat was clearly the greater in the early twentieth century, and Inner Mongolian counsel and personnel dominated the influential leaders of Outer Mongolia. This led to the 1911 Outer Mongolian Revolution and the declaration of autonomy for that state. But "autonomy" lasted only from 1911 to 1919, and even in those few years Mongolia was not free of strong Chinese and Russian pressure. Tsarist Russian policy did, however, at that time support the Mongols in prohibiting significant Chinese settlement in Outer Mongolia.

Sinification was also limited in the Soviet period by the virtual sealing of the southern boundary of the Mongolian People's Republic from 1925 to 1952. For the Outer Mongols, the Soviet Union represented a less serious threat than China. Few of them ever settled in the country and at least a feeling of independence was allowed to prevail among the Outer Mongols.

The question arises: why would Outer Mongolia, then nationalistically oriented and in search for a real independence, allow and even seek Soviet dominance in place of Chinese control? Two answers can be considered. The first, and the most obvious, is that Outer Mongolia was in no position to demand and receive independence. Situated geographically as they are, at best they could only play one side against the other from time to time. The second is in reference to the age-old attitude of the Mongols toward the Chinese. The Mongols have looked down on the Chinese as grubby laborers and town-dwellers. They felt that the Chinese did their dirty work for them,

and despised the occupations dominated by the Chinese: farming, mining, all kinds of menial labor on a regular daily basis, and trade. Owen Lattimore writes that among the Mongols

the term "hard" is used of Mongols and the term "soft" of Chinese. These terms do not stand only for physical robustness, but for the moral "hardness" of the man who lives in the saddle and makes his camp where he pleases, as against the moral "softness" of the man who is in bondage to the land he tills or the merchandise in which he deals, to his goods and his comfort, the safety of his roof and his walled town.⁴³

The Chinese added fuel to the fire of Mongol hatred by taking every opportunity for the economic exploitation of the Mongol. The Kuomintang Government often seemed to envisage complete assimilation as the only "solution" to problems in Mongolia.

2. Attitudes toward Soviet ideology

On the other side of the coin, there were the Russians against which there had never been a simple anti-Russian attitude as there had been an anti-Chinese one. Turning to them seemed a hope for eventual independence or at least more equal treatment.⁴⁴ Mongolian nationalist sentiment had not died, however, as can be seen by some of the comments made by their leaders and foreign observers. Da Lama, a leading Mongol of the Autonomous Government, said about 1912: "The Mongols are poor and uneducated, but freedom-loving, and do not want to change from

⁴³Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria, p. 65.

⁴⁴Such naivite has had some rewards as has been seen.

Chinese slaves into Russian slaves."⁴⁵ Tseren Dorji, prominent in the Autonomous Government and for a time Prime Minister of Mongolia, stated in 1926:

You foreigners think that the Russians are everything in Mongolia. It is not so. We Mongols have been left behind by civilization, and we need help. So we have invited Russians to aid us in building a national bank and an army, in organizing co-operative societies and a customs service. We like their exports, we trust them, but they will not always be here.⁴⁶

Ivor Montagu, British Communist who travelled in Outer Mongolia in 1954 and again in 1957, holds that the Russians treat the Mongols with incredible tact.

There are undoubtedly some Soviet citizens who feel like racists and whose behavior is deeply resented....It would be nonsense to pretend there are none. But in general these relationships are managed with incredible tact compared to the behavior general among our own co-citizens--British, U.S., French or Dutch, etc....The deference, the care, the respect shown to Mongolian nationalism by the Russians is enormous. To us, with our standards, it is an "incredible tact" and is I am certain reaping its reward.⁴⁷

The modernity and progress which Russia undeniably brings to Outer Mongolia is certainly enthusiastically embraced by many Mongols. At the same time, the arat opposes the persistent attempts at collectivization and the threat to nomadic life. His traditional, unique culture has been dealt severe blows: the religion largely eliminated, the language (and script) changed, the overall territory of "Greater

⁴⁵M. T. Haggard, "Mongolia: The Uneasy Buffer," Asian Survey, V (January, 1965), 19.

⁴⁶Lewis S. Gannett, "Mongolia-A Nomad Republic," China Weekly Review, No. 39 (February 19, 1927), 318.

⁴⁷Ivor Montagu, Letter to Robert A. Rupen, March 10, 1958, as cited in Rupen, "Outer Mongolia--1957-1960," p. 140.

Mongolia" significantly reduced. But improved education and communications have put him in closer contact with his fellows and broadened his horizons.⁴⁸ Nationalism and the desire for independence continue to be vital forces, but their content has been greatly changed by the events of the 1950's particularly.

3. Following the Socialist road with a Mongolian "twist"

The forced destruction of religion meant the end of one of the prime sources of earlier Mongolian nationalist sentiment,⁴⁹ and incursions on traditional patterns of living through collectivization and modernization struck at some of the cultural peculiarities which gave such sentiment further strength. Nonetheless a "new Nationalism" seems to exist which is not entirely spurious or synthetic. This

⁴⁸Jack Raymond, "Outer Mongolia Being Modernized," New York Times, August 27, 1957, p. 1.

⁴⁹Traditionally the Lamas in their Buddhist monasteries held the greatest control over the peoples and activities of Outer Mongolia. This type of situation presented an effective barrier to any program of socialization the MPRP hoped to introduce and so they adopted subtle means of depriving the monasteries of their strength. The building of new monasteries was forbidden, searches for reincarnations were prohibited, monasteries were forbidden to interfere in political and social affairs or to take upon themselves judicial or administrative functions, to enroll as lamas minors and persons eligible for military service, and to set one monastery in a position subordinate to another. Despite some resistance, these policies were effective. The number of monks in the monasteries dropped sharply and, by 1940, the Lamaist hierarchy no longer presented a major problem to the Party. Theoretically, religious activity is still permitted in Mongolia, and the state allows two small monasteries to continue religious services. These monasteries are maintained largely for the benefit of Buddhist visitors from south and southeast Asia. (Scalapino, op. cit., p. 98.)

expresses itself in rugged patriotism and a pride in learning new skills and adopting new ways, including a desire to establish and extend contacts with other lands and peoples. The integration with systems external and internal to it has become much stronger since the Mongolian People's Republic joined Soviet Russia "on the socialist road." Internally, integration involved destruction of the old social, political and cultural forms and their replacement by new ones. But the new state of integration is not simply a substitution of new forms for old, important as that is. It also includes tighter integration and far more detailed and effective control of many aspects of life.⁵⁰ The combination of destruction of old integrators and introduction of more far-reaching new ones threatens to bring about the elimination of the Mongols as an independent cultural unit. But the more effective communication among Mongols also leads to greater awareness of that threat. In point of fact, Mongolian nationalism has not been destroyed; it has actually increased in intensity in the last decades. Gerard Friters wrote in 1951 that "the individual Mongol has tried to retain one quality which is omitted from so-called Marxist interpretations of events--his ardour for independence, which is as much a part of his nature as it is that of the eagle."⁵¹ Indeed many reports testify that the Mongols retain a strong sense of independence. The American photographer, Lisa Larsen, who visited Ulan Bator briefly in 1956, notes that the "Mongolians were. . . little touched by the

⁵⁰Haggard, "Mongolia--The Uneasy Buffer," p. 24.

⁵¹Friters, op. cit., pp. vi-vii.

trappings of modern Communism. They seem as 'hardy, unspoiled and superbly independent' as they must have been over 700 years ago when they were the warriors of Genghis Khan."⁵²

The terms of a Russian complaint published in 1955 indicated that "bourgeois nationalism" worried the Communist rulers.⁵³ There was reference to "traces of feudalism in the economy and in the thoughts of the people," and objection to the repertoire of the State Theatre and the content of contemporary Mongolian literature. "Raising the ideological level of members of the Party" was posed as a critical need, as was "inculcation of Marxism in the masses." Teaching of history and literature in the schools continued to show "manifestations of the ideology of bourgeois nationalism." Writers devoted too much attention to traditional epics and folklore, and far too often they wrote "in old-fashioned language and employed archaisms." The Mongols were called upon to "struggle for literature [pertaining to the party] and oppose the enthusiasm for historical subjects and idealization of the past."⁵⁴ One author of note, Professor B. Rinchen, a member of the Academy of Sciences, was severely criticized for his opposition to the changes taking place in Mongol society and for his attempts to popularize the past.⁵⁵

⁵²Life Magazine, July 22, 1957, p. 56.

⁵³Robert A. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia Since 1955," Pacific Affairs, XXX (1957), 349-350.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 351.

⁵⁵Robert A. Rupen, "Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," The China Quarterly, No. 16 (November-December, 1963), 76.

It can be seen, therefore, that Mongolian nationalism continues to exist and has even increased in strength because of the growth of centralization, unification and education. But Mongols recognize the limitations imposed on them by their geographic position and their small population. They recognize too the erosion of "Greater Mongolia" and their dream of Pan-Mongolism. There was hope of briefly reviving Pan-Mongolism with official Soviet blessing at the end of World War II. This was with respect to Inner Mongolia only, however, for Buryat Mongolia was forever out of the reach of the Mongolian People's Republic. During 1945-1947, Soviet Russia, in conjunction with Outer Mongolia, apparently aimed to add Inner Mongolia to the territory subject to Soviet influence.⁵⁶ However, the Chinese Communists, led by Ulanfu in Inner Mongolia, frustrated this attempt, and, on May 1, 1947, established an Inner Mongolian regime loyal to the Chinese Communist movement of Mao Tse-tung.⁵⁷ This was the last of Outer Mongolia's hopes of attaining a "Greater Mongolia."

Although Mongolian territory has been reduced in extent, the Mongols are holding tenaciously to the fact that their territory is nominally independent. The native language, while manipulated, is not suppressed. The Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and of China have made concessions to Mongolian national sentiment and thus far have not dealt final blows to the Mongolian way of life.⁵⁸ The

⁵⁶Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 259.

⁵⁷Nicholas Poppe, "The Facts on Outer Mongolia," The New Leader, February 20, 1956, p. 14

⁵⁸Richard Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 285-286.

"knockout" administered to religion in the Mongolian People's Republic left the Mongols reeling for a time, but they regained balance and survived. Official nationalism might take as its slogan, "National in form, socialist in content," but nationalism of a traditional type persists and tends to break out even when apparently long suppressed.

Any summary of the current state of Mongolian internal and foreign affairs must consider several interrelated factors. One important factor is that livestock-herding nomads still comprise the majority of the population, even though the urban population is growing rapidly. But the nomads, even the ones in remote regions, are effectively integrated into "the system" through collectivization and close party supervision of a multitude of the activities of daily life. The urban population is even more closely controlled and integrated.

Industrial development and, indeed, all new economic enterprises and activities depend on Soviet initiative and Soviet equipment, and are directly integrated into over-all Soviet-Mongolian economic relations.

The Communist Party of Outer Mongolia, operating unchecked in a one-party system, controls the country effectively in all its aspects and limits the expression of the persistent Mongolian nationalism. The one-party system provides good jobs for many Mongols, who may be expected to support it strongly.

The influence of the Soviet Union is dominant in the Mongolian People's Republic and far exceeds that of any other foreign country. The cultural aspect of Russian influence--in language, education, literature and the like--is overwhelming, and threatens indigenous

Mongolian culture.

Outer Mongolia's expansion of diplomatic and other relations with countries outside the bloc immensely pleases the Mongols. This undoubtedly encourages Mongolian nationalism, and at the same time, probably makes Russian direction more palatable. Few Mongols expect much greater "independence" than they enjoy at the present time.

The sum total of Soviet influence in Mongolia is very great, and reaches into all corners of Mongolian life. Culturally, economically and politically Mongolia's orientation will probably continue to be toward Russia, from which the whole complex of internal and external integration derives fairly directly.

By 1961 Outer Mongolia had achieved great goals when compared with the early 1900's. Her acceptance into the United Nations that year may have been based somewhat upon the realization that membership in this International Organization and diplomatic relations with a wide range of countries outside and within the bloc would probably assure continuation of such independence as Mongolia then enjoyed. It is not now likely that Outer Mongolia will be incorporated into the Soviet Union as a constituent unit. The Soviet Union has worked hard to gain that extra vote in the United Nations and is not apt to relinquish it when there is no real necessity.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNIST CHINA'S CONTEST FOR CONTROL OF OUTER MONGOLIA

China had never really acquiesced to Russia's paramount position in Mongolia. She was too weak to prevent the tsarist intrigue of 1913,¹ just as Chiang Kai-shek was too weak in 1945² to prevent Stalin from reasserting the Russian position. Later Chiang repudiated his reluctant acquiescence. Mao Tse-tung nominally conceded Mongolia's independence in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950.³ However, by the terms of the treaty Mao gained the somewhat fine point of recognizing the "independent status," rather than the "independence" of the Mongolian People's Republic. He also gained the omission of any reference to an existing boundary with China such as Chiang Kai-shek had had to acknowledge. More practically, the Peking Government could and did benefit from the changed situation by establishing an embassy

¹Cf. supra, p. 11.

²Cf. supra, pp. 48-50.

³Text in Mandel, op. cit., pp. 115-121.

in Ulan Bator,⁴ where ineffective Chinese "suzerainty" had not even been able to retain a representative. And from diplomatic and treaty relations flowed cultural and economic agreements enabling Peking to compete with Moscow for influence over the Mongolians. So it was that in the latter half of the 1950's the Chinese tried to win Mongolia to their side again. It was the opening phase of the Sino-Soviet split, about which--at that time--the Western world was still oblivious.

In the early 1950's China and Russia had not yet publicly indicated the slightest break in official friendship. To all appearances there still seemed to be a comradeship and a firm military and economic alliance. But in Mongolia there could be seen symptoms of the great Communist schism. There in the depths of Asia, in a land so remote that few Europeans or Americans could precisely locate its frontiers, the evidences of the split were exposed--openly hostile remarks by Russians against Chinese and Chinese against Russians; intense conflict between the two powers for dominant influence with the Mongols; rival and competitive aid programs; aggressive campaigns for political and propaganda influence within the Mongol intelligentsia as well as within the upper echelons of the Mongolian Communist Party.

A. OUTER MONGOLIA'S STRATEGIC LOCATION

It was no accident that it was precisely in Mongolia that the cutting edge of the Soviet-Chinese dispute first became visible for, remote as it may be geographically, it fulfills a strategic function

⁴"Outer Mongolia--Mongolian People's Republic." p. 421.

which belies its isolation. One need not accept the worn and dubious concepts of geopolitics to understand Mongolia's critical role. It is what Sir Halford J. Mackinder, the founder of geopolitical thinking, would have called a true "geographical pivot of history."⁵

1. Heartland

Mackinder's theory was that he "who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the world." Mackinder's belief in the exact location of this heartland changed several times, however, but his theory remained the same. As a result various countries have determined this area in accordance with their own dreams of power. We have seen in Chapter I a reference to Japan's interpretation of Mackinder's thinking in the famous Tanaka Memorial of 1927.⁶ The Tanaka Memorial is particularly interesting because although its authenticity has long been challenged it finds mention in almost every Soviet political work on East Asia and is accepted by the Russians apparently without question. As the Tanaka Memorial put it: "In order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must begin by conquering China."

The importance of the Tanaka Memorial is its pertinence to Russian and Chinese policy. If the two great Communist countries do not consciously espouse this doctrine their policies clearly reflect the

⁵Sir Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, XXIII, No. 4 (1904).

⁶Cf. supra, pp. 30-31.

same kind of thinking. A look at Far Eastern history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries points out the contesting for power in the Mongolian and Manchurian areas by Russia, China and Japan. It is no surprise that it has again assumed a critical role in great power conflict. Its strategic significance has not changed. If Russia is to be dominant in East Asia, if Vladivostok is truly to be "Ruler of the East,"⁷ Mongolia holds the critical role. Any Soviet thrust eastward and southward will inevitably be made from Mongolia. Any thrust at Chinese Communist strength--just as any thrust at Japan's Kwantung army in World War II⁸--will be made from Mongol concentration points. The Chinese troops today stand precisely where the Japanese troops stood thirty years ago. Politics and regimes have changed. Geography has not. Great industrial complexes have been founded in Manchuria by the Russians, developed by the Japanese, and inherited and expanded by the Communist Chinese. And yet, Mongolia's relationship to Manchuria has not changed.

2. Buffer

Conversely, Mongolia is as important to China as it was to Japan's Kwantung army. Chinese industries in Manchuria cannot thrive under the threat of insecurity; neither can the Chinese cities in Inner Mongolia. If the great nuclear facilities of Inner Mongolia and

⁷Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 207.

⁸Friters, op. cit., pp. 145-149.

farther west in Kiangsu⁹ are to be of any consequence they must not stand under danger from long-range rockets. Peking herself cannot afford to be imperiled by a sudden double envelopment. If these basic military challenges are to be coped with with some assurance of security, Mongolia must be neutralized, at a minimum, and brought to China's side if possible.

In the view of the military, Mongolia is not merely a great empty range for horses, sheep and cattle extending 2,000 miles from east to west, sharing a 2,500-mile frontier with China and a 1,800-mile frontier with Russia. It is, as Genghis Khan once put it, "the hinge of the earth."¹⁰ This would not, perhaps, be true if Russia and China were in partnership--as envisaged on paper in their treaty of February, 1950.¹¹ It is the schism between Russia and China which has imparted this deep significance to Mongolia. What is essentially important is that when the supercontinent of Asia is in conflict, when there are two powers seeking to dominate the "world island," Mongolia becomes the key position. But this key position can no longer be thought of in terms of Heartland or "center of the world." Control would characterize such an area. Outer Mongolia's importance is relegated to that of a buffer state--a state situated between two large, antagonistic powers, regarded as lessening the possibility of conflict

⁹Harrison E. Salisbury, Orbit of China (New York: Harper and Rowe, Pub., 1967), pp. 157-158.

¹⁰As quoted in Owen Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. xx.

¹¹Schwartz, op. cit., p. 153.

between them.

It, therefore, behooved the Communist Chinese to use every resource in its power to match Russian influence in Outer Mongolia. Communist China could hope by this little more than to keep Outer Mongolia a buffer state where no single external influence would be dominant. This did not mean that hopes of reclaiming Outer Mongolia were ever completely extinguished. The Chinese, whether under Manchu, Kuomintang or Communist regime, have never accepted the "loss" of Outer Mongolia. Mao Tse-tung attempted in 1954 to bring about the liquidation of Mongolian independence but was unsuccessful. His own words indicate his attitude concerning the Soviet position there.

There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed the country under its domination....In 1954, when Khrushchev and Bulganin came to China, we took up this question but they refused to talk to us.¹²

If Outer Mongolia was not to be reunited to China then China would take up a position of competition with the Soviet Union in Mongolia. Although the Communist Parties of both Russia and China denied the existence of any rivalry, it was clear that Outer Mongolia experienced the conflicting tugs and pulls of a China and Russia competing, ever so politely, for a predominant sphere of influence.

B. CHINA'S ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE

China under Mao faced serious problems in reasserting its

¹²Mao Tse-tung, "Mao's Statement to the Japanese Socialist Delegation," as quoted in Doolin, op. cit., p. 43.

influence in the Mongolian People's Republic. Insofar as China of the 1950's was Communist, the ideology she represented had already been offered to Mongolia by the Soviet Union. Insofar as Communist China was still Chinese, she represented imperialistic territorial ambitions, which in many respects frightened the Mongols. Insofar as Communist China was Stalinist and opposed to liberalizing tendencies, she challenged trends favored by the Mongols. Moreover, since Mongolia had already for many years accepted and to a considerable extent been made over in the Soviet image, what alternative could China offer. China's industrial and agricultural weakness meant that the Soviet Union could easily trump every Chinese economic card. The population ratio between Russia and China caused the Mongols to feel less threatened by Russian population pressure and a resulting immigration into Mongolia.¹³ The Chinese could easily swamp the Mongols. Hence, the Mongolian People's Republic dealt cautiously and warily with China, and it would not lightly act to cut its ties with its Soviet protector, even if it could.

Nevertheless, China's re-entry on the Mongolian scene did affect the Mongolian People's Republic in many ways, and it led the Russians to take conscious counteraction. This Sino-Soviet "socialist competition" led to an acceleration of Mongolian economic development.¹⁴ Before this time, the Mongols had, for the most part, left it to the Russians to determine the pace of their development, and the

¹³Possibly Mongolia considered Soviet encroachment in Tannu Tuva and Buryat as the last of their expansion into Mongolian lands.

¹⁴Cf. supra, Chapter II.

Russians for a long time contented themselves with controlling Mongolian foreign affairs and showed relatively little interest in rapid Mongolian development. Chinese influence posed a challenge to which there was a clear Soviet response.

After Stalin's death in March, 1953, and before Khrushchev established himself as effective successor by 1956, China apparently moved to exploit the Russian interregnum and attempted to displace the Soviet Union as protector of the Mongolian People's Republic. This speculation is supported by the following facts, which suggest a steady growth of Chinese influence immediately after 1953.

1. Official representation

In 1954, Jargalsaikhan,¹⁵ who served as the first Mongolian Ambassador to Peking, from 1950 to 1953, replaced Lkhamsurun¹⁶ as Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This change may well have increased Chinese influence in Outer Mongolia.

On September 24, 1954, Ho Ying¹⁷ replaced Chi Ya-t'ai¹⁸ as Chinese Ambassador to Ulan Bator. Ho had been Deputy Director of the Asian Affairs Department in Peking's Foreign Ministry, and his appointment to Ulan Bator signified higher-level Chinese representation there.

C. L. Sulzberger, in a dispatch sent from New Delhi on February 13,

¹⁵Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 395, n. 36; Cf. infra, p. 97.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 396, n. 40.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 307, n. 35.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 309, n. 51.

1955, reported, apparently on the basis of information from Indian officials, that when Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Peking in October, 1954, "they are said to have recognized that the Outer Mongolian People's Republic, while retaining independence, should eventually come within China's sphere of influence."¹⁹ There was no substantiation of any such agreement, but it at least suggests that some Asian observers had concluded that Peking was rapidly increasing its influence in the Mongolian People's Republic.

In November, 1954, Ulanfu,²⁰ a member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, headed a large Chinese delegation to the Mongols Twelfth Party Congress in Ulan Bator, and his speech strongly stressed closer Mongolian-Chinese relations.²¹ By contrast, a comparatively small and low-level Soviet delegation appeared at the Congress, headed by P. T. Komarov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Union Communist Party's Commission on Party Control.

The role of China in the Mongolian People's Republic, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, probably attained its peak in 1956, when there were more than 10,000 Chinese laborers working in the country.²² It was in that year also that China's foreign aid program included Outer

¹⁹New York Times, February 14, 1955.

²⁰Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 259; Ulanfu was the most important Mongol serving in official capacity in both the Party and Government of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Also, he was a member of the Central Committee and the Chinese Communist Party. He was the liaison between Han Chinese and the Mongols.

²¹Ibid., p. 273.

²²Jack Raymond, "Mongolia Imports Chinese Workers," New York Times, August 27, 1956.

Mongolia among the recipients. Outright grants of 160 million rubles²³ were extended to the Mongolian People's Republic.²⁴ At the same time the Chinese undertook to build a textile factory, a glass factory, a paper mill, and roads and bridges.²⁵ A further aid agreement provided for China to build several other industrial and non-industrial structures, including a sports stadium in Ulan Bator.²⁶

The February 1956 Sino-Mongolian trade agreement called for trade in 1956 to be double that of 1955.²⁷ Mongolia was to export horses, hides, and livestock, and obtain in return such products as dried and fresh fruit, tobacco, and silk products.

²³Both Russia and China paid off their loans in their respective currencies, a ruble and a yuan. Each of these was closely compared with the tughrík of Mongolia, a new currency introduced in 1924 with the establishment of the Mongolian National Bank. Prior to this Mongolia used Chinese currency but Russia, who was responsible for the bank, was determined to establish independence of such currency. At first the tughrík was valued at the fixed exchange rate of 90 tughríks to 100 Chinese dollars. Parity was later proclaimed even though the tughrík contained only 20 grams of pure silver as against 36 grams in the Chinese dollar. Prior to 1959 the tughrík was equivalent to one Russian ruble, but in 1959 the Mongols were claiming a rate of 4 tughríks to 1 ruble, while the Russians seemed to be continuing a one-to-one ratio. Since 1961 Pravda has listed the tughrík in relation to the new "hard" ruble (old and new rubles are related to pre-war and post-war values). 22.50 Mongolian tughríks are worth 100 new Soviet rubles. In 1947 a ruble was the equivalent of 19 cents in American money. Friters, op. cit., p. 128; Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 314, n. 88.

²⁴Murphy, op. cit., p. 177.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Keesing's Contemporary Archives, No. 174760 (1960).

²⁷Murphy, op. cit., p. 175.

2. Exchange programs

Many less dramatic signs also pointed to the new Chinese influence and activity in Outer Mongolia. Chinese literature, traditionally popular with the Mongols, received special attention. Some Chinese students attended the University in Ulan Bator and a few Chinese exchange-professors taught there. The Chinese participated in Mongolian trade union conferences and youth rallies. Chinese observers attended Congresses of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.²⁸ Mongols from Inner Mongolia as well as Han Chinese participated in these exchanges. The frontier between Outer and Inner Mongolia no longer seemed such a formidable barrier. Numerous visits and exchanges during those years testified to a new relationship. Some Outer Mongols even pastured their herds at times in Inner Mongolia. Their newly found friendship was sanctioned in the spring of 1957 when an Outer Mongolian consulate-general opened in Kuke Khote, capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.²⁹

At the same time, Soviet influence appeared to be declining. The last Russian soldiers withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1956, and the number of Russian civilians there was greatly reduced. Continuation of this trend might, before many years, have changed the Mongolian's basic orientation from Moscow to Peking.

But the Soviet Union then acted to oppose Chinese "displacement,"

²⁸Robert A. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia Since 1955," pp. 344-345.

²⁹"Outer Mongolia: Where Two Empires Rub," Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1957.

and on May 15, 1957, Bulganin and Tsendenbal issued a joint statement that reasserted Moscow's role--a document of great significance in Sino-Soviet relations as well as in Mongolian affairs.³⁰ The result was that Soviet aid was stepped up to exceed China's considerably. The export and import trade was still dominated by the Soviet Union. And Russian cultural influence continued to affect Mongolia far more than did that of the Chinese.

Chinese influence did not come to a halt, however. Evidences of its continuance were apparent. Some 20,000 unskilled and semiskilled Chinese laborers were in Mongolia. Outer Mongolia's pattern of equating administrative-territorial units (the somon) with livestock collectives directly paralleled Chinese organizational forms in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and differed from earlier Mongolian practice. There was some reason to believe that the Chinese Communists' new steel complex at Paotow, in Inner Mongolia, had stirred Outer Mongolia to begin to establish its own steel industry. The Chinese Communists made a loan of 200 million rubles to support Mongolia's Five-Year Plan (1961-1965). New transportation ties increased Sino-Mongolian contacts, and since 1956 there was a direct rail connection from Peking to Ulan Bator. And, of course, in addition to the exchange of official representatives, new links were created through friendship societies, cultural visits, joint statements, conferences and the like. Each of these developments deserves attention.

³⁰Excerpts of this statement appear in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IX, No. 20 (June 26, 1957), 27-28.

3. Chinese labor force

The scant and scattered population in the Mongolian People's Republic made labor a scarce commodity and created problems for the country's economic development. In addition, apathy and even resistance to disciplined work obstructed the formation of a trained and reliable indigenous Mongolian labor force. The Mongols did not adapt well to factory work at first and they practically refused to do construction work. They believed that the Chinese were much better suited to labor of that sort, and they would rather import Chinese to dig ditches and put up buildings and bridges than do it themselves. Even before the days of predominant Soviet influence, Chinese provided "coolie" labor to Outer Mongolia, and between 1955 and 1961 the Chinese Communists sent construction workers, ditch-diggers and the like. Early in 1955 a Sino-Mongolian agreement provided for Chinese laborers to come to work in Outer Mongolia on short-term contract, with the option of permanent settlement and adoption of Mongolian citizenship.³¹ In May the first "new" Chinese arrived. By August, 1956, some 10,000 Chinese worked in the country, building bridges and apartments, warehouses and factories. In 1958, 2,400 additional Chinese workers arrived. Then, in September, 1960, a new Sino-Mongolian agreement provided for a continuing supply of Chinese labor.³² On May 5, 1961, 754 more Chinese arrived in Ulan Bator for this purpose, and on July 29, 1961, still more. The wages of these laborers

³¹Jack Raymond, New York Times, August 27, 1956.

³²Survey of the China Mainland Press, 2345, September 26, 1960.

and the costs of materials they employed constituted the major use of Chinese loans and grants to Outer Mongolia. There was no comparable Russian program. Throughout 1962, however, only withdrawals of Chinese labor from Mongolia were reported, and few Chinese workers remained there in 1963.³³

4. Chinese pattern of living

While collectivization of livestock and the organization of cooperatives in the Mongolian People's Republic generally followed the Russian pattern, the merging of basic territorial units (somons) with cooperatives appeared to follow the Chinese model rather than any Russian example. An article published in China in July, 1959, described amalgamation of Mongolian cooperatives and somons as follows:

To strengthen and develop the production and organization of the cooperatives, the Central Committee of the Party has decided to abolish the bag [the smallest administrative unit, encompassing about 50 families] and to combine the somon [about 150 families] with the corresponding cooperative. This forms the so-called "somon cooperative." Implementation of this decision was begun in the first part of 1959. More than 1,700 bag governments have been abolished, and the 370 somons have been reorganized and transformed into 426 somon cooperatives.³⁴

No matter how radical the Communist leadership in Outer Mongolia has been on occasion, it has never tried to shift the country's economic

³³Scalapino, op. cit., p. 105.

³⁴Weekly Information Report on Communist China, No. 280, Sum. 2371, (October 13, 1959), p. 56. (The bag [community] was the primary administrative unit in Outer Mongolia, made up of 30-100 households. The somon [arrow] was a subdivision of the aimak [tribe], made up of 150 households. Both were old political structures of the Mongols.)

base away from livestock-raising. The regime has always based Mongolian economic development plans on its livestock industry. It has always aimed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the animals raised, and it has based the limited industrial development of the country--meat-packing, leather-working, wool-processing--for the most part on livestock products. Other industries have had supporting roles. Coal mining has provided power for such industries. Agriculture has supplied fodder. Biological laboratories and factories have produced serums to control and eliminate animal diseases.

5. Industrial experimentation

It seemed possible, however, that the Mongolian People's Republic would embark on new experiments, partly as a result of the influence of the Chinese model. China established in Inner Mongolia, at Paotow, a major industrial complex, which turned out 70,000 tons of steel in 1959.³⁵ It was scheduled to attain 500,000 tons annual production, and was to be one of China's largest producers. The knowledge of this tempted Outer Mongolia despite the fact that conditions were not as favorable for steel production there as they were in Paotow. The first recorded mention of such plans in Outer Mongolia occurred in Chou En-lai's conversations with Tsendenbal, which took place in Ulan Bator during May 27-June 1, 1961.³⁶ There soon followed an announcement of plans for the construction at Darkhan of Outer Mongolia's first

³⁵Harrison E. Salisbury, War Between Russia and China (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 169.

³⁶Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 326.

steel plant, with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons. Russian help was needed to build the plant but the impetus was that of the Chinese.

6. Aid agreements

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have made significant loans and grants to the Mongolian People's Republic. The timing of the announcement of these loans and grants suggests a pattern of Soviet reaction to Chinese moves. In August, 1956, China extended to the Mongols a grant of 160 million rubles. As if to answer the Chinese challenge and to emphasize its own longer record of aiding Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Union, in the Bulganin-Tsedenbal joint statement of May 15, 1957, publicized, for the first time, the amount of its past and promised loans and gifts, (900 million rubles) and it detailed the uses to which the money was being put. It was only after the Chinese had announced, in May, 1960,³⁷ a 200-million-ruble loan to the Mongols for the 1961-1965 period that the Russians, on September 9, announced their own 615-million-ruble loan for the same period.³⁸

7. Transportation ties

Another important development in Sino-Mongolian relations was the construction of a major rail line linking the two countries. A trans-Mongolian railroad had long been planned and discussed by Russians, Chinese and Mongols, and in 1949 the Russians actually completed the

³⁷Robert A. Rupen, The Mongolian People's Republic, p. 54.

³⁸Murphy, op. cit., p. 176.

first section of such a line, stretching from the Soviet border to Ulan Bator. Then, on September 15, 1952, the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia and China signed an agreement to extend this railroad from Ulan Bator to the Chinese town of Chining.³⁹ The Chinese began building the section within their own territory (the Chining-Erhlien line) in May, 1953, and 25,000 construction workers completed the job by December 11, 1954. (This 210 mile stretch comprised the only wide-gauge track in China.) Finally, the Trans-Mongolian Railroad began operations on January 1, 1956. This completed a new connection of China and the Soviet Union and cut 700 miles from the rail distance between Moscow and Peking. Certainly, it could be said in 1961 that Sino-Soviet relations, China's and Russia's relations with Outer Mongolia, and Mongolia internally, must all be materially affected by this important development. Not only politically, but also socially and psychologically, Outer Mongolia faced fundamental changes. Its traditional way of life could be more basically altered by the fact of the railroad than by any other single event in recent Mongolian history. A report to this effect supposedly made by a Mongol appeared in the Soviet press.

The railroad has outstandingly important economic and political significance....It is difficult to overestimate the progressive role, the great economic, political, and cultural significance of this railroad trunk line for our country. It will in large measure assist in the rapid development of the productive strength of Mongolia and will provide for the development of new branches of industry....This railroad is arousing to life the little-known-out-of-the-way areas of the Gobi, and is altering their appearance by excellent schools. The education of young workers and national cadres of railroad workers will allow these areas to develop rapidly....Mongolian railroad men,

³⁹Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

including machinists and their helpers, train and car masters, truck brigadiers and master, machinists and locksmiths, electricians emerge through the preparation and training of yesterday's nomads....There is taking place in Mongolia a great social-economic transformation.⁴⁰

The railroad required labor of many kinds and involved a tremendously expanded need for petroleum and coal, stations, and barracks for workers. Water had to be supplied, requiring pipelines and pumps in the Gobi. Maintenance alone involved labor and material needs before then unknown in Mongolia.

The political effect, in propaganda at least, was expressed in a song, "The Road to Friendship," sung by a travelling Outer Mongolian choral group to the construction workers.

The long train speeds across the lea
On rails that gleam in desert land
O'er hill and river and Gobi;
Let Moscow, Ulan Bator and Peking join hand
To bring prosperity, glory
And victory to the Fatherland!⁴¹

That the Chinese envisaged considerable traffic over the new railroad emerges from a reported statement of a Chinese engineer mentioning an extensive network of tracks and freight-handling facilities at Chining.⁴² There was to be a large station and a three-level highway development in the area. However, the immediate effects should perhaps be interpreted cautiously. Russian engineering and transport personnel built the railroad and to some extent continued to maintain it, thus

⁴⁰As quoted from Isvestia, April 16, 1955 in Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 274.

⁴¹Survey of the China Mainland Press, 1201, January 5, 1956.

⁴²Ibid.

limiting its social and cultural effect on the Mongols.

8. Diplomatic relations

While any examination of the biographies and careers of Mongolian leaders and officials clearly indicates a far closer Mongol attachment to the Soviet Union than to China, the careers of important Mongols who have spent time in China are of considerable interest. The first Mongolian Ambassador to Peking, Bayaryn Jargalsaikhan,⁴³ who served there from July, 1950, to June, 1953, returned home to become Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs during 1954 and 1955. Later, he became head of the Party's Foreign Relations Section, and he was then Chairman of the Great Khural from March, 1959, to July, 1960. Currently, Jargalsaikhan heads the Mongol's United Nations delegation in New York,⁴⁴ which, of course, removed him from Mongolia and contacts with China. Gombojavym Ochirbat⁴⁵ replaced Jargalsaikhan in Peking and served there from July, 1953, to May, 1957. After the Bulganin-Tsedenbal joint statement reasserting Soviet supremacy in Mongol affairs, Ochirbat was recalled and sent as Ambassador first to East Germany and then to Mali. His replacement in Peking, Sonomyn Luvsan,⁴⁶ served there from May, 1957, to June, 1959. Thereafter, Luvsan became a Deputy Prime Minister for a brief period and then was appointed

⁴³Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 341, n. 35; Cf. supra, p. 86.

⁴⁴This author had an interview with him but found him noncommittal.

⁴⁵Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 400, n. 31.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 402.

Ambassador to Moscow in March, 1960. This marks the first instance of a Mongol serving in both capitals as Ambassador. His successor in Peking, Dendeviin Sharav,⁴⁷ served from July, 1959, to June, 1962. The present Ambassador, Dondogiin Tsevegmid,⁴⁸ who succeeded Sharav, is definitely a Soviet-oriented Mongol.

Four major top-level purges occurred after 1958,⁴⁹ but no clear linkage to Sino-Soviet relations emerges. Nationalistic strivings and competition for power may have been of greater importance. It is possible, however, that they were stage-managed by the Soviets to avert the diminution of Russian influence, or even the threat of pan-Mongolism should China gain dominance in Ulan Bator. If Peking, which already controlled Inner Mongolia, gained such dominance in Ulan Bator, threats of pan-Mongolism might then be directed against the Soviet Union, with the Mongols in the Buryat ASSR and the Tuva Autonomous Oblast the target--or at least a beginning point for the Chinese in future negotiations with the Russians. The purges came at a time and in such a way as to least antagonize Russia's Chinese allies. But they also made quite clear that internal Mongolian political stability did not follow the Soviet reassertion of primary influence in 1957, except that Tsedenbal "won" in every case, and the Russians backed Tsedenbal.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 398, n. 67.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 401, n. 41.

⁴⁹Cf. supra, pp. 56-57.

C. ROLE IN SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

On the basis of developments after May, 1957, it appeared that the Soviet Union would respond to Chinese policies with moves of her own to "protect" Outer Mongolia from Chinese designs and to maintain her own superior position. The Mongolian People's Republic was to grow in importance as the conflict between the Soviet Union and China grew. By 1961 China knew that her chances of regaining some hold over Outer Mongolia were almost nil. However, there was hope that her gestures of help to the Mongols would be rewarded with a stand of neutrality by that country. China needed to know that such an extensive border as existed between herself and Outer Mongolia was not to place her in jeopardy. True, expansion beyond it seemed unlikely but having to guard it could present an even greater problem.

Certain factions and certain desires within Outer Mongolia may have sought such neutrality as that hoped for by China, but what is more obvious is that since 1961 Outer Mongolia has proven by her staunch denunciation of Albanian and Chinese policies that she has definitely chosen the Soviet Union as her ally.⁵⁰ Soviet Russia has wisely combined her aid with a policy whereby ostensibly the Mongols themselves administratively control their country. This helps minimize Moscow's discreet control. But, also, the innate fear of Chinese control and territorial intrusion aided in this decision. That the

⁵⁰L. Tsende's report of November 28, 1961 and Tsendenbal's of February 2, 1962, as translated in Alexander Dallin, ed., Diversity in International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

Soviet Union has taken advantage of Mongolian friendship in their attempts to portray strength in the Sino-Soviet conflict is seen by the positions presently maintained by them in the Mongolian People's Republic.

1. Soviet military dispositions along the railways

A number of secret Russian military installations exist in the eastern and southern sections of Mongolia.⁵¹ The nature of the installations can be guessed by noting the shoulder tabs of the throngs of Soviet officers and men to be seen almost everywhere in Mongolia, which showed that the bulk of the troops were rocket and missile forces, artillery men, airmen and tank men. Most of these bases are built along the north-south Trans-Mongol Railroad. It runs south from Irkutsk and Ulan-Ude (capital of Buryatia) and forms the core for the Soviet military dispositions in Mongolia. The railroad continues south from Ulan Bator, reaching the Chinese frontier at Dzamyn Ude. This is the same railroad that extended uninterrupted sixty miles into China to the city of Chining until 1966 when the Chinese tore up the broad Russian lines and laid their own standard gauge up to Dzamyn Ude.

Soviet military dispositions follow the rail line south across the Gobi. No diplomat has traveled extensively in that area, but those who go back and forth from Peking along the railroad have seen enough to be aware that this is a major Soviet concentration area.

⁵¹Salisbury, Orbit of China, pp. 112-116, passim.




Figure 1. Political Subdivisions and Transportation in Mongolia.

They have no doubt that missiles have been installed in locations not far from the rail right-of-way in southern Mongolia.

The railroads are the key to Soviet missile deployment. The Mongol steppe is adequate or more than adequate for movement of troops, trucks and tanks, but for the delicate and elaborate apparatus required for missilery the railroads are essential because of the absence of real roads.

The second major area of Soviet military concentration is behind the railroad line which projects into Manchuria across the Khalkin-gol River. Here a branch from the Trans-Siberian breaks off from the old Russian link to the Chinese Eastern Railroad from China. It branches west before Manchouli and cuts down into Mongolia to Choibalsan, the metropolis of eastern Mongolia and beyond to Dzuun Bulak and Tamsak Bulak. The Soviet concentration here provides an eastern frontier threatening China and securing Russian primacy.

These two major dispositions together with those deployed into eastern Siberia⁵² support the conviction of the Chinese that the Russians are prepared to attack with nuclear as well as conventional arms. It is difficult to believe that the missile installations which have been rushed into completion along the Chinese frontiers have not been armed with nuclear warheads. The locations suggest the possibility of a strike against the known Chinese nuclear production and testing facilities at Lanchow, Paotow and Lop Nor,⁵³ all of which lie within

⁵²Lamb, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

⁵³Salisbury, War Between Russia and China, p. 153.

200 to 300 miles of the Soviet bases--well within missile range.

2. Soviet "first strike" thesis

Supporting the theory that the Russians are prepared to attack Chinese nuclear capability is a Soviet "pre-emptive first strike" thesis⁵⁴ which has been advanced repeatedly since 1957. It was in that year that Mao Tse-tung made his famous declaration which the Russians interpret as indicating a Chinese willingness to utilize nuclear war in behalf of their revolutionary aspirations.⁵⁵ The Russians have convinced themselves that if war comes China will use her nuclear arms. This being true, Moscow must strike first and destroy China's capability of retaliation. In this argument the Soviet military voices weigh in heavily in favor of a pre-emptive blow against China.

Such a strike would closely fit the pattern of the war the Soviet military are prepared to wage in the Far East. There is no difficulty in constructing an approximation of the Soviet war plan against China, because the outline of past campaigns in the region are so detailed and well known.⁵⁶ They would undoubtedly follow the pattern of their two most successful encounters in that area, confrontations with the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1939 and again in 1945. In both instances Eastern Mongolia was a focal point serving as headquarters and supplier to the Soviet command.

⁵⁴Salisbury, Orbit of China, pp. 157-158.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 190.

⁵⁶Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, pp. 3-5.

The location of the chief army groups, the direction of their strikes, and the weight of concentration in eastern Mongolia and on the Amur and Ussuri all match the pattern of Soviet military needs for a strike against the Chinese. The Chinese defense forces are concentrated in the same areas where the Japanese Kwantung Army was located. The Russian build-ups have gone forward in those regions which marked the 1939 and 1945 build-ups. The only apparent new factor in Soviet dispositions is the concentration in southern Mongolia on the edge of the Gobi. This, no doubt, ties in with the only new feature of the Soviet plans--that of new weaponry and new long-range missiles and nuclear arms to counteract the Chinese missile sites to the south of them. The range of the installations in Mongolia is great enough to cover all the targets in Inner Mongolia, the provinces to the west and the Peking region, if not farther.

3. Mongolian backing

It would not be correct, however, to suggest that the present position of Soviet Russia in the Mongolian People's Republic is an imposed one. To the contrary it would appear that Mongolia is of one mind with her ally concerning the potential danger of China. This attitude was clearly observed in the abusive attacks hurled by Mongolia on the Chinese People's Republic and Mao Tse-tung for lingering Chinese territorial designs on them. The Soviet Union seized on statements made by Mao Tse-tung to a group of visiting Japanese, in which he stated that he had asked Soviet leaders in 1954 to restore Mongolian independence. He also accused them of making a general attack

on Chinese territorial ambitions in East Asia.⁵⁷ Moscow implied that Mao had asked for the incorporation of the Mongolian People's Republic into Communist China, and claimed that Khrushchev "naturally refused to discuss this question."

Ulan Bator, following this Soviet lead, not only denounced Chinese designs on Mongolia but showered abuse on Mao, whom the Mongolians claimed had "exposed himself" for what he was, and charged that the "malicious intentions" of the Chinese leaders who "have long dreamed of making the Mongolian People's Republic an outlying region under Chinese power" was now obvious.⁵⁸ Ulan Bator claimed that Chinese designs on Outer Mongolia gave evidence of the racist and expansionist aims of Chinese policy. Mongolian fears of Chinese domination were spelled out in the criticism of Chinese policy toward minority groups, with the Mongolian statement claiming that Chinese control would force "our people to share the lot of the Inner Mongolians." The Mongolians warned the Chinese that "we have a friend who stands on guard with us in the defense of the interests of our country."⁵⁹

These charges coincided with a report by the Yugoslav news agency of a concentration of Chinese troops along the Mongolian border.⁶⁰ An increase in military strength along the border was a

⁵⁷Cf. supra, p. 84.

⁵⁸Excerpts from a broadcast from Montsame International Service, Ulan Bator, September 10, 1964, as quoted in Doolin, op. cit., pp. 61-65.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 64.

⁶⁰Scalapino, op. cit., p. 106.

reflection of Chinese concern with Soviet "defense" measures in areas adjacent to the Sino-Soviet border and uneasiness as to Moscow's motives in "escalating" its polemical attack against alleged Chinese territorial aspirations in Asia. The strengthening of border defense could also have been an effort by Peking to prevent Mongolians in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region from fleeing into the Mongolian People's Republic.

The territorial issue was only one in a series of squabbles with the Chinese. A major attack was made by Premier Tsedenbal on China's "self-reliance" policy in the lead article in the September, 1964, issue of World Marxist Review.⁶¹ Tsedenbal presented a general defense of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and of the benefits to be derived from "division of labor under socialism" and coordination of economic plans. He defended Mongolia's economic dependence on the Soviet Union, claiming that acceptance of extensive Soviet aid was in the best interests of Mongolia and "helped to strengthen the sovereignty of our country."

The Mongolians also had their problems with Chinese activity inside Mongolia, and issued a number of diplomatic protests against propaganda activity by Chinese citizens in Mongolia and against incidents involving Mongolian and Chinese citizens.⁶² Partly as a result of this activity, the Mongolians refused to renew the contracts which

⁶¹Text in Haggard, op. cit., p. 20.

⁶²Scalapino, op. cit., p. 106.

had provided Chinese workers since 1955.⁶³

Premier Tsedenbal shared Russia's view that the 1969 Ussuri River outbreak should be blamed on the Chinese and tabbed as plain murder at the command of Mao Tse-tung.⁶⁴ According to Tsedenbal the order to fire was given by Mao for no one below that rank would have taken the responsibility.

Why was Mao taking this course? To quote Mr. Tsedenbal, "Mao has approved arrangements aimed at preparing war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Mao has attacked Russia because it serves his overall policy and prepares his people for the war which, on a limited basis, has already begun."⁶⁵

So far as Mongolia is concerned, Premier Tsedenbal was convinced that Mao long ago opened his attack upon that country and its region, seeking deliberately to sow discord, overturn the government and place his own agents in charge. Along the Mongol frontiers incident has followed incident, incitement has followed incitement.

The Chinese people have been infused with the idea of the inevitability of war with Russia, Tsedenbal feels, and the Chinese are employing every possible method to sow discord in Russia and among Russian friends and allies. To Tsedenbal the Mao policy toward Mongolia is simply an extension of old Chinese Nationalist policy--that is, an

⁶³Cf. supra, p. 91.

⁶⁴Tsedenbal's speech as quoted in Salisbury, War Between Russia and China, pp. 181-182.

⁶⁵Ibid.

effort to resume Chinese control over the country.⁶⁶ Premier Tsedenbal declared:

Speaking of the expansionist policy of Peking, we do not have in mind an imaginary threat now and then arising in the imaginations of individuals as a result of an erroneous evaluation of activities or allegorical reaction to questions concerning sovereignty and independence. We are speaking of a really existent threat coming from the ruling Chinese circles which is aimed primarily against countries neighboring China.⁶⁷

These confrontations with China do not mean that the Mongolian People's Republic has accepted total dependence upon Russia. It appears Mongolia still wants her independent status recognized and the right of sovereignty accorded her. The Mongols had considered balancing China against Soviet Russia and vice versa in order to win greater freedom of action. Hopefully this would give her a role in which she would have more real initiative and would be less tied to either of her great neighbors. For nearly a decade Mongolia had been moving in this direction. She had won her long fight for membership in the United Nations and also had begun to broaden her area of diplomatic contact. The total number of countries with which Mongolia has diplomatic relations is now over forty.⁶⁸ Mongolia has been striving to widen her foreign trade base, particularly with countries like West Germany, France, Britain and Japan. If the volume has not yet reached notable totals, this is due more to lack of trading goods

⁶⁶A policy openly repeated before the Yalta Agreement and the Mongolian plebiscite in 1945 and internally adhered to even after it; Cf. supra, p. 84.

⁶⁷Tsedenbal's speech as quoted in Salisbury, War Between Russia and China, pp. 182-183.

⁶⁸Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 337.

than anything else.

But Mongolia is still blocked in one of the chief goals of her foreign policy--the establishment of relations with the United States. Washington in the summer of 1961 had come to the point of recognizing Mongolia. But at the last moment the United States backed away in fear of complicated reprisals by the Chinese Nationalist Government.⁶⁹ In 1965, after a four-year interval, the United States began again to move toward a new initiative. But this ran aground on the rocks of the Vietnam war. In the harsh atmosphere between East and West generated by the Viet conflict Ulan Bator felt its hands tied. Much as it desired contact with the United States, important as American relations were in the context of Mongolia's effort to move out into the world, the Mongols did not see that their way would be clear to go forward so long as the Vietnam conflict remained unresolved.⁷⁰

Outer Mongolia is in a geographical position where she must rely on someone. At times and through certain people's eyes China could have been that someone, but past history, present circumstances and Mongolia's desire to look to the future through westward glasses have caused them to choose Soviet Russia. Experience has taught them that their goals are much more likely to be realized with Russia than with China.

The importance and delicacy of Sino-Soviet relations magnify the international significance of the Mongolian People's Republic's

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 336.

⁷⁰Told to Harrison Salisbury by the Mongols when he visited there in 1966, and related in Salisbury, Orbit of China, p. 118.

external and internal developments. In this regard, most internal affairs bear also external implications, and the distinction in many cases obscures rather than helps analysis. Mongolian nationalism, and at least a degree of Mongolian independence, really exist, and the Mongols think and do many things for themselves, but the huge populations and area of their great neighbors inevitably restrict their range of free choice and action.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRE-CONDITIONING DETERMINING UNITED STATES- OUTER MONGOLIAN RELATIONS

The Mongolian People's Republic was and probably will remain a contention point between her two neighbors, Soviet Russia and Communist China.¹ Since Mongolia's independence and loyal attachment to the Soviet Union has long been a thorn in China's side, it will certainly remain so as long as the Sino-Soviet rift continues. Rather than being detrimental, however, thus far this contest has helped Mongolia economically, politically and socially. Besides the aid and trade offered by these two countries we have seen that Outer Mongolia has attempted to strengthen herself by establishing trade and diplomatic relations with other People's Democracies and with the western world. Certainly the fact that forty nations now have relations with her gives Mongolia a greater sense of independence and growth--a feeling she greatly desires. Possibly the number would be greater if the United States counted among Mongolia's diplomatic friends.

Mongolia has long been interested in establishing such relations,

¹Cf. supra, p. 84.

believing that United States recognition would immediately open the door to expansion of contacts with the non-communist world. In an interview in December, 1961, L. Tsend, then Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, stated that only United States policy, not Mongolian, prevented the establishment of relations. Tsend stated that the Mongolian People's Republic hoped to benefit from American scientific and technical know-how, to develop trade, and to carry out cultural and artistic exchanges. Tsend also stated that Mongolia was interested in advanced American techniques, particularly in the raising of livestock.² Having made known their desires, Mongolia only could hope that the United States would take initial steps toward relations. Several initiatives have been taken but, thus far, the United States has not seen her way clear to make this move.

In the fifteen years between Outer Mongolia's first request for United Nations admission and her acceptance, reasons for the United States turning a deaf ear to Mongolian recognition accumulated. In 1946 Chiang Kai-shek's China played the main role but by 1961 the Sino-Soviet conflict and admission of Red China to the UN had added new aspects to the Mongolian question. These factors and various related ones are still causing debate over United States-Mongolian relations.

A. UNITED STATES-FAR EASTERN POLICY

It is inevitable that China and the Soviet Union should play such

²New York Times, December 17, 1961, p. 33.

an important role in the United States-Mongolian relationship. Diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, of itself, have very little political significance as far as the United States is concerned. Her geographical location and main economic source, livestock, account for this. But whatever contact America has with her will greatly affect United States relations with the other two major powers. Any relations affecting a balance of power are most important. Beginning with the World War II years this author would like to point out significant incidents which have helped determine United States governmental and general opinion concerning the Mongolian People's Republic.

1. American desire to make China a great power

The main American objective in the Far East during World War II was the unconditional surrender of Japan within an over-all strategy of defeating Germany first.³ As a means to this end, the United States pursued a policy of keeping China in the war in order to make maximum use of her military potential and strategic geographical position in the common war effort. Linked with this policy was another which proved to have far-reaching consequences--the policy of making China a great power and treating her as one of the Big Four for the purpose of building a postwar political order in the Far East.⁴

To avert a military collapse of China while making maximum use of her military potential, the United States endeavored to discourage the

³Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1950), pp. 102-104.

⁴Tsou, op. cit., pp. 59-63.

Nationalist government from launching a large-scale attack on the Chinese Communists, to use Communist forces and base areas in the common war effort, and finally to bring the Nationalists and the Communists together in a coalition government. This policy of bringing about a united and democratic China by peaceful means also derived impetus from the policy of making China a great power. For China could not fulfil the role assigned to her by the United States if she was left, in the words of Sumner Wells, "to welter indefinitely in civil war and anarchy."⁵

The American attempt to make China a great power and to bring about a political settlement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists was grounded also on her estimate of Russia's intentions toward China and her hope for continued cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war, not only in the Far East, but throughout the world. Washington thought that by giving China the status of a great power, by obtaining a Soviet pledge to observe certain principles of international conduct, by bringing China and Russia together in a formal accord, and by uniting the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in a coalition government--it could ward off Soviet interference in Chinese affairs, gain Russia's good will toward China, and assure continued American-Soviet cooperation in the Far East after the war.⁶

Both the grand design for postwar American-Soviet cooperation

⁵Sumner Wells, Seven Decisions that Shaped History (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1950), pp. 161-162.

⁶Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 95-100.

and the policy of bringing about a united and democratic China by peaceful means were consistent with the objective of obtaining the unconditional surrender of Japan. For, assuming the possibility of continued American-Soviet concord in the Far East and Nationalist-Communist cooperation inside China, the most important task was simply to defeat the enemy. Thus, American military objectives, political policies, and assumptions about the postwar world formed a coherent whole, linked together by the supreme operational goal of a quick victory over Japan and by the principle of unconditional surrender.

But, unfortunately, this whole structure was founded on a misjudgment of the intentions of the Soviet Union, the world Communist movement, and the Chinese Communist party. It crumbled when neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists behaved according to the expectations of American officials.⁷ Furthermore, the structure took its consistency and its rationale from a military rather than a political objective. In the flux of unfolding events, the political policy became simply a means to achieve the military goal. This reversal of the rational order of political end and military means was the wartime expression of the traditional American divorce of diplomacy from military power. Since the military objective was the paramount goal, the political implications of American military measures were not taken fully into consideration and military strategy was not planned in the light of its political effects on the internal stability of China. The desire to use Chinese Communist forces and

⁷Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 486-493.

base areas became one source of the misjudgment of the nature and intentions of the Chinese Communist party. As a result, the political policy of making China a great power was implemented merely by diplomatic actions, that is, the inclusion of China in the important international conferences determining post-war conditions.⁸ This policy was not deliberately supported either by the strategy of the Allies in the Far East or by American military activities in China. Thus, China gained only a formal status devoid of the substance of power, while the United States suffered excessively by the consequences of American diplomatic defeat when the Chinese Communists triumphed in China.

2. Taiwan policy

The Communists' success in China amounted to a painful defeat for United States policy as well as for the Nationalist Government. America found that with half-hearted attempts she was not able to bring about a political settlement between Nationalist and Communist factions. Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported to the President in July, 1949,

A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. Such intervention would have required the expenditure of even greater sums than have been fruitlessly spent thus far, the command of Nationalist armies by American officers, and the probable participation of American armed forces--land, sea, and air--in the resulting war. Intervention of such a scope and magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been condemned by the

⁸Yalta was an exception to this and it was at that conference that the dichotomy in American intentions can be seen.

American people.⁹

In January, 1950, in line with that appraisal, President Truman declared that the United States would not follow a course leading to involvement in the Chinese civil conflict and would therefore not "provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Taiwan."¹⁰ And in more general terms Secretary Acheson reaffirmed the strategic "defensive perimeter" policy, which excluded further United States intervention both on the island and on the mainland.¹¹ Official statements thus appeared tacitly to accept Taiwan as an integral part of China, though that may not have been their intention, as its legal position remained open in the official view of the United States.

Taiwan also represented an integral part of the Chinese domain to Peking, which therefore considered that "liberation" of the territory (and of the offshore islands) was essential to the successful completion of the revolution. On the basis of the American declarations just noted, it might have been supposed that Washington would accept the political implications of its military position and accede to the Moscow-Peking claims to China's seat in the Security Council. It even seemed that way in fact when the United States delegate, in January, 1950, maintained that while his government considered the Nationalist

⁹U. S. Department of State, United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period, 1944-1949, Publication No. 3573 (August, 1949), pp. XV-XVI.

¹⁰U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 22 (1950), p. 79.

¹¹Ruth B. Russell, The United Nations and United States Security Policy (Washington, D. C.: The Brookling Institution, 1968), pp. 15-16.

representative's credentials to be valid, it would "accept the decision of the Security Council on this matter when made by an affirmative vote of seven members."¹²

By early 1950, however, Peking's seizures of American properties and citizens and its closure of United States consulates¹³ made Washington unwilling to give formal recognition to the communist government. With the cold war in full force, it may also have been influenced to oppose seating the Chinese Communists in the Security Council because of Soviet sponsorship. An even more important element was the fact that domestic opinion in the United States had become roused to the support of Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁴ Secretary-General Lie was therefore violently attacked by the American press when he supported the seating of Peking in the Council. He was accused of "surrendering" to Moscow as well as of transgressing the limits of his authority in taking his position publicly.¹⁵ Washington succeeded in defeating Lie's effort

¹²United Nations Document, A/AC, 18/62, June 5, 1948. Interim Committee Report on Voting in the Security Council, which had recommended that approval of credentials of representatives of Members of the Security Council should be by procedural vote. (p. 12) The United States approved this position.

¹³Russell, op. cit., p. 370.

¹⁴There were at work a few missionary and church groups and a vast variety of business interests, American and Chinese, some very probably having access to American government money once given to Chiang--all making whatever contacts they could by different techniques with different members of Congress. This has been called the "China Lobby." But the fragmentary evidence available does not reveal much coordinated effort, at least before 1950. H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 240.

¹⁵Russell, op. cit., p. 370.

at that time to find seven votes for seating a Communist Chinese delegate in the Security Council. The policy of "no recognition, no representation" was consistently adhered to thereafter by the United States.

Its arguments in support of that position in the United Nations have been determined since the Korean war by broader strategic concerns of the United States. That development altered the American military view of the Pacific and Asia. From the 1949 defensive-perimeter policy of neutralism and withdrawal, the United States increasingly changed over to a Far Eastern version of its European policy of containing "international Communism," now manifested most virulently by Peking. As a result, not only was the relationship of Taiwan to United States policy radically changed, but a steady expansion of American political and military involvement in the entire Pacific region logically followed.

Concurrently with sending help to South Korea, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Straits on June 27, 1950.¹⁶ The extension of action to Taiwan was justified to protect the flank of United States forces acting in Korea; but the official explanation of this move also reflected Washington's interpretation of the actions of all communist governments as integral parts of a single vast conspiracy regardless of the particular national source. The President thus declared that

[t]he attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that

¹⁶Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 334; New York Times, June 28, 1950, p. 1, under the by-line of James Reston.

communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Taiwan by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.¹⁷

He therefore ordered the Fleet to "prevent any attack on Taiwan" and to see that Nationalist attacks against the mainland from Taiwan also ceased.¹⁸ These actions amounted to forcible intervention in the Chinese civil war, although not so declared. Moreover, the official announcement also pointedly raised the question of the legal status of the island, in announcing that "the determination of the future status of Taiwan must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."¹⁹

All of this was logical in terms of United States strategic concern to prevent Peking from succeeding in its announced intention to seize Taiwan, and thus turn a safeguarding military flank into a hostile source of potential attack on American defense and communica-

¹⁷U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 23 (1950), p. 5.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid. The legal status of Taiwan at that time rested on a pledge at the Cairo Conference in 1943 (US, UK, and China) that Taiwan and the Pescadores would be restored to China after the war, to which the Soviet Union adhered in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945; and on the allied decision that Chiang Kai-shek would accept the surrender of Japanese troops in the island. Nationalist authorities thereafter administered the island as an army of occupation, until the Nationalist Government retreated there in defeat from the mainland in 1949. By 1950 the island was in practice treated as a de facto part of Nationalist China. Russell, op. cit., p. 372.

tions lines from Alaska to the Philippines and Southeast Asia.²⁰ It also had the result of serving to silence some of the domestic criticism of Washington's earlier "hands off" policy toward the Chinese situation. Perhaps of most importance in the present context is that it fed the emotional build-up of the American attitude toward Red China which was a major factor leading to McCarthyism and preventing a more rational, unemotional approach to the problems of United States relations with both de facto Chinese governments.

Insofar as America's policy toward China was concerned, the decisive question in that period was whether to defend Taiwan by military means. If Taiwan should fall, the issue of recognizing the Communist regime and granting it membership in the United Nations would automatically lose its political significance. On the other hand, if the United States should commit herself to the defense of this last Nationalist stronghold by her own armed forces or by military assistance, she could not recognize Peking or allow it to be admitted to the United Nations without opposition, unless there was to be an overall political settlement with the Chinese Communists in the Far East. This issue caused heated debates between the Democrats and the Republicans. The former wished to adhere to their policy of 1948, that is the ruling out of the use of American armed forces to defend Taiwan. The latter demanded strong measures to defend Taiwan.²¹

²⁰Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations (Council on Foreign Affairs, 1956), p. 111.

²¹U. S. Congress, Senate, Debate Concerning kind of defense for Taiwan, 81st Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, XCVI, 636-651.

3. McCarthyism

During this time, when American policy was frozen over the issue of Taiwan, the United States acquiesced to the demoralization of the McCarthy era. American liberalism in the early 1950's had no adequate explanation for the deeply frustrating emotional disaster in China, and no solution to advocate. It was bankrupt of ideas about how to meet the problem of communism in China and therefore had no answer with which to check the exploitation by Senators Joseph McCarthy and Patrick McCarran of the "loss" of China. McCarthy's attack on China policy gained him the support for the first time of powerful and respectable Republican leaders. For Patrick Hurley in 1945 and Walter Judd in 1947 had already advanced the theory of conspiracy as an explanation of America's failure in China.²² Frustrated in their efforts to obtain a program of large-scale aid to China, many Republican leaders had, since 1949, intensified their attack on the State Department, demanded an investigation, and asked for a change in personnel. Failing to realize that the defeat of American policy had its roots in assumptions and attitudes which they themselves shared, many Americans expressed their anxieties over Far Eastern affairs by accepting McCarthy's theory of conspiracy as a salve to their wounded pride and by acclaiming or acquiescing in his hunt for non-existent Communists in the State Department as a substitute for a search for

²²U. S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, Text of Hurley's letter of resignation, pp. 581-584.; U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, 80th Congress, 1st session, 1947, pp. 239-251.

a workable policy.²³

The decision of the United States to back the Chinese Nationalists and oppose the Chinese Communists brought to a decisive end American hopes of using the friendship of China as a foothold in the Far East. Communist China's strength in the Korean War, her alliance with a hostile Soviet Russia and the impetus of McCarthyism versus Communism caused a great fear and violent hostility in American public opinion and among American policy makers. Emotional attitudes and unresolved problems reinforced each other to harden Sino-American antagonism which, in day-to-day struggles, overshadowed the long-term Soviet-American rivalry for world leadership.

The courses of action adopted by the Eisenhower administration flowed naturally from the collapse of the policy of the Truman administration. To many, the only alternative to a program that had failed was its logical opposite. The plan for maximum isolation of Peking replaced that of seeking a modus vivendi. The policy of rehabilitating the Nationalist government as a foremost ally in the Far East replaced the decision to limit America's commitment to Chiang Kai-

²³Among the eighty-one cases presented by McCarthy to the Senate as bad security risks or worse, only one employee of the State Department, Mr. Val Lorwin, was ever indicted for perjuring himself in denying past membership in the Communist party. In May, 1954, the Justice Department dropped the charge for lack of evidence. James Rorty and Moshe Decter, McCarthy and the Communists (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 14. Richard H. Rovere reported that at one time McCarthy named an ex-Communist in a government agency, who had concealed his past membership. But McCarthy soon dropped the case. According to Rovere, this was about "the closest" McCarthy ever came to turning up a real Communist in the government. Richard H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), p. 159.

shek's struggle. Up to at least the end of 1958, the supposition that the Chinese Communist regime was not a lasting phenomenon replaced the assumption that it was here to stay. The risk of going to the brink of war to deter Peking's new moves replaced efforts to reassure China about America's present intentions and to remind her of traditional friendship. The exertion to split the Sino-Soviet alliance replaced the hope of making Russia the primary target of Chinese nationalism.²⁴ Meanwhile, Peking had taken upon herself the role of the most uncompromising enemy of the United States in the Communist bloc.

B. UNCERTAINTY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MONGOLIAN RELATIONS

This survey of the development of United States policy in the Far East has been necessary to comprehend the long-standing American policy of non-recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic. The influence of failure and fear placed the United States in a position of uncertainty regarding this territory once controlled by China and presently, dominated by Soviet Russia. There were two aspects underlining this uncertainty.

1. Soviet influence in Mongolia

One was that America was determined not to fail Nationalist China again. The exploitation of China in the Yalta Conference served as a reminder of just how far the United States had gone to acquire her ends. Outer Mongolia, at that time, counted for little more than a

²⁴Tsou, op. cit., p. 590.

pawn in United States hands. The participants at the conference were Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, the former two playing the primary role. It is now quite apparent that while Stalin came fully prepared to gain territorial concessions, Roosevelt, under pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was primarily anxious to obtain a promise of Russian aid against Japan. For this he was willing to make considerable concessions.²⁵

It is doubtful whether the American government was fully cognizant of actual conditions in the Mongolian People's Republic. No diplomatic relationships or even contacts had ever been established with the country. However, the American State Department knew that Russian influence was very strong in the area and that despite Outer Mongolia's legal status of a Chinese dependency with its own local government, it was really a Soviet satellite. Vice-president Henry Wallace and the presidential Far Eastern adviser Owen Lattimore had made a good will tour through the Soviet Union in 1944.²⁶ Impressions

²⁵Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1949), pp. 96-98.

²⁶After this trip and several to Outer Mongolia, Owen Lattimore wrote in 1946 that

[w]e know virtually nothing of internal developments in Outer Mongolia in this period. We do know that both Outer Mongolia and Russia were chronically menaced with aggression by Japan, and that there were actual border conflicts, some of them on a large scale. We know that the situation led to an increasingly close coordination between Russian and Mongol defense; but we do not know exactly how this led to the development of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, nor do we know how far influence approximated to control....

Perhaps the major feature of the picture can best be described by saying that the Mongols, under the stress of complex influences, are rapidly changing their old ways,

were passed on to the President and the State Department and they undoubtedly contributed to the American acquiescence to the Soviet demands regarding the Mongolian People's Republic. Roosevelt probably did not regard the provision of the Yalta agreement regarding Outer Mongolia as a major point and promised to obtain Chiang's approval for this as well as other articles which concerned China.²⁷ The outcome for Outer Mongolia was rewarding as she became independent, but the point here considered is that the United States did not back Chiang Kai-shek in his desire to retain what he considered Chinese territory. After the Communist takeover of mainland China any retrospective look at America's lack of consideration for Chiang's rights seemed a factor in United States' failure in Far Eastern policy.

The United States also was not unaware that the Mongolian People's Republic was one of the first countries, after the Soviet Union, to recognize the new regime in China. On October 7, 1949, six days after similar action by the Soviet Union, the government of Outer Mongolia broke diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government and extended official recognition to the Chinese Communists.²⁸ Besides, wherever necessary, the Mongolian government endorsed actions of the Soviet government regarding foreign policy. A subservience to the

but changing some of them more rapidly than others. In making changes, they appeal for intellectual and philosophical sanction to the Marxist classics, not to the classics of either oriental or western democratic political philosophy. Owen Lattimore, "The Outer Mongolian Horizon," Foreign Affairs, XXIV, No. 4 (July, 1946), 657 and 660.

²⁷Stettinius, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

²⁸New York Times, October 8, 1949, p. 5.

Soviet Union and a tie with the Chinese Communists can be seen in the fact that after the outbreak of the Korean War, Outer Mongolia sent troops into Korea to help the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in their war against the United Nations.²⁹

2. The "Two-Chinas" problem

These actions, by Mongolia, constituted the second reason for Washington's uncertainty in recognizing the Mongolian People's Republic. The United States had no intention of recognizing Communist China. Thus, it seemed a bit incongruous to recognize Mongolia who then, at the height of the McCarthy era, seemed to reflect the evil of communism. The containment of this evil was the real trump card held by the Nationalist Chinese. America's pledge to protect needy countries from this threat gave Chiang Kai-shek a hold over her that was inconsistent with United States strength.

The great fear that pervades Nationalist China, namely the recognition of the Red China regime in the United Nations, has been woven by her into any consideration of the status of the Mongolian People's Republic. First of all, Nationalist China has maintained since 1949 that Taiwan is an integral part of China. She has allowed no thought of a "two-Chinas" concept because such a reality would diminish her strength considerably. Since 1958, however, Chiang has become aware of the fact that America would like to find an in-between formula that could somehow reconcile the American and Taiwanese

²⁹Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 342.

impulses toward self-determination and the instinctive Nationalist demand for the unity of all Chinese. The only formula apparently available is a play on position. Taiwan is independent of mainland China in government and ideology but she does not wish to be considered as an independent state. Therefore, her independence could be called "autonomy," the way the de facto independence of Tibet and Outer Mongolia was labeled after 1915.³⁰ Under this formula, Taiwan's separation from the continent could be viewed in the long sweep of Chinese history as purely temporary, a matter of only a few decades or at most a mere century or two. Independent Tibet, as it turned out, did not survive long after Britain left India, though it is still called autonomous. But Outer Mongolia did survive. If this were to happen to Taiwan, Nationalist China's dreams of unity would be shattered.

It is this author's opinion that this fear, that Taiwan could be another Outer Mongolia, naturally necessitates non-recognition of Mongolia by Nationalist China. A similar response by the United States is China's constant concern. Any kind of compromise in that area might lead into the greater problem of the "two-Chinas" formula. Should the United States allow diplomatic relations with the Mongolian People's Republic, a very possible next step, as seen in the eyes of Chiang Kai-shek, could be her recognition of Red China in the United Nations. Here is the crux of United States relations with Outer Mongolia. How much are we committed to a "one-China" policy?

³⁰John K. Fairbank, China--The People's Middle Kingdom and the USA (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 78.

This has been a prominent question concerning United States foreign policy for twenty-one years now and still no satisfactory answer has been found. One answer was considered in the Kennedy administration and was determined on the basis of whether communism on the mainland of China was a passing phase or there to stay. If it were a passing phase it would be wise to stick to the "one-China" policy and to keep the civil war going. But President Kennedy aligned himself with those who felt that Communism was now well entrenched on the mainland, regrettable though that might be, and that the longer-range interests of the United States lay in easing the risks of continuing the Chinese civil war and in looking toward some change in American policy of regarding the government in Taiwan as the true government of all of China.³¹

As a result certain initiatives were taken toward ending the status of civil war. One of them was the proposal to allow Mongolia to become a member of the United Nations and also to extend to her diplomatic recognition by the United States. Chester Bowles, special Assistant of African, Asian and Latin American Affairs, and others saw an opportunity here for taking an initiative that would have repercussions on the whole of United States policy in Asia, including policy toward Communist China herself.³² There were only four Asian Communist countries: China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia. America

³¹Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, Inc., 1967), p. 303.

³²Ibid., p. 305.

did not regard the half-countries of North Korea and North Vietnam as true states, but she did acknowledge that Mongolia was in fact a state even if she did not recognize her government.³³ Since Mongolia was Soviet-oriented, by recognizing her the United States could make a distinction between the more aggressive Stalinist policies of Communist China and the more moderate Soviet policy under Khrushchev, to which Mongolia also subscribed. Another political advantage was that recognition would also demonstrate to other Asians that United States policy was not so completely rigid as it appeared and that it did not slavishly follow the dictates of President Chiang Kai-shek, as was also frequently charged. Finally, recognition of Mongolia, situated as she is on the far border of China next to the Soviet Union, would give the United States, through an embassy in Ulan Bator, a "window" on a part of the world to which she had little access, and a source of much-needed information on what was going on.

The idea made sense, and a feeler was extended to the Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow to determine whether his government would be receptive to an exchange of ambassadors and willing to provide facilities and guarantees for a meaningful and effective embassy in Ulan Bator. On June 29, 1961, the State Department announced that the response to the diplomatic gestures was "such that it was possible to continue the discussions."³⁴

³³U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and its Implications (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 108-109.

³⁴State Department, Bulletin, Vol. 45 (1961), p. 113.

Then the storm broke out. The Nationalist Government on Taiwan did not like it, but the China Lobby in the United States liked it even less. Marvin Liebman, Secretary of the Committee of One Million, launched an angry attack, arguing that Mongolia was not an independent state, and charging that recognizing her was a move "motivated by pressure from Communist states."³⁵ Congressional sympathizers quickly followed suit. Walter Judd, representative from Minnesota and the long-time Republican spokesman on Asian affairs, for example, denounced the move as "incredible." His statement went on to say that "the gains will be insignificant, but the losses are likely to be catastrophic."³⁶ Everett Dirksen from Illinois, Republican leader in the Senate, proposed an amendment to the foreign aid bill opposing recognition of both Communist China and Mongolia. Most of the congressional critics, in fact, saw the move as a preliminary to the recognition of Communist China itself.³⁷ An example was the statement of Senator Kenneth Keating, the Republican from New York. "What I suspect is really meant is that a United States mission in Outer Mongolia would be the thin edge of a wedge designed ultimately to push Red China into the United Nations."³⁸ Even the merits of Mongolia as a listening post were challenged. Senator Styles Bridges, Republican from New Hampshire,

³⁵Hilsman, op. cit., p. 306.

³⁶U. S. Congress, House, Diplomatic Recognition of Outer Mongolia, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, p. 12245.

³⁷U. S. Congress, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, p. 15605.

³⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, pp. 13234-13235.

said that the only thing the mission would hear was "the bleating of sheep, the whinnying of vast herds of wild Mongolian ponies, the lowing of cattle and whatever musical notes yaks may emit."³⁹

The press reported--quite accurately--that the State Department was actually split on the wisdom of the move, and identified Chester Bowles as the leader of the group advocating it.⁴⁰ President Kennedy, the stories went on, supported Bowles even though Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, was somewhat lukewarm about the whole idea and had finally gone along when it became obvious that he was "outgunned" at the White House. Following the press lead, the congressional opponents of recognition attacked Bowles as at least an "appeaser" and hinted at something worse. For it was not long before some of the ghosts of McCarthyism were invoked. One of McCarthy's principal targets was Owen Lattimore who had written extensively about Mongolia.⁴¹ Soon the critics in Congress made the most of it. Representative Thomas Pelly, Republican from Washington, for example, said that it could be assumed that Lattimore was again advising the Department of State.⁴²

Then, with almost fictional irony, someone discovered that Owen Lattimore was at that very moment on a visit to Mongolia. "I do not

³⁹U. S. Congress, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, pp. 13316-13319.

⁴⁰Hilsman, op. cit., p. 307.

⁴¹Cf. Bibliography, infra, pp. 226 and 231.

⁴²U. S. Congress, House, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, pp. 20525-20526.

think it is an accident," said Senator Thomas Dodd, Democraft from Connecticut, "that, at the very moment when there is a big drive on to persuade the State Department to grant recognition to Outer Mongolia, Owen Lattimore should have arrived in the so-called People's Republic as a VIP visitor."⁴³ Ohio's Representative John Ashbrook, jumping on the band wagon, inserted in the Congressional Record an article by Alice Widener charging that "informed sources at the UN say it is highly probable that Lattimore's real mission to Mongolia during the summer will be to work with Mongolian Reds conducting negotiations for the setting up of an official U. S. diplomatic mission at Ulan Bator."⁴⁴ Dodd called for an official congressional investigation, and wrote the Secretary of State demanding to know whether or not Lattimore was on an official mission.

In Congress, the stalwarts of the China Lobby, including members of both parties, mustered their forces and quietly let it be known that they intended to destroy Kennedy's foreign aid program with crippling amendments unless the administration abandoned its plan to recognize Mongolia.⁴⁵ A few days later, Lincoln White, the official State Department spokesman, announced that negotiations to establish relations with Mongolia had been suspended. "We believe," White said, "that, in view of the existing world situation, it is in the best

⁴³U. S. Congress, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, pp. 16644-16647.

⁴⁴U. S. Congress, House, 87th Congress, 1st session, 1961, Congressional Record, p. 20527.

⁴⁵Hilsman, op. cit., p. 307.

interests of the United States to suspend further exploration of that matter at this time."⁴⁶

In 1963 another attempt was made to recognize diplomatically the Mongolian People's Republic. This time two new elements were brought into the debate--first, the fact that Mongolia was the only Asian Communist country that had signed the nuclear test ban treaty,⁴⁷ and, secondly, the Sino-Soviet dispute. Regarding the former, some in the United States felt that because of this action on the part of Outer Mongolia, recognition could be used as a means to an end. It could be an instrument for demonstrating that the United States judged Communist nations neither by their ideology nor by their race, but by their behavior and policies. The implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute were more weighty.

The United States is undoubtedly aware that diplomatic acceptance of Mongolia could allow for an opening to the recognition of Communist China. A decade of debate has surrounded this decision and it is not yet resolved. The United States is confronted with alternatives should these other two major powers go to war. It would almost certainly be a nuclear conflict--the first major use of these weapons in mankind's history. No one can be certain what the consequences would be, but most likely the fallout from the Chinese and Russian bombs would also be deposited on North America and on the territory of the United States, probably in amounts more deadly than would fall

⁴⁶State Department, Bulletin, Vol. 45 (1961), pp. 408-409.

⁴⁷Hilsman, op. cit., p. 349.

elsewhere on the earth, with the exception of Japan. The prevailing wind currents of the earth would attend to that.

This would be disaster enough. But the prospect that China and Russia would fight a mass war on the Asian continent without dragging other Asian powers, willy-nilly, into the conflict seems unrealistic. India, already in a de facto state of war with China, would be involved. Where would Southeast Asia stand, or North Vietnam, North Korea, Hong Kong or even Taiwan, flirting with the Russians but standing with the Chinese Communists on territorial issues? Would Eastern Europe be drawn to Russia's side in spite of itself? Much depends on the success of the Russian effort to patch together an Asian security pact against China. Certainly the signatories to such a document would aid Russia in the event of such a war.⁴⁸

C. ADVANTAGES TO UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF OUTER MONGOLIA

Seen in realistic terms, the Russo-Chinese conflict is one the United States cannot lightly brush aside. The stakes are too great-- for her own interests and for those of her friends. The United States is a super power. China and Russia cannot fight without radically affecting the power balance and eventually involving Asia, Europe and the world in actual conflict. The United States cannot avoid the responsibility of preventing such a development.

In view of this what would be a positive American policy and how can it be advanced? Quite obviously, if the United States is to take

⁴⁸Salisbury, War Between Russia and China, p. 201.

a serious role in the Sino-Soviet dispute she must establish a viable relationship with China. Recent Warsaw talks, where negotiating has remained at a minimum, have proved insufficient for such a relationship. To some, the possibility of a real change in relationships with China seems an insuperable barrier. But, in fact, a creative approach has not been foreclosed. The Chinese themselves have several times hinted at a useful first step--a simple American declaration, made in the light of certain understandings, that the fate of Taiwan is a Chinese question, one which must be resolved by the Chinese themselves.⁴⁹

As far as the United States is concerned this would not move into new and unprecedented ground. It would merely be a return to the position she held prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. It was the Korean war which poisoned American relations with China,⁵⁰ which caused the United States to place Taiwan under protection, to ban trade and travel to China, to organize an economic blockade of China, to prevent consideration of Communist China in the United Nations, and to continue without official diplomatic relations with Peking.

Such a declaration about Taiwan would not spell out the future. It would not specify procedures. It would not even define who is Chinese and who is not. Taipei could define the formula one way, Peking another, and Washington a third. So long as no one tried to

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 203.

⁵⁰It was Soviet Russia who first backed the North Koreans in support of the Communist cause. Russia had not believed that the United States would respond through the United Nations and war. When, in 1950, the United Nations forces were present at the Yalu River boundary of China, Russia began to relax her position and Communist China carried on the full force of the war.

define it precisely it could be accepted by all three.

It is the author's belief that such a step would be made easier by first recognizing the Mongolian People's Republic. Some kind of easing of the twenty-one year struggle would allow each side to approach this major issue with a bit more grace. Recognition of Outer Mongolia, of course, would be cutting one tie with Nationalist China but still would not be an alliance with Communist China. As a matter of fact Soviet Russia would be better served by this move because Mao Tse-tung still contests the position of Mongolia--a question he has raised since 1954.⁵¹ However, contrary to this fact, Mao is aware that United States recognition of Mongolia could be a significant step towards the recognition of Communist China in the United Nations. In this light it could be seen as favorable.

1. A wedge in Sino-Soviet conflict

But, United States policy in Outer Mongolia, as any positive action to remove barriers to United States-China relations, should be viewed only as a step toward quite a different aim--the aim of maximizing United States influence in the Sino-Soviet dispute. By eliminating barriers to diplomatic interchange with China the United States could make her influence felt in Peking and would acquire the ability to provide a counterweight to Moscow. If Moscow believed that America had no choice but to take a neutral stand or side with her, United States' ability to influence Russian conduct would be limited.

⁵¹Cf. supra, p. 84.

If Moscow knew a rapprochement between the United States and China could occur it should put the brakes on precipitous Soviet action.

What effects better United States-Chinese relations might have on Russian actions was debated in past occasions of the Warsaw talks. The fact that Mongolia might be a means to better relations is assumption, but foreign policy often is based on calculated risks taken in order to attain a greater good. Outer Mongolia is a small country involved in a great power struggle. How the United States handles the Mongolian situation may determine her position of influence in a greater issue.

2. Facilitate mutual relations

Certainly, this should not be the most important reason for recognizing this strategically located country. The primary purpose should be to facilitate relations between the two countries concerned. In the case of the United States and Mongolia, both countries would benefit. It is as important for the United States that the Mongols should have a chance to know what she is like as it is for America to learn something about Mongolia. It is necessary for her to understand the relations of Mongolia with the Soviet Union and China if she wants to know what kind of world she is living in. Mongolia is the only Communist-ruled country which is completely surrounded by other countries of the Communist bloc--Russia and China. In this respect she is different from Yugoslavia and Albania, from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and also from Romania, which has one frontier with Yugoslavia. All four of these countries have at least one frontier with

some country that is not in the Soviet bloc. But they are not all alike. Yugoslav policy is independent of Soviet policy, though often similar. Albanian policy today is hostile to Soviet policy. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have somewhat different policies, but both are in line with Soviet policy. These differences are a reminder that Mongol policy needs to be studied in the light of Mongolian conditions. Mongolia should not be simply lumped together with all other Communist-ruled countries.

3. Shared knowledge of the value of economic development

There is another aspect of Mongolia which should be of world-wide interest, and from which the United States could learn much. The relatively prosperous Mongolia of today is an example of development economics promoted through aid programs, particularly through solely communist aid programs, by which a country formerly without machines or domestic capital is being rapidly modernized. While the aid is foreign, the development is highly national in the sense that the country can now take over new enterprises and staff them with her own personnel. The economy appears to be a boom of increasing prosperity. The political consequences are that the government seems to be popular, and the alliance with Russia, the country principally responsible for the development program, is regarded by the people as their own alliance, not just a deal between politicians.

The importance of Mongolia's modernization is not so much that this has happened to a country for years isolated from the rest of

the world. The significant factor is that whatever improvement has occurred has been made possible solely through Communist foreign aid. No western country is responsible in any way for the achievements noted in the Mongolian People's Republic. The type of development that has been seen in Outer Mongolia is not that which would benefit Russia militarily, at least not ostensibly so. What can be seen is an improvement in areas that have raised the standard of living of the peoples of Mongolia. This surely is a different aspect of Soviet backing and most certainly a beneficial one.

Perhaps that for which Soviet Russia can best be accredited is something apart from the financial and technological aid itself. "Foreign aid alone cannot provide the creative innovation and leadership needed to prepare a society for modernization."⁵² It can, however, significantly influence the direction and pace of development. By selecting from among several modernizing forces at work within a country, it can sometimes determine which of them is likely to prevail. "An important tactic of development aid is, therefore, to exert its marginal influence selectively, when the alternative roads to modernization do not seem equally desirable."⁵³ Russia was able to modernize the livestock sector through collectivization. This approach, while at first dissatisfying to the Mongols, was later accepted by them and the external aid combined with internal efforts

⁵²Herbert Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 231.

⁵³Frederic Benham, Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 34.

gave modernization the impetus it needed in Mongolia.

Analyzing foreign aid in general it can be noted that modernizing the agricultural sector in most underdeveloped countries can result in staggering difficulties. Perhaps first among these are the technical problems--involving knowledge of diseases and pestilences prevalent in different climates as well as knowledge of different soils. It is necessary to learn how to cope with these factors as well as the behavioral patterns of peasant farmers in the various countries. Ignorance of the latter can make it difficult to find effective ways of gaining acceptance of new techniques even after they have been experimentally validated.

Apart from deficiencies in knowledge and approach, there are important political obstacles to making major improvements in the agricultural sector. Working with many farmers requires more human effort than negotiating with a few industrialists; education is a slower process than capital investment; and the urbanized political elites in the modern sector associate development with power lines and factories, not with field experiment stations and credit cooperatives. National plans therefore tend to overlook or downgrade the agricultural sector.⁵⁴

The urban orientation of development administration is, of course, understandable in view of the obviously greater economic progress that is possible in an industrial society. Aid administrators, for their part, have often confirmed this preference for industry over agriculture.⁵⁵

In Outer Mongolia some of these distinctions were not applicable

⁵⁴John D. Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 57-58.

⁵⁵Ibid.

when Russia first proffered her aid. Mongolia didn't have an industrial sector and therefore no urban life centered around industrialization. Her livestock was her life. Attempts at modernization here were similar to attempts in the agricultural sector, however. Politically it was not as beneficial. It was, however, the only major area that could allow for outside interference and still elicit the participation of the Mongols themselves. First there was a need for modernizing the livestock sector and then with a sense of growth in productivity accomplished, a move toward industrialization could be initiated. Russia's success in this regard is noteworthy.

It must be noted that the means used to realize this growth in the Mongolian People's Republic was and is socialism. The Communists have placed Outer Mongolia in a Marxist theoretical context. In brief summary, the orthodox Soviet analysis defines Outer Mongolia as a feudal society before 1921 which was enabled to "skip capitalism" because of the example of the Bolshevik Revolution and the aid of the Soviet Union. "It went through two stages in bypassing capitalism to attain socialism: 1) the democratic, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal stage, from 1921 to 1940, and 2) building socialism, 1940-1960."⁵⁶

A citation from Lenin defines the basic theoretical view. "With the aid of the proletariat of advanced countries, backward countries may make the transition to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, they can make the transition to Communism,

⁵⁶Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 353.

bypassing the capitalist stage of development."⁵⁷ Soviet experience and Soviet aid is indispensable to such development.

The most general law of this transition is the fact that political aid, economic aid, production aid, cultural aid, and any other kind of aid is given by countries in which the socialist revolution has been victorious to backward countries and peoples. The need for this aid arises because backward countries have insufficient material and political prerequisites for socialism and thus cannot make the transition to socialism completely independently.⁵⁸

Such aid replaces the developed proletariat and industry otherwise necessary.

The absence or smallness of a national working class cannot act as an obstacle to the beginning of the transition of backward countries from feudalism to socialism because the popular democratic revolution is supported by the aid and experience of the working class of the socialist states.⁵⁹

All the Mongols some of the time, and some of the Mongols all the time, have eagerly embraced changes brought by the foreigner. But most of the Mongols most of the time have been suspicious of non-Mongols and their innovations. Nevertheless, many of the changes of recent years are irreversible. The most striking innovation is education and literacy, which go far to eliminate backward Mongolia, and Communists brought it about. Rampant disease has been controlled. But violent purges are a Communist legacy, too.

Freedom gained from breaking the shackles of illiteracy and disease has been simultaneously circumscribed by continued demand for political and intellectual orthodoxy. Mongolia's free spirits have been chained. So judgment of the net result

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸As quoted in Ibid., p. 354.

⁵⁹Ibid.

of fifty years of Communism in the MPR must be subsumed in the larger context of "freedom" vs. Communism everywhere. But literacy, education, sanitation, health, and variety in career opportunity, have come to the Mongols via Communism, and no simple condemnation will suffice. The Communist challenge to us in all the "backward" countries of the world is clearly illustrated in the MPR; there are lessons here which we all must learn.⁶⁰

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 362.

CHART 1
SECURITY COUNCIL

Year/Session	Dates Discussed	Main Discussants	Final Vote	For Against Abstain	References
1946/1st	August 28-29	United States China Soviet Union United Kingdom	6 - Brazil, China, France, Mexico, Poland, Soviet Union 3 - United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands 2 - Australia, Egypt		SCOR - 54th- 56th meetings
1947/2nd	August 18	Soviet Union China	3 - Poland, Syria, Soviet Union 3 - USA, China, UK 5 - Australia, Brazil, Belgium, France, Columbia		SCOR - 186th meeting
1952/6th	February 6	Soviet Union United Kingdom France Brazil	2 - USSR, Pakistan 6 - USA, China, Greece, Turkey, Netherlands, Brazil 3 - United Kingdom, France, Chile		SCOR - 573rd meeting

CHART 1--Continued

Year/Session	Dates Discussed	Main Discussants	Final Vote	For Against Abstain	References
1952/7th	July 9 - September 8	Soviet Union China, France, Netherlands, Brazil, Turkey, Greece	2 - USSR, Pakistan 5 - USA, China, Greece, Brazil, Netherlands 4 - France, Chile, Turkey, UK		SCOR - 590th- 597th meeting
1955/10th	December 10-13	USSR, USA, China, UK, Brazil, New Zealand	8 - Brazil, France, Iran, Turkey, New Zealand, USSR, UK, Peru 1 - China 2 - USA, Belgium		SCOR - 701st- 704th meetings
1955/10th	December 14-15	USSR, USA, UK, Turkey, Peru, Brazil, New Zealand	1 - USSR 0 - 10 - USA, UK, Peru, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Iran, Turkey, New Zealand		SCOR - 705th- 706th meetings
1955/10th	December 21	USSR, USA, UK, France, China, Peru, Iran	1 - USSR 0 10 - USA, UK, Peru, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Iran, Turkey, New Zealand		SCOR - 708th meeting

CHART 1--Continued

Year/Session	Dates Discussed	Main Discussants	Final Vote	For Against Abstain	References
1956/10th	February 6	USSR, USA	No Vote		SCOR-716th meeting
1956/11th	December 12	USSR, Yugoslavia	4-USSR, Peru, Iran, Yugoslavia 2-China, Cuba 5-USA, UK, France, Australia, Belgium		SCOR - 756th meeting
1957/12th	September 9	USSR, China, USA, Australia, UK, Sweden	2-USSR, Sweden 5-USA, China, Columbia, Cuba, Philippines 4-UK, Australia, France, Iraq		SCOR - 789th- 790th meetings
1960/15th	December 3	USSR, USA, France, Poland, Ceylon	No Vote		SCOR - 911th meeting
1961/16th	October 25	USSR, USA, China, UAR, France, UK, Ceylon, Chile	9-USSR, UAR, UK, Ceylon, Chile, Ecuador, France, Liberia, Turkey 0- 1-USA China did not take part in the voting		SCOR - 971st meeting

CHART 2

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Year/Session	Dates Discussed	Main Discussants	Recommend			Reference
			Final Vote to S. C.	For	Against	
1946/st	November 6-11	USSR, Byelorussia, China, Ukraine, Egypt, Panama, Yugoslavia, Philippines	42	0	7	GAOR-1st Committee 14th-17th meetings
1948/3rd	November 22-27 and December 1-2	USSR, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia, USA, Yugoslavia, UK	No Vote			GAOR-Ad hoc Committee 6-6th mtgs. 22-23rd mtgs.
1949/4th	October 31 - November 4	USSR, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, UK, Poland, Ukraine, Iraq, Mexico, France, Canada	9	30	4	GAOR-Ad hoc Committee 24-29th meetings
1950/5th	December 4	USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, UK, USA, Byelorussia, Ukraine	18	22	15	GAOR-318th Plenary Meeting
1951/6th	January 21-25	USSR, Egypt, India, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, USA, UK	21	12	25	GAOR-1st Committee 495-501st meeting

CHART 2--Continued

Year/Session	Dates Discussed	Main Discussants	Final Vote	Recommend to S. C.	Reference	
1953/8th	October 15	USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Egypt, India, Mexico, China, Canada, UK, USA, France	No Vote		GAOR-Ad Hoc Committee 12th meeting	
1955/10th	December 2-7	USSR, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Ukraine, USA France, Australia, Poland, China	52	2	5	GAOR-Ad Hoc Political Committee 26-32nd meet- ings
1955/10th	December 8	China, Greece, Cuba, Israel, France	52	2	5	GAOR-552nd Plenary meeting
1961/16th	October 27	China	By acclamation China did not take part in voting		GAOR-1043rd Plenary meeting	

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED NATIONS ADMISSION OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Mongolian People's Republic is still seeking the diplomatic recognition of the United States. There is no doubt that such relations would open the door to many more agreements between Outer Mongolia and the western world. The Mongols greatly desire international involvement as an impetus to their spirit of independence. The first major step toward the world arena came when she was admitted as a member of the United Nations in 1961.¹ This had occurred after fifteen years of repeated applications on the part of Mongolia and a comparable time of political debating and watchful waiting on the part of certain member nations.

It was on June 27, 1946 that the Mongolian People's Republic

¹United Nations Document, S/4968, Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 971st meeting on October 25, 1961, concerning the Application of the Mongolian People's Republic for Membership in the United Nations.

first applied to the United Nations for admission.²

So little was known about Outer Mongolia in the outside world that there was no general disposition in United Nations circles to act on

^{2*}Your Excellency, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, attaching great importance to the Organization for maintaining international peace and security and for assuring cooperation among the peoples in the political, economic and social fields; being inspired by the principles underlying the United Nations Organization and fully sharing those principles, has the honor to ask you to transmit to the Security Council and to the General Assembly the request of the Mongolian People's Republic to be admitted to membership in the United Nations Organization.

In applying to the Security Council and to the General Assembly with the request to be admitted to membership in the United Nations Organization, the Government of the Republic deems it necessary to draw attention both of the Security Council and of the General Assembly to the fact that the people of the Mongolian People's Republic took part in the struggle against fascist States on the side of the United Nations, having contributed to the struggle by the material resources it had placed at the disposal of its great neighbor, the Soviet Union. The Mongolian People's Republic which on August 10, 1945 declared war on Japan took part in military operations against the country. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic feels sure that both the Security Council and the General Assembly will remember this contribution of the Mongolian people to the common cause of the United Nations and that they will treat favorably the request of the Mongolian People's Republic to be admitted into the United Nations Organization.

At the same time I deem it necessary to declare in the name of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic that our country is prepared to undertake all the obligations arising out of the United Nations Charter and to observe all provisions of the Charter. I allow myself to take this opportunity, Mr Secretary-General, to wish, in the name of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, in that of the Mongolian people and also in my own name, all success to the United Nations Organization and to you personally." United Nations Document, S/95, Telegram from Choibalsan, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Secretary General of the United Nations, June 24, 1946. Outer Mongolia was not represented at the Japanese surrender following World War II nor was she invited to be present. It is the author's belief that Outer Mongolia was not included at this time because her legal status was rather moot. It wasn't until October 20, 1945 that Mongolia was legally considered independent following a plebiscite. If she did participate she did so as a result of an alliance with Soviet Russia.

this application until members were better informed about the country. Accordingly the Membership Committee of the Security Council cabled requests for advice about a number of points related to the system of government, the nature and extent of Outer Mongolia's foreign relations, and its capacity and willingness to broaden existing relations and fulfill the obligations of the United Nations membership.³ No reply was received until two days before the Security Council voted on the application on August 30, 1946.⁴ The reply created a poor impression, not only by its tardiness but also by failing to reassure the Security Council regarding the capacity of Outer Mongolia to participate normally in international life. The application was therefore rejected.⁵ "The representatives of the United States, Australia, Egypt, Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while reserving their Governments' positions, stated that the available information was not sufficient to show whether the Mongolian People's Republic was capable of fulfilling

³SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement 4, Appendix 12, pp. 123-124, Telegram from Acting Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, July 31, 1946.

⁴SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement 4, Appendix 12, Addendum, pp. 124-130, Reply from the Mongolian People's Republic to the Questionnaire of the Committee on the Admission of New Members, August 28, 1946.

⁵United Nations Document, S/133, United Nations Security Council, Report of the Security Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members, August 30, 1946, SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement 4, Annex 7, p. 66. This first vote of the Security Council appears to be the only unbiased vote regarding Outer Mongolia. In each successive one power politics played a major role. It is likewise notable that this application was rejected not by a physical majority but by a qualitative majority. Six voted in favor of admission and only three voted against, but two of the dissenting three were permanent members and thus constituted a veto. Cf. charts, supra, p. 144.

the obligations under the Charter, and expressed a desire for further information which would clarify some points."⁶ A look at the United Nations Charter, particularly those areas where Outer Mongolia apparently fell short of compliance, will better clarify the reasons for this opinion.

A. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.⁷

Thus, there are five qualifications: 1) that the applicant for membership must be a state; 2) that it must be peace-loving; 3) that it must accept the obligations contained in the Charter; 4) that it must be able to carry out these obligations; and 5) that it must be willing to carry them out. Such qualifications are indicative of the fact that while absolute universality was "an idea toward which it was proper to aim,"⁸ most of the participants at the San Francisco Conference favored some sort of selectivity in the admission of new members.

⁶Ibid.

⁷United Nations Charter, Article 4.

⁸United Nations Document, 604, I/2/42, UNCIO, Vol. 7, p. 114.

1. General Assembly and Security Council

The authority to interpret these qualifications is not specifically given to any body of the United Nations. Qualifications one, two and three are facts, the existence of which the United Nations can ascertain itself. Four and five, however, involve additional qualitative judgment on criteria which should distinguish a United Nations member from any other state that does not or can not become a member. Where such qualitative judgment is necessary the Security Council and/or General Assembly often have arrogated to themselves interpretation of the Charter. They have done so based on the wording of Article 4 paragraph 2.

This second paragraph of Article 4 led to extensive and controversial discussion centered around the correct interpretation of the clause: "by decision of the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council." The permanent members of the Security Council maintained that in order to make a recommendation the concurrent votes of all of them was required, and if the Council did not pronounce itself favorably, there was no recommendation. This presupposed that the term "recommendation" meant a favorable opinion solely and would thereby cause a termination in the consideration of an applicant's admission to the United Nations. This, according to Jose Arce, was a violation of the Charter because, if as stated, the General Assembly was to make a decision regarding an applicant, the application for

admission should reach them.⁹

Nevertheless, it was decided in early 1946 "that any member which is a permanent member of the Security Council will be able by its sole opposition to prevent a state from becoming a member of the Organization,"¹⁰ for a decision to recommend the admission of a member is not a matter of procedure and is therefore subject to the "veto" of the Big Five.¹¹ Furthermore, the rules of procedure adopted by the Security Council in connection with the admission of new members¹² make it clear that the Security Council possesses both the initiative and the ultimate word.

The earlier discussion was not ignored, however. The application is referred to the General Assembly accompanied by a recommendation for positive or negative action, as the case may be. There is no obligation upon the General Assembly to accept the positive recommendation, but it cannot overrule the opposition of the Council

for in the system adopted by the Charter, admission is effected by the decision of the General Assembly, which can only act upon a recommendation of the Security Council, and after both these organs are satisfied that the applicant state possesses the qualifications required by paragraph one Article four.¹³

⁹Jose Arce, United Nations--Admission of New Members (Madrid, Spain: 1952), p. 77.

¹⁰L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), p. 82.

¹¹United Nations Charter, Article 27 (3).

¹²United Nations Document, S/96, Rev. 3, Chapter 10, Rules 58-60.

¹³International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) Reports, Case: Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948, p. 57; Joint Dissenting Opinions, p. 85.

The only way in which the General Assembly can express its disagreement with the recommendation of the Security Council is by referring it back for reconsideration.¹⁴ If it considers that the Security Council has acted illegally and disregarded its obligations concerning membership, the General Assembly may¹⁵ ask the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the Matter.¹⁶

2. International Court of Justice

The necessity of turning to the International Court of Justice was occasioned due to a considerable divergence of opinion concerning interpretation of the criteria laid down in the Charter. The question was whether said criteria were minimal or exhaustive. In the course of the Security Council's consideration of the applications of Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania and Bulgaria at the 204th, 205th and 206th meetings of the Council,¹⁷ the representative of Poland had proposed that these five countries be admitted together.¹⁸ The representative of the Soviet Union, in supporting the Polish proposal, had stated that he considered that each of these applicants

¹⁴United Nations Journal, No. 75, Supplement A-64, Add. 1; Resolutions of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1948, pp. 13-14.

¹⁵United Nations Charter, Article 96 (1).

¹⁶Resolutions of the Second Regular Session, op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁷SCOR, 204th meeting, 1947; SCOR, 205th meeting, 1947; SCOR, 206th meeting, 1947.

¹⁸United Nations Document, S/565.

fulfilled all the requirements laid down in the Charter for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with the Potsdam Agreement all these countries should therefore be admitted to membership in the United Nations at the same time.

When the representatives of Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom insisted on a separate vote on each application, the representative of the Soviet Union voted against the admission of Finland and Italy after the other three were refused admission by other votes. They did so on the ground that all former enemy states should be treated in the same way. But for the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council, Italy and Finland would have been recommended for admission, having obtained nine affirmative votes each. The other three countries failed to receive seven affirmative votes.

The procedure followed in the Security Council was criticized by many representatives in the course of the discussion on membership applications in the First Committee of the General Assembly. The representative of Belgium, therefore, submitted a draft resolution¹⁹ which provided that the General Assembly request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion concerning the matter. In its advisory opinion of May 28, 1948 the International Court of Justice was categorically on the side of those interpreting the criteria to be exhaustive.

The natural meaning of the words used leads to the conclusion that these conditions constitute an exhaustive enumeration and

¹⁹United Nations Document, A/C.1/242.

are not merely stated by way of guidance or example...²⁰

Nor could it be argued that the conditions enumerated represent only an indispensable minimum, in the sense that political considerations could be superimposed upon them, and prevent the admission of an applicant which fulfills them.

Moreover, the spirit as well as the terms of the paragraph preclude the idea that considerations extraneous to these principles and obligations can prevent the admission of a State which complies with them. If the authors of the Charter had meant to leave Members free to import into the application of this provision considerations extraneous to the conditions laid down therein, they would undoubtedly have adopted a different wording.²¹

The General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed this opinion²² and, on February 1, 1952 it approved an amended Peruvian resolution declaring

that the judgment of the United Nations on the admission of new Members ought to be based exclusively on the conditions contained in Article four of the Charter.²³

3. Political considerations

However, despite the position taken by the Assembly and the International Court, there is also a considerable amount of evidence which points in another direction. "Even if the conditions of admission are fulfilled by an applicant, admission may be refused" on important political grounds, for, as cases have proven

the admission of a state is liable to disturb the international

²⁰ICJ, Conditions of Admission, 1948, p. 62.

²¹Ibid., p. 63.

²²General Assembly Resolutions 197 (III), December 8, 1948.

²³United Nations Document, A/L. 77, p. 2.

situation, or at all events the international organization, for instance, if such admission would give a very great influence to certain groups of States, or produce profound divergences between them.²⁴

The long and repetitious discussion of the question of admission ever since 1946 has so confused the issues that the political aspects of the problem have been vastly overshadowed.²⁵ What is more, a conviction has grown that the introduction of political considerations into the debate is not admissible and that all and any arguments over and above those relating to strict compliance with the five requirements enumerated in the Charter are of necessity in violation of the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

What has actually happened is that two problems have become quite unnecessarily intermingled. First, there is the simple question as to whether Soviet tactics of stubbornly demanding the simultaneous admission in a single resolution of a number of unconnected candidates irrespective of their qualifications, and of repeatedly using the veto privilege to block their separate admission is in conformity with the Charter.²⁶ This question was occasioned by the ten year deadlock,

²⁴ICJ, Conditions of Admission, 1948, p. 71.

²⁵Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit., pp. 125-137.

²⁶Reference here is to the "package deal." The history of package deals on the admission of new members may be divided into two periods. The first period was one of confusion. During that period, a small number of delegations wavered between support and opposition. Then, on May 28, 1948, came the historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

A member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a state to membership in the United Nations, is not juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission

between 1945 and 1955, of admitting new members to the United Nations. The permanent Members on both sides of the cold-war front acted to keep out other applicants that each considered to favor the opposite side-- a criterion not listed in the Charter. This was the result of a consideration--should a nation that espouses a certain policy permit the admission of another that is dedicated to pursuing a conflicting policy? If this position is not resolved, the question of membership immediately becomes a battleground between contesting coalitions within the membership and the supportive and universal objectives of the United Nations become obscured in the contest to gain support for one or another of the coalitions. The answer as to whether the Soviet tactics were in conformity with the Charter is clearly in the negative

depending on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article....In particular, a Member of the Organization cannot, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the state concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other states be admitted to membership in the United Nations together with that state." ICJ, Conditions of Admission, 1948, p. 65.

With that opinion the United Nations entered upon its second period in the discussion of the package deal. Whereas in the first period there was confusion and sometimes even contradiction, since the Court decision there has been neither confusion nor contradiction. Since that time, and until December 14, 1955, all delegations with the exception of the Soviet bloc, have held any package deal to be unconstitutional.

Use of the package deal does not mean that the nations admitted must be in the Western or Communist blocs necessarily. Neutrality is also an effective position in this consideration. The distinction between the two became the basis of a clash between the United States and Soviet Russia. The United States advocated selectivity and Soviet Russia paid lip-service to the principle of universality in order to tie in bloc desires. Neutral states adhered to the latter principle. Thus, the neutral states were used to comprise an unbalanced package. Nemesio Encarnacion Prudente, Admission to Membership in the United Nations as an Instrument of Diplomacy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1959), pp. 310-312.

and not subject to serious argument. "The provisions of Article 4 necessarily imply that every application for admission should be examined and voted on separately and on its own merits."²⁷ Second, there is the rather academic problem of whether the qualifications enumerated in Article 4 are exhaustive and sufficient. The conditions for admission provided for in Article 4 are so broadly phrased that there is plenty of room for political considerations and, furthermore, representatives are not obliged to indicate the reasons for casting their votes one way or another. It should also be noted that there is no way of enforcing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning this second question.²⁸

Thus the problem is not as simple as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice seems to imply. However, this does not mean that any and all political maneuvers are equally permissible. The distinction between legitimate political considerations consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and others which are not still holds good.

It is not difficult to see that membership consists of an interrelation between a member and an association and vice versa, as well as interrelations between the member and all other members of the association and vice versa. Therefore every act of admission creates certain changes in the functioning of the organs of the organization

²⁷ICJ, Conditions of Admission, 1948, p. 65.

²⁸Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The International Court of Justice (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951), pp. 91-92.

sometimes negligibly small but sometimes important. Admission is bound to affect, through mutual interaction between organs of the organization and its members, the behavior and tactics of the newly admitted country in varying degrees.

It may similarly have some influence on the behavior of the old members of the association, those who sponsored the admission and particularly those who opposed it strongly. Like all political decisions the decision to let an outsider enter an international peace association is only partially based on facts known at the time and on available evidence. It has to be taken mainly on the basis of expectations about future events, on reasonable probabilities involving a large margin of possible error.

How will the admission of a particular applicant state affect the achievement of the main purpose of the United Nations--the maintenance of peace? That is obviously not so much a legal question but a perfectly legitimate political one. Should, after honest reflection of all pertinent circumstances, the answer point in the adverse direction, a negative vote against admission would be perfectly fair and in order even if the anticipated effect of admission would be due to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. The interests of peace coinciding with the interests of the organization itself are paramount.

There is another political implication involved in the act of admission which must be mentioned. By the fact that a state is admitted into the organized community of nations the government in power at that time and the whole country acquire additional prestige

and good standing at home and abroad. That occurs in spite of the now carefully elaborated and accepted legal doctrine that admission to the United Nations does not necessarily imply recognition either de facto or de jure by states members of the United Nations.²⁹ It, therefore, amounts to the so-called "collective recognition."

B. STIPULATED CONDITIONS OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

With such significant considerations before each voting member of the United Nations varied interpretations of the conditions of admission are inevitable. This is possible because the stipulated conditions assume, as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has put it, a "very wide and very elastic nature,"³⁰ not being liable to precise definition. In fact, "there has never been any attempt, in proposals submitted to the Council or the Assembly, to define their meaning in any general sense."³¹ The meaning of these conditions is only pragmatically expounded, in concrete cases of admission, by member states at the meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Most of the five conditions of admission, in addition to being general in wording, are subjective in meaning. The only exception is the condition of acceptance of the Charter obligations. According to

²⁹United Nations Document, S/1466, Memorandum of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, March 9, 1950.

³⁰ICJ, Conditions of Admission, 1948, p. 60.

³¹United Nations, Repertory of United Nations Practice, I (1955), p. 179.

the established procedure of the United Nations, an applicant state is considered as fulfilling this condition if it submits a formal instrument, accompanying its application, to the effect that it accepts the obligations of the Charter.³² The fulfillment of all the other conditions are to a large extent not objectively ascertainable.

Being elastic and subjective in character, these conditions (or requirements) of admission are highly susceptible to different and even conflicting interpretations by member states of the United Nations. Consequently, member states may arrive at different conclusions on the qualifications of the same applicant, and the General Assembly and the Security Council, in turn, may make different judgments regarding whether that applicant should be admitted. Interpretations of the conditions of admission by member states of these two organs, therefore, assume a crucial importance in determining admission or denial of an application for membership.

With these conditions and the possibility of varying interpretations in mind we can now consider Outer Mongolia's fifteen year delay in being accepted.

1. Statehood

In connection with the formal requirement of statehood for admission to membership, United Nations members have dealt extensively with the concept of sovereignty in their arguments for or against specific applicants. In arguing against the admission of the Mongolian

³²United Nations, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, I (1955), pp. 4-6.

People's Republic the British representative challenged her independence. Making an analogy between Outer Mongolia and Tanu Tuva, he noted that both countries

had been set up at the same time and with identical status. However, Tanu Tuva had disappeared as an independent entity and had become a mere province of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. That occurrence, he feared, justified the question whether the same might happen to Outer Mongolia.³³

On the other hand, the Soviet Union's delegate claimed that the Mongolians attained their independence by democratic means. He stressed that the Mongolian people had voted for independence in 1945 and the results of their plebiscite had been recognized by her two immediate neighbors, China and the Soviet Union.³⁴

Another argument regarding Outer Mongolia's sovereignty had been presented by the Chinese representative in 1946, even though they voted in favor of admission that year. He declared that "the lack of diplomatic or consular relations with other countries might be an indication that Outer Mongolia was not yet ready to take her place as a member of the world community."³⁵ This attitude was reemphasized one year later by the Australian representative. He stated that the "Legal Department of the Secretariat [of the United Nations] had expressed the opinion that a criterion of sovereignty was that the government of a State should be solely responsible for its foreign

³³GAOR, 3rd Session, Plenary Meeting, Part I, 177 meeting, December 8, 1948, p. 798.

³⁴SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No. 4, 1946, pp. 24-27.

³⁵Ibid., p. 64.

affairs. The Australian Government had no evidence that the Mongolian Government fulfilled that condition, since it had established diplomatic relations only with the USSR."³⁶

The British representative also believed that if Outer Mongolia had diplomatic relations with only two countries (this was after Outer Mongolia had established relations with Communist China) this demonstrated "that they have not yet gained experience in international affairs sufficiently to equip them to play a part in the international work of the United Nations."³⁷

It was the United States delegate that put forth an argument against the way of thinking of the last three representatives. He declared that while it was traditionally the characteristic of a state to possess full sovereign freedom to form its own international policy, "neither at San Francisco nor subsequently has the United Nations considered that complete freedom to frame and manage one's own foreign policy was an essential requisite of United Nations' membership."³⁸ However, over and above this, the United States representative stated that the United States Government had yet to receive information which convinced it that the Mongolian People's Republic was in fact an independent state.³⁹ This statement, as well as similar statements of other representatives, all led to one fact--

³⁶SCOR, 2nd year, Special Supplement No. 3, 1947, p. 11.

³⁷SCOR, 56th meeting, 1946, p. 90.

³⁸SCOR, 3rd year, No. 128, 383rd meeting, December 2, 1948, p. 10.

³⁹Ibid., p. 11.

the Mongolian People's Republic was not being admitted because of her lack of proof concerning her willingness to open up diplomatic relations with other nations. The relevancy of this factor to the Charter, therefore, was implied.

Outer Mongolia, at that time, indicated that she was aware of this deficiency for she began to attempt to make contacts with the rest of the world. From among the non-Eastern bloc nations India, Indonesia and Burma recognized Outer Mongolia before her final acceptance to the United Nations.⁴⁰ East European and other "People's Democracies" had also exchanged representatives or delegations with them.⁴¹

2. Peace-loving

In addition to being a state, the applicant must be peace-loving. The term is vague and can be answered only in the light of the admission practices of the United Nations. In the debate of the General Assembly and the Security Council, member states have taken into consideration various factors in order to determine the peace-loving character of applicant states. One of them is whether the state has committed an act of aggression against another state.

In the case of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese delegate accused them of attempting to seize, by armed invasion, territory in the Peitashan

⁴⁰India established diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia in 1955. Indonesia and Burma did so in 1956.

⁴¹Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia in 1956; Yugoslavia, 1956; Hungary, 1956; East Germany, 1955; North Korea, 1955; and North Vietnam, 1954.

region of the Province of Sinkiang.⁴² It had been alleged that the Peitashan region was Mongolian territory, but as far as the Chinese Government knew, the claim of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Peitashan region had no other basis than the mere assertion made after the conflict of June 5, 1947. The Chinese representative pointed out that Peitashan lay on the Sinkiang side of a boundary which had been established in 1915 when Outer Mongolia was made an autonomous unit, and which had remained unchallenged until June 5, 1947. That boundary was found on all official maps of China, of which Outer Mongolia had been an integral part until granted independence. During that same period, Peitashan had been under Chinese civil administration and guarded by Chinese armed forces sufficient to maintain peace and order. The Mongolian People's Republic had in no way showed claim to the area, he asserted, until they started an invasion with a forty-eight-hour ultimatum to the local authorities. When the Chinese Government had protested and demanded suspension of hostilities and retirement from the invaded territory pending investigation, the Mongolian Government had replied by asserting that the territory concerned was theirs.⁴³

These acts demonstrated that the Mongolian People's Republic was not a peace-loving State, that it had acted contrary to the Charter and would not be able or willing to carry out those obligations after admission. For this reason, it was impossible for the Chinese Government to support the application by the Mongolian People's Republic.⁴⁴

⁴²SCOR, 2nd year, Special Supplement No. 3, Appendix 4, 1947, pp. 36-37.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 9.

Because of this Chinese charge of aggression, the British delegate maintained that a prima facie doubt as to Mongolia's peace-loving character had been established and, therefore, objected to Mongolia's admission.⁴⁵

In support of Outer Mongolia, the Russian delegate, quoting a special communique issued by the Mongolian Government, stated that the allegations by the Chinese representative regarding penetration into China by the Mongolian military units were false and had been fabricated for provocative purposes.

The falseness and unlikelihood of these statements are evident from the fact that the Baltak-Bogdo mountain range (Peitashan region) is situated not on Chinese territory...but on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.⁴⁶

He said that the communique went on to describe the circumstances in which Chinese troops had entrenched themselves in Mongolian territory and made sorties against Mongolian frontier guards. These guards had sent a spokesman to the Chinese troops to request that they leave Mongolian territory. The spokesman had been arrested and the Mongolian guards had taken action to expel the intruders, but they had not entered Chinese territory. He further indicated that China might have used frontier incidents as a means of distracting attention from their internal situation and that Outer Mongolia's admission should not be refused on the strength of such tactics.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁶SCOR, 2nd year, Special Supplement No. 3, Appendix 5, 1947, p. 39.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 39-40.

Ten years later, the Chinese Government again accused the Mongolians of another act of aggression. The Chinese representative claimed that the Mongolian People's Republic had participated with the Chinese and Korean Communists in the war in Korea against the United Nations.⁴⁸

Another factor, consistently used by the Soviet Union, determining the peace-loving character of applicant states, was their conduct during World War II. The good war conduct of the Mongolian People's Republic was a constant argument by the Russian delegation for Mongolian admission into the United Nations. The Mongolians gave considerable aid to the Soviet forces in the economic and military spheres to fight the Japanese.⁴⁹ Outer Mongolia declared war on the Axis powers on June 22, 1941, and actively continued the struggle against the fascist aggressors until their final capitulation.⁵⁰ Soviet Russia claimed that their voluntary fight against Japan further proved that Outer Mongolia was able and willing to carry out the Charter obligations.⁵¹ The sensitiveness of Russia to the value of Outer Mongolia's role in the war was demonstrated by heated discussions and the statement that Outer Mongolia "has earned with the blood of her sons the right to become a member of the United Nations... [they] had a better

⁴⁸SCOR, 703rd meeting, 1955, p. 11; SCOR, 704th meeting, 1955, p. 5. The author found no verification of the truth of this statement.

⁴⁹Cf. supra, pp. 39-41.

⁵⁰SCOR, 1st year, 2nd series, Supplement No. 4, 1946, p. 65; also cf. supra, p. 150, n. 2.

⁵¹SCOR, 56th meeting, 1946, pp. 88-89.

right to be in the United Nations than many of those whom the United States' delegate is supporting."⁵²

Many of the representatives felt that the factor of conduct during the second world war was extraneous to the Charter.⁵³ However, they themselves referred to such favorable conduct of the applicants they supported. Again, relevancy of World War II conduct to the conditions laid down by the Charter was implied.

3. "To Be Able" and "To Be Willing"

To be able to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and to be willing to do so are the last two conditions of admission listed in Article 4, paragraph 1. Theoretically, "to be able" differs from "to be willing," and it is possible that an applicant may be found able but unwilling to carry out the Charter obligations, and vice versa. In practice, however, member states of the United Nations tend to ignore the difference between the two conditions and seem to consider them as synonymous. The records of the United Nations reveal that applicants have been regarded either as fulfilling both conditions or not so. In the history of the organization no applicant was found fulfilling one and lacking the other of the two conditions.

The determination of member states concerning Outer Mongolia's admission and these last two conditions was intrinsically bound with

⁵²SCOR, 573rd meeting, 1952, pp. 35-36.

⁵³Refer to the statements of the delegates, SCOR, 56th meeting, 1946, Britain, p. 94; Australia, pp. 92 and 95; France, p. 93, Netherlands, pp. 92 and 96.

the statements made with regard to the first two conditions. Repetition is not necessary, therefore, to ascertain the viewpoints of China and the Soviet Union, particularly, relative to the ability and willingness of the Mongolian People's Republic to carry out the obligations of the Charter. It seems to me that economic instability could have been an unstated factor hindering Outer Mongolia's ability to significantly contribute to the community of nations. While not a legal hindrance to admission, this could have nourished the many doubts concerning future ability to carry out the obligations and desires laid down by the Charter.

C. EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS

Conditions extraneous to the Charter and yet able to effect the admission of applicant states have already been referred to. They include conduct of the applicant during World War II and en bloc admission of applicants. As has been seen, with regard to Outer Mongolia, the first came into discussion under the stipulated conditions of Outer Mongolia's statehood and its peace-loving characteristics. The last, en bloc admission, even though declared unconstitutional by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 1948,⁵⁴ has played a big part in the affirmative and negative voting for Outer Mongolia's admission into the United Nations.

⁵⁴ICJ, Conditions of Admission, 1948, p. 65.

1. En bloc admission

En bloc admission was first proposed by the United States in 1946⁵⁵ but quickly recalled after Soviet disapproval.⁵⁶ In 1947, it was again proposed, this time by Russia, and opposed by the United States.⁵⁷ After 1948 all major powers except the Soviet Union opposed it in principle. Russia's insistence upon its adaptation was an attempt to get East European countries, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, into the organization. Italy was being used as a lever to pry the door open. These four plus Finland were bunched under the title, ex-enemy states. But the Western powers were not willing to have the communist countries inside the organization just to let Italy in. The leaders at the Kremlin revised their tactics. They hoped that the smaller nations would be easier to convince than the United States and Britain of accepting the concept of simultaneous admission. They, therefore, decided to put the pressure on the small nations by blanket-ing the whole admission question with this idea of en bloc admission.⁵⁸ En bloc admission was not to be limited to the applications of the five ex-enemy states. It was to apply to all applications. This would provide more levers to pry open more doors of the United Nations.

⁵⁵U. S. Department of State, The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1946, Publication 2735 (1947), pp. 39-40.

⁵⁶Russell, op. cit., pp. 359-360.

⁵⁷Ibid., n. 76.

⁵⁸Prudente, op. cit., p. 308.

Consequently, the Soviet delegate demanded the simultaneous and immediate reconsideration of the twelve applications then pending, among them Outer Mongolia.⁵⁹ The accusation of "discrimination against certain countries and favoritism towards others" was conveniently hurled against supporters of the admission of the non-communist applicants. The Ukrainian delegate saw discrimination against Outer Mongolia, for instance, and favoritism toward Ceylon as the primary reason for resolutions by non-communist members to give preference to the consideration of Ceylon's application.⁶⁰ Lengthy debate resulted only in a stalemate at the time and further attempts⁶¹ by Russia to find a means of acceptance for her satellite countries. In 1955 this stalemate was broken and a compromise was considered due to a resolution, overwhelmingly passed by the General Assembly.

2. 1955 package deals

That which allowed for this possible breakthrough was not a result of United Nations machinery, which is unable to deal with great power dissension, but a political agreement, in principle, reached outside the United Nations. When major nations disagree they can use the United Nations to prick each other but in order to actually settle their dispute they must lift the issue out of United Nations auspices

⁵⁹SCOR, 279th meeting, 1948, p. 29.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 32-33.

⁶¹cf. Charts, supra, pp. 144-145 and 147.

and solve it on another level, formally or informally. Implementation, then, can be handled by the United Nations.

A treaty with Austria was an issue that had divided the Communist and democratic camps for a decade, causing similar division in the United Nations over membership admission. The Western powers had made several attempts at proposals of treaties acceptable to the Soviet Union, but it wasn't until May 15, 1955, that a settlement was reached satisfactory to the West, Russia and Austria.⁶² Austria was to have her independence. The Soviets also made concessions concerning land, oil and prisoners of war. In return Moscow made favorable trade agreements with Austria and, very importantly, insisted upon Austrian neutrality.⁶³

This political agreement, in principle, opened the way for a breaking of the stalemate in the United Nations concerning the admissions problem. Austria could now "legally" be admitted in the United Nations because of the treaty with both Soviet Russia and the West. This afforded Russia a new lever because in the 1955 Austrian Treaty both the Western powers and Soviet Russia had pledged themselves to support the admission of Austria to the United Nations. Mr. Molotov, therefore, had two suggestions to propose in the United Nations. The first was a small package of six, composed of Austria, Italy, Finland and three European Soviet satellites, Bulgaria, Hungary and

⁶²New York Times, May 16, 1955.

⁶³This neutrality was seen to be a part of a neutral bloc being formed by Russia from the Baltic to the Adriatic. New York Times, May 19, 1955.

Rumania.⁶⁴ The second was a larger package of sixteen, composed of the foregoing six together with two additional Soviet satellites, Albania and Outer Mongolia, plus the following applicants supported by the West: Cambodia, Ceylon, Ireland, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal and Portugal.⁶⁵

Two separate criteria were laid down by Mr. Molotov in explanation of his package suggestions. For the small the criteria was "legality." This, as defined by Mr. Molotov, meant "states that fought on the Axis side and with which both the Soviet Union and the Western powers have signed peace treaties."⁶⁶ This was the same package as suggested before by the Soviet Union only Austria was added. The addition could be construed as a fulfillment of the treaty pledge together with previous Soviet pledges to Italy and Finland.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union would gain the admission of three satellites that had been kept out by the West on the ground that they were not peace-loving states, as was qualitatively required by the Charter.

Mr. Molotov's criterion for the large "package" was "political," with a special bow to the recent Arab-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, which recommended the admission to the United Nations of all the Asian countries, included in a package of fourteen proposed by

⁶⁴New York Times, June 22, 1955.

⁶⁵New York Times, June 28, 1955.

⁶⁶Ibid.

the Soviet Union the previous year.⁶⁷ This second package appeared to be an eleven-five division in favor of the non-communist world. Of the eleven, however, at least four could be expected to follow neutralist policies. Besides this obvious outcome, the addition of either the three nations in the first deal or the five in the second would give the Communist nations a higher ratio in the United Nations no matter what else happened.

Before a decision was reached concerning either package, Canada offered a third one in which Japan and Spain were added to the largest of Russia's packages.⁶⁸ Japan had been excluded by Mr. Molotov because, while the Western powers had signed a peace treaty with her in 1951, the Soviet Union had not done so. One reason, supposedly, for the timing of the Soviet suggested packages was that Soviet-Japanese negotiations were under way in London at that time and the prospect of United Nations membership might have induced Japan to give way on some of the disputed points.⁶⁹ Spain, under Franco, had not been included because of that nation's instability.

Twenty-seven other members, including England, backed Canada's proposal but, while the United States was in favor of the admission of Japan and Spain as well as other non-communist governments on Mr. Molotov's list, she held firm to her previous decision, that each applicant should be judged individually and on its own merits. The

⁶⁷Cf. supra, p. 173.

⁶⁸New York Times, October 4, 1955.

⁶⁹New York Times, June 28, 1955.

acceptance by twenty-seven members, however, caused the United States to abstain rather than vote against the proposal. The General Assembly voted upon the acceptance of the Canadian package.⁷⁰ The American delegate explained that abstention in votes on the membership applications of the East European countries did not imply endorsement of their regimes. He emphasized that

In fact, there is reason to hope that membership in the UN will to some extent bring the peoples of these nations closer to independence. The overriding fact is that the admission of thirteen free nations greatly outweighs whatever drawbacks there may be in admission of the others--because the thirteen would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the UN.⁷¹

At the same time Italy,⁷² Spain⁷³ and Japan⁷⁴ were putting some pressure on the United States for their lack of support in helping these three countries gain admission into the United Nations.

American declarations to the effect that the United States would not thwart the will of the qualified majority by its veto in the Security Council and a public statement by Ambassador Lodge that the United States would abstain on Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania in order to get admission of the Western-supported states had not eased the anxiety of the Japanese, the Italians and the Spaniards

⁷⁰GAOR, 32nd meeting, 1955, p. 153.

⁷¹New York Times, November 14, 1955, p. 11.

⁷²Ibid., October 23, 1955, p. 1; November 5, 1955, p. 1; December 18, 1955, p. 12.

⁷³Ibid., November 2, 1955, p. 18; November 5, 1955, p. 1.

⁷⁴Ibid., December 8, 1955, p. 14; December 18, 1955, p. 12.

along with their supporters in the United Nations.⁷⁵

Particularly disturbing were statements by Mr. Lodge that the United States was opposed to the admission of Outer Mongolia because it was not really independent but merely a province under the divided control of the Soviet Union and Red China.⁷⁶ In a secret conference between the big powers efforts to break the admissions deadlock failed. The admission of the Mongolian People's Republic was the main obstacle.⁷⁷ The Soviet delegation had made it very clear that the package deal would be vetoed unless Outer Mongolia was also included.⁷⁸ The United States delegate, before the voting on the joint resolution, had insisted on the admission of seventeen. Outer Mongolia was to be excluded from the deal.

Such stubbornness on the part of the United States undoubtedly was related to its dogged backing of Nationalist China.⁷⁹ The Chiang Government had threatened to veto the admission of Outer Mongolia even if it meant that the other applicants would also be vetoed by the opposition. The United States, even though it meant the loss of Italy, Spain and Japan to the United Nations, undeniably wanted the defeat of the en bloc proposal without being blamed for it. However, it would like the Soviet Union blamed for it and not Nationalist China. Russia's

⁷⁵Ibid., November 14, 1955, p. 1.

⁷⁶Ibid., November 11, 1955, p. 13; November 14, 1955, p. 1.

⁷⁷Ibid., November 20, 1955, pp. 1 and 2.

⁷⁸Ibid., November 15, 1955, p. 1; November 18, 1955, p. 24; December 2, 1955, p. 6.

⁷⁹Cf. supra, pp. 127-134.

hope was that if Nationalist China did veto the package deal the South American countries, who had hitherto backed Nationalist China in her refusal to admit Communist China into the United Nations, would show their displeasure by voting against Nationalist China in the future. Indeed, supporters of the package deal were threatening to expel Nationalist China from the organization if it blocked the en bloc proposal.⁸⁰

To save the Taiwan seat in the United Nations, the United States had to declare its position on Outer Mongolia⁸¹ hoping that its announced opposition might convince at least another three members of the Council to abstain from voting on Mongolia's application.⁸² This is the so-called "hidden veto" used by the United States. This, then, would prevent Mongolia's admission instead of a Chinese veto. Responsibility for the defeat of the package proposal would be shared by the abstaining Council members together with Nationalist China and the United States. Even when the potential abstainers, because under heavy pressure by supporters of the joint draft resolution, would decide not to abstain, the United States, by its declared objection to Mongolia's admission, would have shifted part of the blame away from Taiwan to itself. Hopefully, this would save the Taiwan seat in the United Nations.

Despite these attempts, Washington was not totally in agreement

⁸⁰New York Times, December 4, 1955, IV, p. 3; December 6, 1955, p. 5; December 8, 1955, p. 1.

⁸¹SCOR, 701st meeting, 1955, p. 18.

⁸²Prudente, op. cit., p. 342.

with Chiang Kai-shek. Certainly a realistic appraisal of the situation convinced Washington that the West could afford to admit Outer Mongolia. Pressure was put on Chiang. It was believed that if the United States insisted on a change of policy Chiang would not antagonize them. The very survival of his regime depended on the good will and protection of the United States. But the United States, as did the other countries, underestimated the value for the Taiwan Government of the rejection of Outer Mongolia's application. Chiang rejected three separate appeals from President Eisenhower not to cast his veto, even though it was made clear that by so doing Nationalist China would jeopardize its own chances of staying in the United Nations.⁸³

Chiang Kai-shek knew he was taking a big gamble in antagonizing the Eisenhower administration. But he calculated that Washington could not hastily withdraw its economic and military aid for fear of domestic political repercussions⁸⁴ and because Taiwan was valuable as a link in the chain of Pacific island bases. Maybe, too, he thought that in an Assembly of sixty (the number of nations in the United Nations at the time of debate the United States had a virtual power of veto to stop a move to oust Nationalist China. Timely action through the China Lobby and the right wing of the Republican Party might have given him confidence that his government could force the

⁸³New York Times, November 30, 1955, pp. 1 and 12; December 7, 1955, p. 17; December 9, 1955, pp. 1 and 4.

⁸⁴Cf. supra, p. 117, n. 4.

United States to act accordingly.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, it was a well calculated gamble and therefore shows the deep concern that Chiang had over the issue. He must have felt personal bitterness toward the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia which had contributed to his expulsion from the Chinese mainland. He was also incensed over Outer Mongolia's invasion of Peitashan. He still considered himself the leader of China and Peitashan was his territory. Non-admission of Outer Mongolia gave him a certain satisfaction, not to exclude a gain in personal prestige among his supporters because of the manner in which he had demonstrated that he was still his own boss.

Another explanation for Chiang's action could be that he had intended the veto as a bargaining weapon. It was well known that France had successfully used the threat of veto to delete the question of Algeria from the agenda of the Tenth Assembly as price for its non-opposition to the joint resolution for en bloc admission.⁸⁶ Chiang could be doing the same thing to prolong his stay in the United Nations.

A most logical explanation for the veto of Outer Mongolia's application was that Chiang wanted to disrupt the Geneva talks taking place in that year between Red China and the United States and thus delay or prevent a rapprochement between Washington and Peiping. Chiang knew that Secretary Dulles was working hard for such a

⁸⁵Mario Rossi, "New Members Shift Balance," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXV (January 15, 1956), 65.

⁸⁶New York Times, November 24, 1955, p. 6; November 25, 1955, p. 1; November 26, 1955, p. 1.

rapprochement.⁸⁷ By vetoing Outer Mongolia and thereby wrecking the package deal, he could scuttle Dulles' policy of disengagement in the Far East.

Another reason for blocking the passage of the en bloc proposal would be to prevent establishment of a precedent. This would assure that the principle of individual admission or selective membership would strictly apply. By this process and by obscuring the distinction between admission and representation, the seating of Red China could be barred indefinitely.⁸⁸

The Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, of course, had based his objections to the Mongolian application on the juridical conditions under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Those objections we have already observed. By 1955, however, there was a desire on the part of other nations to "assay the qualifications of a candidate with benevolence."⁸⁹ This was the attitude of the British delegate regarding Outer Mongolia for he said that

India, for whose political judgment we have great respect, has recognized Outer Mongolia and established diplomatic relations with it. This makes it easier for us not to press our reservations to the point of abstention, and makes it possible for us to feel justified in casting our vote in favor of that country.⁹⁰

⁸⁷William R. Frye, "18-17-16--And We Lost the Game," The Reporter, XIV (January 26, 1956), pp. 12-18.

⁸⁸Prudente, op. cit., p. 348.

⁸⁹SCOR, 701st meeting, 1955, p. 11.

⁹⁰SCOR, 703rd meeting, 1955, p. 4.

The veto of the Chinese delegate did follow much debate and delay. It was followed by the Soviet veto of all non-communist applicants. The attempt of China to prevent en bloc admission, however, was not successful because almost immediately a draft resolution was submitted again by the Soviet Union, this time omitting Outer Mongolia and Japan. The reasons were obvious and were contended by the United States particularly, but on December 14, 1955 the package deal went through regardless of United States opposition.⁹¹ Soviet Russia was attempting to cause friction between Japan and Nationalist China both of whom were backed by the United States. Moscow's aim was thwarted, however, during the debate, due to the thrice repeated Soviet veto of Japan's separate membership request.⁹² Japan could not feel friendly toward Russia after that. Pro-American Japanese stayed at the helm of the Japanese state and she did receive membership in 1956.

D. OUTER MONGOLIAN MEMBERSHIP

Soviet Russia was successful in getting the East European states into the United Nations. The need for Outer Mongolian admission was not as important to them as it was to get the states bordering the remainder of Europe into the international arena. In reality, the Mongols had not been particularly active in their attempts to become a new member of the United Nations. Of course, they were not permitted

⁹¹United Nations Document, S/3509, SCOR, 705th meeting, 1955; United Nations Document, A/AC.80/L.3/Rev. 1, GAOR, 35th meeting, 1955.

⁹²SCOR, 705th meeting, 1955, p. 3; 706th meeting, 1955, pp. 1, 3 and 20.

representation in the United Nations during the debate over possible admission.⁹³ Most of the efforts had been those of Soviet Russia and, other than the actual application for admission on June 24, 1946⁹⁴ and the reply to the Security Council on August 28, 1946,⁹⁵ there had been no direct contact with the United Nations on the part of Mongolia.

1. Activity of Mongolia

In 1956 a telegram was sent to the President of the Security Council from the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adilbish,⁹⁶ and two were sent to the Secretary-General, one from Adilbish and the other from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Tsedenbal. The contents of the two sent to the Secretary-General indicate the urgency for the Mongolian People's Republic to be admitted into the international organization.⁹⁷ The first was written before the Security

⁹³United Nations Document, S/4953.

⁹⁴Cf. supra, p. 150, n. 2.

⁹⁵Cf. supra, p. 151, n. 4.

⁹⁶United Nations Document, S/3757, Telegram from Adilbish, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, December 10, 1956.

⁹⁷Owing to opposition and the discriminatory policy pursued by certain circles in some countries, the Mongolian People's Republic still remains outside the United Nations.

The right of the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the United Nations is not disputed by the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations, as is evident from the fact that, at the Tenth session of the General Assembly, the representatives of fifty-two States, Members of the Organization, voted in favor of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations. It is particularly difficult, therefore, for the Mongolian people and its Government to

Council vote and the last after, indicating that the application was again rejected on December 12, 1956.⁹⁸ The Australian delegate, Dr. E. R. Walker, said, in explaining his abstention, that it remained doubtful whether Outer Mongolia was in a position to discharge the obligations of membership under the United Nations Charter.⁹⁹ The matter

understand the motives advanced without any justification by certain representatives to the United Nations who oppose the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations." United Nations Document, S/4953, Telegram from Tsedenbal, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, September 13, 1956.

"The vote in the Security Council on December 12, 1956 (756th meeting) on the question of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the United Nations has shown that the majority of Council members disregarded the legitimate right of the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the United Nations. The result of the voting makes it clear that certain members of the Security Council, pursuing their policy of discrimination and ignoring the precise provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning membership, prevented the necessary majority of votes from being obtained in the Security Council in favor of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic. Mongolian public opinion is especially indignant at the action of the Chiang Kai-shek representative who once again frustrated a favorable decision in the matter by using the right of veto of which he illegally disposes and by again acting as the obedient instrument of those who are opposed to peace and international cooperation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic declares that the presence of the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique under the protection of certain groups in a number of countries has harmed and will continue to harm the cause of the United Nations and is thereby undermining its authority in the eyes of the world. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, expressing the unanimous desire and will of the Mongolian people, firmly protest against the unjust decision on the question of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the United Nations." United Nations Document, S/4954, Telegram from Adilbish, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, December 13, 1956.

⁹⁸United Nations Document, A/3448, December 12, 1956; Cf. charts, supra, p. 146.

⁹⁹SCOR, 756th meeting, 1956.

was considered again during Australia's second term on the Security Council. When it was known that it would be considered, the Mongolian Foreign Minister, by that time, S. Avarzed, sent another telegram to the President of the Security Council.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, inspired by the lofty aims and principles of the United Nations set forth in its Charter, imbued with the desire to cooperate with it in realizing the noble aims of international peace and security and convinced of the right of the Mongolian People's Republic to be a member of the United Nations, hereby repeats its application for membership of the United Nations. At the same time, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic declares its readiness, as it has done ever since 1946 when it submitted its first application to assume and fulfill to the letter all the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁰⁰

A memorandum was attached containing a resume concerning State, Economic and Cultural Life in the Mongolian People's Republic.¹⁰¹ On the thirteenth of September, 1957, the application was rejected again.¹⁰²

The application was not revived for a few years after this rejection but Mongolia felt the rebuff very keenly. This can be seen in an article of S. Avarzed concerning the foreign policy of the Mongolian People's Republic. After relating the various actions that Mongolia had taken to ease international tension and consolidate peace in Asia, he criticized the fact that she was not permitted admission into the United Nations.

¹⁰⁰United Nations Document, S/3873, Telegram from Avarzed, Foreign Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, September 1, 1957.

¹⁰¹United Nations Document, S/3873/Add. 1.

¹⁰²United Nations Document, A/3662; Cf. charts, supra, p. 146.

It is precisely for peaceable purposes that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic is interested in participating in the activities of international organizations, whose purpose it is to promote peace and cooperation among the nations.

The Mongolian People's Republic, as a state which made its contribution to the struggle of the democratic forces against fascism and aggression, has a right to be a member of the United Nations called upon to be an important instrument of peace and security. Our republic, as a sovereign and peaceable state, fully meets all the requirements of Article 4 of the United Nations Charter. With the object of extending friendly cooperation with member states of the United Nations and guided by the desire to make its contribution to implementing the lofty purposes of the United Nations, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, since 1946, has repeatedly applied for the admission of our country to the United Nations, declaring its readiness to fulfill the obligations of the Charter of the Organization.

Our peaceable republic to this day, however, remains outside the United Nations solely because of the resistance of the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek clique which is under its wing. Such resistance to the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic not only flagrantly violates the United Nations Charter and ignores the lawful right of the Mongolian People's Republic to be a member of this Organization, but is also disrespectful for the will of the majority of the United Nations members and the peace-loving public which favor the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations.¹⁰³

2. Third world involvement

On April 19, 1961, the General Assembly voted to recommend to the Security Council the admission of Mongolia once again and this time the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was coupled with the request.¹⁰⁴ The importance of the Third World in relation to the major powers and the United Nations should be treated at this point.

The Western powers have no philosophy of international relations

¹⁰³S. Avarzed, "The Foreign Policy of the Mongolian People's Republic," International Affairs (Moscow), X (October, 1958), pp. 39-44.

¹⁰⁴GAOR, 989th meeting, 1961.

that can be applied directly to the Third World. Their style and policies arise from their former experience and their sense of present needs. There are significant differences among the Western powers that are obvious, however, and can best be illustrated by the distinction between United States and British or French policy with the Third World. The United States has taken greater notice of Third World opinion at the United Nations, stood behind numerous schemes for alleviating poverty and improving conditions in Africa and Asia, and devoted considerable diplomatic and scholastic resources to the further understanding of Third World affairs.¹⁰⁵ At times she has expressed muted criticism of the colonial policies of fellow members of NATO, and has tended to dissociate herself from these policies. The United States has also tried to take a different view of formerly colonial areas than either Britain or France.

The latter two powers have understandably concentrated on the countries they know best. In Britain's case this has meant emphasis on the Commonwealth as a unique association of ex-colonies with a former metropolitan power; in France's case this has meant consolidating links with the new states which speak French. The two styles are different, but the aim has been broadly the same--to capitalize upon previous connections and maintain advantages in trade and in consultation with the new sovereign states.

In Africa, one of the four main areas of the Third World, both

¹⁰⁵J. D. B. Miller, The Politics of the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 18-68, passim.

Britain and France have been concerned almost exclusively with the decolonization process and with keeping good relations with ex-colonies. The United States, with no such problem, has concentrated upon the attempt to combat Russian and Chinese influence in the new states. Economic aid has been a principal weapon. Here again, American policy has been to dissociate herself from colonial associations and emphasize the sovereignty of the new states, while hinting that Communist connections will produce no good result. The comparative balance between the major powers, since most African states gained independence, has meant that these states could largely pick and choose their sources of aid; but the fact that so many of them have proved suspicious of Russian and Chinese intentions has given the United States numerous opportunities.

Taking the three powers together, it cannot be said that they have pursued anything like a concerted Afro-Asian policy. Even when they have acted together, as in the formation of SEATO, they have quickly diverged over the lines to follow, and they were unable to find common ground over either Suez or the Congo.

The Communist powers, however, do have a philosophy of international relations that can be applied directly to the Third World. It is a mixture of dogma and necessity, as applied to relations with the various Third World countries. Since Lenin, in his Imperialism,¹⁰⁶ put these countries into a setting agreeable to militants there, Communists

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 59.

have had the advantage of a doctrine which could be expected to strike a responsive chord in colonial peoples. From the Soviet and Chinese angle, it is clear gain that much intellectual opinion in Third World countries should assume the broad truth of what Lenin wrote about economic exploitation and revolutionary situations. The difficulty comes from the assumption that successful revolutions can only be led by Communists.

Several policies were tried by Soviet Russia from endorsement of Communist parties as the only road to progress, to endorsement of national governments which follow policies agreeable to Soviet interests. This latter is the Soviet approach today, and it enables them to select their favorites amongst Third World states, giving pride of place to those which not only reject military alliances with the United States, but also denounce colonialism in militant terms and enlarge the state sector in their economies.

In Africa the Soviet Union has been active in the west, especially in Ghana-Guinea-Mali, and has been able to render solid assistance to the local governments. However, she did not gain much popularity over either the Congo or Algerian imbroglios. The establishment of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow and verbal support for the Algerian rebels were no substitute for armed assistance in the eyes of many militants. And, the role played by the Soviet Union in regard to the United Nations operations in the Congo was sufficiently ambiguous to warn African governments of the Soviet Union's primary concern for its own interests. There has also been considerable scepticism about Russian intentions in setting up special study

centers in African countries and in bringing many young Africans to Moscow for study. Centers in Kenya and Ghana have been stigmatized as training grounds for local subversion. Students in the Soviet Union have been subjected to close political control and have also encountered racial discrimination on the social plane. Apparently neither of these influences is strong enough to turn African states against Soviet policies if they find them congenial on other grounds. But they tarnish the Soviet image, as does the constant enmity between Soviet and Chinese representatives at militant conferences.

Each major power wishes to get as much support as she can from the Third World, and also to avoid trouble there. Each wishes to bring about changes. It is, however, important to recognize the difference between an approach to the Third World as a whole, and an approach to particular problems involving particular countries. Each major power would say that she has both. And in propaganda statements she would probably assert or imply that she was very devoted to the raising of the standards of Afro-Asian countries and their further development in freedom. At the United Nations, in particular, there is ample opportunity for this kind of statement. Many of the debates encourage it. Many of the votes taken are calculated largely in terms of their general propaganda effect. The concurrence of all major powers in declaratory resolutions, sponsored by Third World countries and devoted to matters such as racial discrimination, show that the major powers wish to establish themselves as agreeing with, or at least not opposing, the concerted views of the Third World.

This seemed a most important policy in 1960-61, following the

rapid increase in the number of independent African states.¹⁰⁷ Afro-Asian representation as a whole had risen considerably since the United Nations was established. Between 1946 and 1961 the Arab, Asian, and African states, taken together, increased from 25 to 47 per cent of United Nations membership. The biggest increase was among African states, which rose from 3 to 20 per cent. A degree of solidarity in the Afro-Asian countries seemed likely then and the major powers were cognizant of the impact that a Third World concept might have. While the basic form of the United Nations was not changed, its tone and purposes were altered with the increase in the number of Afro-Asian states. It was not concerned just with security, as its makers expected, but with issues of colonialism and economic development. Sometimes these issues merged with issues of security and of tension between the major powers. Because of this it was and still is important to each of the major powers to be in good standing with these developing nations. While they are rarely united in their vote--this occurs only when the issue obviously pertains to their bloc--their number is significant enough to be of consequence in General Assembly votes particularly. The issue concerning Communist China representation in the United Nations is just such an example and hence the necessary precaution taken by the United States to retain African backing.

Africa's involvement with this issue was entwined with the

¹⁰⁷Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 245-255, passim.

admission of Outer Mongolia and Mauritania into the United Nations. Mauritania's request for admission was considered along-side of Outer Mongolia's as a result of a telegram, dated November 28, 1960, from the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. It was received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on December 4, 1960,¹⁰⁸ at which time he placed it before the Security Council. During the consideration of the adoption of the agenda, the President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of the Soviet Union, moved that the Council first consider the letter dated December 3, 1960,¹⁰⁹ from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union, concerning the application of the Mongolian People's Republic. The Soviet motion was rejected by seven votes to four. In accordance with a motion by the representative of the United States to vote separately on the two requests, the Council decided, by nine votes to two,¹¹⁰ to include in its agenda the Islamic telegram. The Council further decided, by a vote of four in favor to five against, with two abstentions,¹¹¹ not to include the letter from Soviet Russia. France and Liberia, then, submitted jointly a draft resolution¹¹² to

¹⁰⁸United Nations Document, S/4563/Corr. 1.

¹⁰⁹United Nations Document, S/4569.

¹¹⁰The nine for were the United States, United Kingdom, China, France, Ceylon, Chile, Ecuador, Liberia and Turkey. The two against were Soviet Russia and the United Arab Republic.

¹¹¹In favor--Russia, United Arab Republic, France and Liberia; against--China, Ceylon, Chile, Ecuador, Turkey; abstentions--United States and United Kingdom.

¹¹²United Nations Document, S/4567/Rev. 1

recommend the admission of Mauritania but the vote was eight in favor, two against with one abstention.¹¹³ Russia, being a negative vote and a permanent member, caused the joint draft resolution to fail.

On April 19, 1961 an eleven-power draft resolution was presented by the General Assembly,¹¹⁴ noting the vote taken in the Security Council but also pointing out that no recommendation had yet been made to the General Assembly because of the opposition of a permanent member. It was also stated that in the opinion of the Assembly Mauritania fulfilled the obligations of the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly requested the Security Council to take note of this decision.

On the same day the Soviet Union added an amendment to the above draft resolution.¹¹⁵ It was designed to ensure that the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations be examined at the same time as the admission of Mauritania.

Linking the admission of Mongolia to that of the new African state put the United States and Nationalist China in a difficult position. If the Nationalists vetoed Mongolia this time, Mauritania would also be blocked, and enough of the African states might blame the Nationalists to tip the balance in favor of admitting Communist China to the United Nations when it came up again in the fall. It was at this time that certain members of the United States Congress

¹¹³In favor--United States, United Kingdom, China, France, Ceylon, Ecuador, Liberia and Turkey; against--Russia and the United Arab Republic; abstain--Chile.

¹¹⁴United Nations Document, A/L.335.

¹¹⁵United Nations Document, A/L.336.

attempted to persuade the entire Congress of the diplomatic need to back Mongolia, and hence Mauritania, in order to be able to persuade the African states to continue to side with the United States on the question of seating Communist China. Their efforts were not effective, however, as we have observed.¹¹⁶ The issue connected with it, the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, did gain a great deal of notoriety in the United States and consequently throughout the world. The Committee of One Million had kept up a steady barrage, determined that if necessary they would lead a campaign to take the United States out of the United Nations should Communist China win a seat.¹¹⁷ This noise and unrelenting opposition did win a considerable victory for the United States in regard to the vote concerning Communist China's seating. It demonstrated that the seating of Communist China was an "important question" if in no other sense at least in its repercussions on United States participation and role in the United Nations. On December 15, 1961, therefore, the General Assembly made Chinese representation an "important question," requiring a two-thirds majority.¹¹⁸

Before the above outcome was realized, however, the United States was still faced with the problem of what could happen if she lost the backing of the African States. The only hope left to Washington was to persuade Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists how important it was

¹¹⁶Cf. supra, pp. 129-133.

¹¹⁷Hilsman, op. cit., p. 349.

¹¹⁸GAOR, 16th session, 1080th meeting, December 15, 1961.

that they not veto the admission of Mongolia and provoke the African states into voting against them in the seating question. Finally he did agree to abstain rather than veto Mongolia's application for membership.¹¹⁹ The United States was successful in 1961 where she had been a failure in 1955 because of differing circumstances in the international scene. The United States had openly committed herself now to upholding Nationalist China and denying Communist China's right to a seat in the United Nations. Chiang's gamble in 1955 had assured that. The position of the United States in the United Nations was not as powerful in 1961 as Chiang had been sure it was in 1955. The African States had become a most prominent addition, especially to the General Assembly. A gamble in 1961 by Chiang could mean a loss that the United States physically could do nothing about. It was diplomatically better for him to relinquish his Mongolian stand for greater support in the bigger problem of seating Red China.

The coupling of the Mongolian People's Republic with Mauritania disturbed the Soviet Union as well as the United States. Russia did not wish any unfriendly relations with the African group which exhibited what Moscow called "progressive" attitudes. Fragmentation had occurred in Africa only in 1960 with the disruption of independence in the Congo. The groups that emerged at that time were Radicals, Moderates and Conservatives.¹²⁰ Each saw the cause of the

¹¹⁹SCOR, 971st meeting, 1961.

¹²⁰G. H. Jansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Pub., 1966), pp. 271-277, passim.

Congo crises from a different vantage point and consequently advocated different remedies for it. The differences in approach to the Congo problem by the African states were not the result of any prior grouping. Rather the groupings were produced by policy differences over the Congo. But it was not long before these differences in approach became formalised in official groupings.

The splitting process began at Abidjan in October 1960, when eleven ex-French states, all from the Conservative group, agreed to form a bloc the existence of which was confirmed in December, 1960. This group, twenty-one in all,¹²¹ assembled in Monrovia in May, 1961 and drew up a Charter for an Organization. The Charter called for the acceleration of development in the fields of economics, health and education, and for concerting political action as far as possible.

The radical Africans had already formed a group of their own. They had conferred at Casablanca in January, 1961,¹²² and had produced their own Charter and Organization. Their Charter was far more aggressively political than the mild Monrovia document. It called for unity of action in international affairs and the adoption of a policy of non-alignment, the liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, and an end to foreign military bases on the continent. It also referred to the exploitation of the national wealth and its

¹²¹Dahomey, Upper Volta, Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Gabon, Malagasy, Chad, Niger, Senegal, Mauritania, Liberia, Togo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia.

¹²²Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, United Arab Republic, Algerian Provisional Government.

equitable distribution for the benefit of the people, and intensified efforts for African co-operation.

Apart from their existing differences over the Congo the Monrovia and Casablanca Charters drew new lines of division between the African groupings. In the latter document there was the suggestion of Socialism in its mention of "the equitable distribution of wealth," which was anathema to the Conservatives. The document's statements attacking colonialism, neo-colonialism and military bases put the Casablanca countries in clear opposition to the Western Powers with whom the Monrovia countries were, to say the least, very closely associated. And for the first time, non-alignment became a divisive element in Africa. When proclaimed as the policy of the Casablanca group, it automatically became suspect to the Monrovia countries.

Two specific political issues also divided these two groupings. To please Morocco the Casablanca group denounced Mauritania, a member of the Monrovia alliance, against which Morocco had territorial claims. To please the three Arab states the group denounced Israel, with whom many of the Monrovia states had good relations.¹²³

To be sure, the Soviet Union did not wish unfriendly relations with the Casablanca group and specifically, in the case of Mauritania's admission into the United Nations, with Morocco. Morocco had charged that the admission of Mauritania would constitute a most dangerous precedent by amputating a part of her territory. Morocco's representative to the Security Council had stated that such a move

¹²³Jansen, op. cit., p. 276.

was a disruption of Morocco's unity by colonialist machinations through which the French hoped to dominate the territory, gain strategic bases and exploit her mineral riches.¹²⁴ Russia could agree with these arguments but she also favored the granting of even incomplete independence to a colony. She may not have weighed her vote so carefully had it not been that the outcome of Outer Mongolia's status was also involved. In order to obtain recognition for Mongolia it was necessary to allow recognition of Mauritania.

3. Security Council and General Assembly acceptance

We have noted Russia's proposal to place Outer Mongolia first on the agenda considering admission of the two states. Ironically, despite the diplomatic haranguing that followed this attempt, it was finally decided that the Security Council would consider the two applications in the chronological order of their submission. The President of the Security Council suggested that, while discussing the application of Mongolia, members should also indicate briefly their positions on Mauritania's application. The agenda was adopted accordingly with the application of Mongolia being taken up before that of Mauritania.¹²⁵

The representative of the Soviet Union, commending Mongolia's social, economic and cultural progress, its expanded diplomatic relations and its peace-loving foreign policy, proposed a draft resolution

¹²⁴SCOR, 971st meeting, 1961.

¹²⁵SCOR, 971st meeting, October 25, 1961.

whereby the Council would recommend that the Assembly admit the Mongolian People's Republic to membership.¹²⁶

Ceylon, Chile, Ecuador, France, Liberia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom expressed support for this proposal.

The United States representative stated that, for well-known reasons, the United States would not obstruct Mongolia's admission. Accordingly, he would abstain in the vote, out of respect for the view expressed by the General Assembly on April 19, 1961 that Mongolia was qualified for membership. The representative of China announced that he would not participate in the vote on Mongolia's application, so that no pretext might be used to delay Mauritania's admission still further, despite his delegation's conviction that Mongolia was still a Soviet colony.¹²⁷

Discussion concerning Mauritania followed and Russia, seeing that the Mongolian People's Republic would certainly be admitted at this time, determined on another attempt to ease her situation with Morocco. She would abstain in the vote concerning Mauritania. The way was opened for the admission of both countries.

On October 25, 1961 the Council voted on the Mongolian resolution. It adopted the Soviet Union's text recommending Mongolia's admission to United Nations membership by 9 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (United States); China was present but did not participate in the voting.¹²⁸

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Ibid.

¹²⁸United Nations Document, S/4968, October 25, 1961.

The General Assembly considered the Security Council's recommendations on October 27. By acclamation, it adopted on that day a resolution admitting the Mongolian People's Republic to membership in the United Nations.¹²⁹

After a fifteen year struggle the Mongolian People's Republic attained membership in the United Nations and was moved more into the world arena. World recognition of her status was most important to the proud Mongolian people. With it they felt that they could continue to grow and to better themselves and their surroundings.

4. International relations since UN membership

Among the major states having reciprocated diplomatic recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic are the Soviet Union, Communist China, India, Great Britain and France. Mongolia has not yet established diplomatic relations with the United States, the states of Latin America (except Cuba), and Japan. In the spring and summer of 1968, Japanese and Mongolian officials engaged in discussions on the subject of reciprocal diplomatic exchanges. Although the major stumbling block to exchange of diplomatic representation is the question of Japanese payment of reparations for the damage allegedly inflicted on Mongolia during the war, this is not the only problem preventing diplomatic recognition, since Japan considers she recognized Mongolia when voting for Mongolia's admission to the United

¹²⁹United Nations Document, A/L.359/Add. 2, October 27, 1961.

Nations. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations have not yet been established.¹³⁰

Outer Mongolia's alignment with those Communist nations that support the leadership of the Soviet Union in world affairs is strongly reflected in the principal treaty commitments of the Mongolian Government. The most important of these is the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Ulan Bator on January 15, 1966. This pact provided for "all necessary measures, including military steps" to be taken by both countries in the event of an attack on either by a third party. The importance of the military aspects of the Treaty was underscored by the presence of the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, in the Soviet delegation which was headed by CPSU First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

In part, the Treaty was directed against the West, but it was equally apparent that the military cooperation clauses were pointed also at Communist China. An attack against Outer Mongolia is not likely to come from Japan, whose military forces are not capable of such an offensive operation. The final communique which was issued following the signing of the Treaty was openly critical of the policies of Communist China. Reaction by the Chinese and their Albanian allies demonstrated their recognition that the Treaty's principal purpose was to counter the threat posed by China. The Albanians claimed it had an "anti-Chinese character," and aimed at

¹³⁰Trevor N. Dupuy, Wendell Blanchard, et al., Area Handbook for Mongolia (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 240-260, passim.

making Outer Mongolia into a "colonial base of supply for the Soviet revisionists" against the Chinese People's Republic.

In addition to the fundamental treaty discussed above, Outer Mongolia is aligned with all other Communist states through a series of bilateral agreements relating to trade, economic and cultural matters.

With the continuing deterioration of Mongolia's relations with Communist China, its formal treaty ties with that country have also become less meaningful. In 1962, a Sino-Mongolian border demarcation agreement was entered into. Its final implementing protocol was signed in June, 1964. All that is known of the protocol's effectiveness is that Mongolia and the Soviet Union promptly revised their maps to agree with the demarcation line, while so far as is known, the Chinese have not.¹³¹ Especially in the Altai and Gobi regions, the Chinese maps show the boundary as well on the Mongolian side of the demarcation line. In late 1965 and in 1966, the Chinese protested against incursions by Mongolian border guards, but it is not known to which boundary line they were referring. Relations continued to deteriorate in 1967. In May the Mongolians expelled three Chinese school teachers for spreading Maoist propaganda. On their departure a Tass report stated that four-hundred Chinese, egged on by embassy personnel, rioted at the station.¹³² In Peking, this set off a series of demonstrations at the Mongolian Embassy, culminating in

¹³¹Ibid., p. 252.

¹³²Ibid., p. 259.

August in an invasion and vandalizing of the Embassy building.

Protests and counterprotests were exchanged.

The policies pursued by Outer Mongolia in the United Nations since her entry have been almost indistinguishable from those of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the fears of the United States and Nationalist China, Mongolia has played no part at all in the "two Chinas" issue. It would appear that her membership has lost its former significance now that she has been admitted to the International Organization. Mongolia has been an active member of United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and as such it organized a United Nations seminar on "Women in Public Life" which convened in Ulan Bator in August 1966.

The Mongolian People's Republic also belongs to the United Nations World Health Organization, the Economic Council for Asia and the Far East, the International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the World Meteorological Organization. Outside the United Nations, Mongolia is a member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, with headquarters in Moscow, and of the Organization for the Collaboration of Railways located at Warsaw, Poland. It has subscribed to the 1963 nuclear test-ban treaty. In 1963, the United Nations technical assistance board approved an initial program of \$300,000 for the training of Mongolians by foreign specialists.¹³³

Since June 1962, the Mongolian People's Republic has been a

¹³³Ibid., p. 293.

member of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON), an economic association binding together most of the Communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Mongolia is the only Asian Communist member state, an index of her strategic importance and loyalty to the Soviet Union. She participates fully in all of the commissions of the COMECON which relate to her own economy, and Ulan Bator is the capital in which the Geological Commission meets. Through the COMECON, Mongolia's economy is integrated with those of the other member states, and her current five-year plan was adopted only after it was completely harmonized with the economic plans of the other member states.

In overall consideration Outer Mongolia remains a land of extensive territory, few people and much livestock, a land of blue sky and cold winds, a severe climate and little water. She is still landlocked between the same giant neighbors, Russia and China. Mongolia is still not an entirely independent country, as she has not been for many centuries. Her control of her own affairs, however, appears to be greater than it has been for a long time. Many small countries generally accepted in today's world enjoy no greater independence.

This has all been no story of unmitigated tragedy, nor of overwhelming victory; it has been the bitter-sweet tale of a very small people and very remote country in a very large and increasingly more integrated world. Many similar peoples and cultures have fared much worse. But somehow the world is the less when a culture and a way of life disappears. Those who hate Communism can find fuel for their hatred here; those who believe in it can stoke their furnaces, too. And there still remain a few Mongols in the present time who gather sheep dung for their own little fires in their felt tents; take in the lambs to share their hearth on cold spring nights; and repeat centuries-old tales of glorious ancestors and gods.

But their children go to school, take baths, play volleyball, struggle to master the Russian language, learn to curse Ghinggis Khan and the Buddhist religion, and participate in the Twentieth Century.¹³⁴

¹³⁴Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, p. 363.

CONCLUSION

Outer Mongolia's membership in the United Nations was the crowning of many years of internal and external efforts and the beginning of increased involvement in activities and affairs beyond the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. It seems reasonable to believe that, in a very quiet way and probably unnoticed by the rest of the world, Outer Mongolia will continue to grow economically, socially and politically. The Soviet Union will certainly see to that for, of the nations active in Mongolia's entrance on the international scene, Russia contributed the greatest share.

The Soviet Union exerts influence in Mongolia through formal diplomatic relations, trade and aid, and institutional, cultural and educational predominance. Soviet models obviously inspired the Mongolian Constitution, the single political party, the Marxist-Leninist orientation, the schools and the textbooks.

A long anti-Chinese tradition in Mongolia favors the Russians, but the huge Chinese population in bordering North China, and the slight Russian population in bordering Eastern Siberia, favors the Chinese. With Outer Mongolia's extensive territory and few people, there always exists a labor shortage which the Chinese could meet and

the Russians cannot. And while the Mongols have long expressed hatred of the Chinese, they also long depended on them for many varieties of hard labor.

Mongols have generally reached out hungrily for contacts beyond Russia and China, contacts with Eastern Europe, with uncommitted countries, and with the West. They have enjoyed and appreciated benefits of de-Stalinization and the thaw. China in its opposition to the detente and peaceful coexistence thereby runs counter to Mongolian desires. The Mongols must always fear that one or the other of their huge neighbors will eliminate their independence and snuff out their cultural entity. Many Mongols interpret foreign contact, and hopefully official foreign recognition, as helping them to withstand such pressures. To the United States and other Western countries it may appear to be of little significance whether Outer Mongolia is a nominally independent Communist satellite, or an integral administrative part of the Soviet Union or China, but the Mongols value even limited independence. At the present time most of the Russians have withdrawn from the country, and Chinese came in only as laborers, so that Mongols run their own affairs to a very real extent, and they like it that way.

Mongolia's future depends to a large degree on the course of overall Sino-Soviet relations. She has been used for many years as a bone of contention significant of the bigger problem between her two neighbors. The United States saw this and evaluated its importance, and obviously still considers it sensitive enough not to have extended diplomatic relations. United States feelings and

those of Nationalist China are reflected in the United Nations proceedings throughout the fifteen years of Outer Mongolia's attempts at admission.

United States friendship for Nationalist China and her commitment to that country bogged down proceedings pertaining to the Outer Mongolian request. The leverage that Chiang Kai-shek held over the United States seems inordinately strong considering the position that America holds. Nevertheless it was there and it played a decisive role in the United States attitude toward Outer Mongolia. The vote in 1961, itself, shows that both the United States and Nationalist China still feared the ultimate results of voting in the affirmative. Yet, the appearance and potential of the Third World put them in a position where their ultimate desires were being jeopardized.

These Afro-Asian States had catapulted to prominence in a very short amount of time and in the process had become a potential opponent or ally in United Nations decisions. As the General Assembly grew in number due to the admission of these states, United States leadership in that organ decreased. Incurring their animosity only could prove to be unfavorable for the United States and Nationalist China in their principal concern over the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. The result was favorable for Outer Mongolia and shaky for the United States and Nationalist China.

Inner Mongolia will undoubtedly continue as part of China, while Outer Mongolia will continue under Russian indirect hegemony. Why does the Soviet Union not simply incorporate Mongolia into the USSR as an Autonomous Republic or other administrative unit, since it

already exerts such great influence there? Such a move would presumably put an end to any possible dalliance with China, and this could cause open conflict--something neither side wants.

An "independent" Mongolia has been for many years a useful pawn in Soviet relations with China. An outside possibility long existed that Mongolia could be "returned" to China in exchange for some other important Chinese concessions. The "independent" Mongolia also might yet serve as some sort of bridge to improve Soviet-Chinese relations.

It also proved useful for the Soviet Union to have a "buffer" separating Russian territory from Chinese, which permitted border incidents and military "adventures" to be handled indirectly, without involving Moscow-Peking or Moscow-Tokyo direct negotiations.

As an "independent" country today, the Mongolian People's Republic in the United Nations adds a vote to the Soviet bloc, and it serves as a useful supporter of the Soviet Union in Asian and Afro-Asian meetings where the Chinese work to exclude the Soviet Union as a "European" and "white" power.

"Independence" does of course give Mongolia some things it would not have as a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. United Nations membership is one of the most important. There is also membership in other international organizations, including the 1964 Winter Olympics, participation in which greatly pleased the Mongols. The Mongols maintain their own embassies in Peking, Delhi, and London, as well as in many other capitals in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Membership in COMECON also adds to Mongolia's prestige. And, of course, the psychological appeal of "independence" is very

great. As an independent country, the Mongolian People's Republic maintains a large bureaucratic governmental apparatus providing very good jobs for many of its own people, and it can at least pretend to control its own affairs to a far greater extent than it could as a part of the USSR. The country now possesses at least some of the attributes of "equality" which accrue to every recognized sovereign nation, and do not accrue to anyone else.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1727 Russo-Chinese Treaty of Kiakhta establishing frontier demarcations, etc.
- 1860 Establishment of first Russian trading firm in Urga
- 1861 Opening of first Russian Consulate in Urga
- 1905-11 New Chinese policy of active interference and economic penetration in Outer Mongolia
- 1905 Mongols apply to Russian Consul in Urga for "advice and protection"
- 1907 (July) Secret Russo-Japanese Convention recognizing special interest of Russia in Outer Mongolia
- 1910 Khutukhtu of Urga appeals to Russia. Mongols oppose measures proposed by Peking Government.
- 1911 (July) Delegation of Outer Mongolian princes in St. Petersburg asks for Russian protection
- (Autumn) Increasing disorders in China
- (November) Outer Mongolian (Khalkha) princes declare their independence and proclaim Khutukhtu of Urga as Ruler of Mongolia
- 1912 (January) End of Manchu Dynasty. Proclamation of Chinese Republic
- (Early) Mongol tribes of Urianghai, Barga and a few of Inner Mongolia declare their allegiance to Urga
- (November 3) Russo-Mongolian agreement concluded in Urga signifying Russian support for Mongolian autonomy, but not supporting Outer Mongolian claims on Urianghai, Barga, or parts of Inner Mongolia

- 1913 (November 5) Russo-Chinese Declaration recognizing Outer Mongolian autonomy
- 1914 (January) Urga Kutukhtu sends letter to Emperor of Japan asking for help in struggle for Mongol unity and for a Japanese representative in Urga. Japan refuses to accept the letter.
- (May) French, British, German and U. S. Ministers in Peking receive letters from Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs informing them of the establishment of Mongolian independence and conditions of treaty of commerce with Russia
- (July) Russo-Mongol Loan and Arms agreements
- (September) Russo-Mongol Railway and Telegraph agreements
- 1915 (June) Tripartite Treaty of Kiakhta between Russia, China and Outer Mongolia recognizing autonomy of Outer Mongolia and China's suzerainty.
- 1917 (February-September) Fall of Tsarist regime. Provisional Government
- (October) Bolshevik Revolution. New regime denounces all "imperialist" treaties and rights derived from them
- 1919 (November 22) Cancellation of autonomy of Outer Mongolia by President of Chinese Republic. General Hsü in Urga
- 1921 (February) Urga taken by White Russian forces under Baron Ungern Sternberg
- (March) Provisional Revolutionary Mongol Government proclaimed at Kiakhta
- (June 22) Baron Ungern Sternberg defeated and captured by Bolsheviks
- (July) Mongolian People's Revolutionary and Soviet troops enter Urga. Outer Mongolia again declared independent
- (November 5) Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship concluded in Moscow

- (November) Soviet Government recognizes independence of Urian-ghai (Tanna Tuva) after having crushed attempt by old Mongol official class in Ruianghai to effect unity with Outer Mongolia
- 1923 Establishment of Buriat Mongol Autonomous S.S.R.
- 1924 (May 31) Soviet-Chinese agreement on Outer Mongolia recognizing China's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and promising withdrawal of Soviet troops
- (June) Mongol Industrial and Commercial Bank (with monopoly status) founded
- (July) Death of Khutukhtu of Urga (No new incarnation searches permitted)
- (August) Mongolian People's Republic proclaimed
- (November) Text of Constitution of MPR approved by the first Great Khural of the MPR
- 1925 (Early) Soviet-Mongolian exchange of notes concerning withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia
- 1927 Tanaka Memorial to Japanese Emperor expounding, i.e., Japanese aims in Mongolia
- 1929-32 "Left-wing" attempts at a hasty socialization of Mongolian economy
- 1931-32 Japan invades Manchuria. Creation of Manchukuo gives Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia a new neighbor
- 1932-33 Reckless socialization program replaced by more moderate policy
- 1934 Soviet-Mongolian agreements signed: on currency exchange rates, on Soviet-Mongol trade, for the delivery of goods to Mongols on preferential terms of gold, on joint companies, on terms of employment of Soviet workers
- (November 27) Soviet-MPR "Gentlemen's Agreement"
- 1935 (Middle) Border Incidents on Mongolian-Manchukuo frontier. MPR government refuses to admit Manchukuo representatives

- (December) New border incidents near Buir Nor. MPR Government files strong protest to Changchun authorities
- 1936 (March 12) Soviet-Mongol Protocol of Mutual Assistance. Soviet troops again in Outer Mongolia
- 1937 (July 7) Japan begins attack on North China
- 1938 (Early) Japanese occupy greater part of Inner Mongolia (Chahar and Suiyuan)
- 1939 (May 11) Fighting starts on the Mongolian-Manchukuo border (in the Nomonkhan district, east of Buir Nor)
- (June) Tanks and airplanes participate in battle between Soviet-Mongol and Japanese-Manchukuo troops. Implementation of Soviet-Mongol Mutual Assistance Pact of 1936
- (September 16) Truce effected and Mongol-Manchukuo border commission set up
- 1939-40 (September-March) Border Commission makes no progress
- 1940 New Constitution of Mongolian People's Republic
- 1941 (April 13) Declaration attached to Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact pledging respect of territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo and of the MPR
- (May 28) Mongolian-Manchukuo Border Commission reassembles at Chita and decides to begin work of demarcation on June 27
- 1944 People's Republic of Tannu-Tuva becomes Tuvinian Autonomous Republic of USSR
- 1945 (August 8) USSR declares war on Japan. United States fliers drop atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan
- (August 9) Soviet forces launch drive into Manchuria
- (August 10) MPR declares war on Japan
- (August 14) Japan surrenders unconditionally to Allies, Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between USSR and Chinese Republic. Exchange of notes regarding Outer Mongolia in which Chinese Government agrees to a plebiscite of the people of Outer Mongolia

- regarding the independence of Outer Mongolia
- (August) Chinese Communist forces occupy Chahar and Jehol
- (October 20) Plebiscite is held in MPR on independence issue
- 1946 (January 5) China recognizes independence of Outer Mongolia
- (February 13) Establishment of diplomatic relations between Chinese Republic and MPR agreed upon, but not subsequently realized
- (February 27) Soviet-Mongol Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and Agreement on Economic and Cultural Collaboration concluded
- (June 24) Application of MPR for membership in United Nations
- (August 28) MPR Government answers questionnaire sent by the Acting Secretary General of UN
- (August 30) Security Council rejects application for membership (China votes in favor)
- 1947 (June) Mongol-Chinese border incidents in the Peitashan area along Sinkiang-Mongolian frontier. Chinese and Mongolian protests and counter-protests
- (August) Security Council of UN again rejects application for membership of MPR (China votes against admission)
- 1948 (January) Five Year Plan published in Ulan Bator
- 1949 (October 1) Chinese Communists in Peking; proclamation of "Chinese People's Republic"
- (November 7) First train of railroad connecting Ulan Bator to Trans-Siberian arrived in Ulan Bator
- 1952 (January 28) Death of Choibalsan
- (May 28) Tsedenbal announced as new Prime Minister of MPR
- (October 4) Ten-year Sino-Mongolian Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement
- 1953 (March 5) Death of Stalin

- 1953-57 MPR's Second Five Year Plan
- 1955 (May) Arrival of first Chinese laborers in MPR
- 1956 Withdrawal of last Russian soldiers from MPR
- (January 1) Completion of Ulan Bator-Chining Railroad ("Trans-Mongolian Railroad")
- 1957 Beginning of vigorous collectivization campaign in MPR
- (Early) MPR established consulate at Kùke Khoto, IMAR
- (May 15) Bulganin-Tsedenbal Joint Statement
- (August 31-September 27, 1960) Molotov served as USSR Ambassador to MPR
- 1958 (July 7) Buryat Mongolian ASSR became Buryat ASSR
- (November-March, 1959) Extensive purge of MPR Government and Party, including removal of Damba as First Secretary, MPRP
- 1958-60 MPR's Three-Year Plan
- 1959 (September) First International Congress of Mongolists, Ulan Bator
- 1960 (July 6) Adoption of new MPR Constitution
- (September) Sino-Mongolian agreement providing for continued supply of Chinese laborers to MPR
- 1961 MPR's Third Five-Year Plan
- (April 26) Sino-MPR trade agreement signed
- (May 5) Last reported arrival of Chinese workers in MPR
- (October 10) Tuvan Autonomous Oblast became Tuvan ASSR
- (October 27) MPR admitted to United Nations
- 1962 (June) MPR admitted to COMECON

- (November 17) Talks in Ulan Bator concerning Sino-MPR border agreement
- (December 26) Signing of Sino-MPR Border Treaty in Peking
- 1963 (May) Great Britain established diplomatic relations with MPR
- (May 28) Announcement of \$300,000 UN technical assistance to MPR
- (August 8) MPR signed nuclear test-ban treaty
- 1964 (January 20) Sino-MPR trade treaty signed
- 1966 (January 15) Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
- (August) UN seminar on "Women in Public Life" in Ulan Bator
- 1967 (May) Expulsion of three Chinese school teachers from MPR for spreading Maoist propaganda
- (August) Vandalizing of MPR Embassy building in Peking
- 1968 (Spring and Summer) Japanese-Mongolian discussions on reciprocal diplomatic exchanges

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INTERVIEW

Jargalsaikhan, Bayaryn. Interview held in United Nations Building,
May, 1970.

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United Nations Admission of the Mongolian People's Republic.

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The Mongolian People's Republic was able to achieve membership in the United Nations Organization only after solving a number of internal problems and surmounting serious external obstacles. Mongolia became a candidate for admission into the United Nations in 1946 after her participation in the Pacific War as an ally of the Soviet Union. In the fifteen years it took to attain membership Mongolia received economic and political aid from both Russia and Communist China, who were vying for leadership in their neighbor's affairs. This aid was most effective in helping Outer Mongolia attain a more prominent position in the world arena. It was also indicative of the value of a solely Communistic-backed assistance program.

Mongolia's position regarding Russia and China was defined in 1727 in favor of China. By 1924 sides had switched several times leading to the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic as a satellite to Soviet Russia. This relationship allowed for a Communist oriented industrial revolution. That which gave impetus to the overall modernization of Outer Mongolia was a renewed interest by

Communist China in the 1950's of again absorbing that country into China Proper. The dual interest of this Communist state and that of Russia gave evidence of the friction smoldering between these two nations. Early signs of the Sino-Soviet conflict centered in Outer Mongolia some time before the West was aware of its existence. Consequently Communist China had mixed feelings concerning the issue of Mongolian membership in the United Nations. Once Mongolia was admitted the Communist Chinese could no longer make their wish for unification a reality. Using Mongolian admission, however, as a lever for their own possible admission could not be ignored. Red China had no vote in the United Nations but her concerns and possible actions were ever present in the minds of those who did.

Member states of the United Nations consistently showed uncertainty about admitting Outer Mongolia into the international organization. This bias was based on power politics rather than adherence to the Charter requirements. United Nations official records show that it was the latter, however, that formed the substance of legal debate. The stipulations stated in Article 4 of the United Nations Charter were thoroughly scrutinized regarding Mongolian ability to carry out its specifications. The extraneous condition of en bloc membership was raised in an attempt to solve certain problems concerning a balance of power in the United Nations. Outer Mongolia was included but was faced with negative results.

The principal issue preventing affirmative votes was United States and Nationalist Chinese fear that Outer Mongolia's admission would open the way for Communist Chinese membership. The United

States Congressional Records document the reticence of Congress to break with Nationalist China over this matter. The China Lobby likewise showed determination in holding the United States government to her pledge to Chiang Kai-shek. These attempts were successful until the African state of Mauritania was coupled with Outer Mongolia in seeking admission. The presence of the ever-growing Afro-Asian states in the General Assembly caused the United States and Nationalist China to abstain in a final vote for Outer Mongolian admission. The need for Third World backing over the greater issue of admission of Communist China prompted this.

The desires of the Mongolian People's Republic came a little closer to being realized when she gained the affirmative vote of the Security Council in October, 1961. Mongolia knew that independence in the literal sense of the word could never be attained. But this new position on the international scene did place the country higher on the ladder than it had ever been and assured the Mongolian People's Republic of her identity. Likelihood of being absorbed into the USSR was almost nil. At present, Outer Mongolia possesses at least some of the attributes of "equality" which accrue to every recognized sovereign nation, and do not accrue to states of lesser status.

VITA

Sister Mary Aline Henderson, daughter of Charles and Lucile Stump Henderson, was born on November 5, 1932, in Charleston, West Virginia. She attended Charleston Catholic High School, Charleston, and was graduated in June 1950.

She entered the Novitiate of the Sisters of Saint Francis of Penance and Christian Charity at Stella Niagara, New York in September 1950. At the same time she entered Rosary Hill College and received the degree of Bachelor of Science, cum laude, in August 1959.

After having taught between 1953 and 1965 in various elementary and high schools staffed by members of her order she was made an Instructor at Rosary Hill College in September 1965. She was promoted to the rank of Assistant Professor in 1968.

In July 1962 she was accepted as a graduate student in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Seton Hall University, where she majored in History of Asiatic Areas under the mentorship of Professor Paul Tsai, Ph.D. She received the degree of Master of Arts in June 1967.

In September 1968 she was granted a leave of absence from Rosary Hill College to pursue doctoral studies as a graduate student in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Fordham University, where she majored in Political Science under the mentorship of Professor Peter P. Remeck, Ph.D.